The Migrant Economy During the Pandemic: An Exploratory Study in Baisi Block, Bihar

Migration from India’s villages is linked to poverty, the lack of livelihood opportunities and, in some States, feudal structures that dominate rural societies. COVID-19 and the lockdown implemented on March 24, 2020, to contain the spread of the pandemic resulted in traumatic conditions for migrant workers stranded across India. Bihar is second only to Uttar Pradesh in the number of out-migrants. In this Policy Watch, Girija Shankar and Rakhi Kumari discuss the impact of the COVID-19 lockdown in Baisi, a block (sub-district) in Bihar, from where workers move to 17 States and Nepal as short-term migrants. In an exploratory study conducted in April 2020, they find that the lockdown resulted in drastic changes in villages: the rural economy was disrupted, spending priorities had changed, and savings and investments fell. Interventions by the Union and State governments appeared to have a minimal effect on boosting demand and providing sustainable income support opportunities. CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION II. THE MIGRANTS FROM BAISI III. THE DISRUPTED MIGRANT ECONOMY IV. THE IMPACT OF THE PANDEMIC ON SPENDING PATTERNS V. REVIVING RURAL BIHAR – AN UPHILL TASK I. INTRODUCTION Bihar, with nearly three times the national population density and about a third of its urbanisation rate, has been a source State for internal migration for centuries. 1 It is India’s most densely populated State (1,102 persons/per square kilometre), compared with a national average of 382. 2 Moreover, with only 11.30 per cent if its population living in urban areas, it naturally follows that Bihar’s population is predominantly rural (88.70 per cent). The Bihar Economic Survey 2019-20, provides sectoral growth rates in GDP/GSDP 3 from 2013 to 2019. 4 Figure 1 shows the growth in GDP/GSDP in the secondary (manufacturing, EGWUS, 5 and construction) and tertiary sectors (transport, communications, and storage), and a sharp decline in the primary sector (agriculture and allied activities) in 2018-19. Picture1jpg Source : Bihar Economic Survey 2019-20. The State’s poor performance in development indicators has placed it in a cluster referred to as the BIMARU, 6 an acronym for Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh (U.P.). The State has high levels of poverty and illiteracy, a defunct health care system, and a corrupt political administration. However, the situation was not the same historically, as the region was the seat of empires in ancient India. There are several reasons behind the economic decline of Bihar from its ancient glory despite its rich alluvial river valley and generous natural resource endowment. Economic policies and the State’s decline One view on the economic deterioration in the modern period is that it began with the introduction of opium and indigo farming at the behest of the British in the 1920s, which took over almost entirely the land under sugarcane cultivation. Around the same time, the textile industry, which began in the early nineteenth century and sustained about 60,000 people in the region, was also on the decline 7 , 8 due to a combination of social, economic, and political factors. According to Rasul and Sharma, the process of marginalisation, which began during the colonial rule, was “further reinforced by the [Union] government’s policy of ‘freight equalization’, which nullified the comparative advantage of Bihar and U.P. in natural resources by subsidizing railway freights of industrial inputs like coal, iron ore, steel, cement, and other bulk resources…which undermined the State’s “capacity to invest in health, education, and other social and physical infrastructure, and resulted in low human development.” 9 Added to these factors is the reality that people employed in the agricultural sector had among the lowest wages across the country. Between 1987-88 and 1989-90, the average per capita income (at current prices) in the agriculture sector was ₹948, against the national average of ₹1,522. This deficit was primarily due to a severe lack of research facilities and technology support, and institutional backwardness. In 1989-90, the per capita net value added 10 in the manufacturing factory sector in Bihar was only ₹305, against the national average at ₹514. 11 Nevertheless, in recent years, the Bihar government has claimed that the poverty ratio has reduced compared with previous years. 12 Migration, an escape from economic and social subjugation A historical trait that has dotted Bihar’s socio-economic landscape is out-migration. As per the estimate of the Economic Survey of India 2017 , inter-State migration in India was close to nine million between 2011 and 2016, with the highest number of migrants hailing from U.P. and Bihar, followed by Madhya Pradesh, Punjab, Rajasthan, Uttarakhand, Jammu and Kashmir, and West Bengal. 13 Migration from Bihar can be traced back to the 1830s when people were moved as indentured labourers to the British colonies of Mauritius, Guyana, Trinidad, and Fiji. In the 1960s during the spread of the Green Revolution, migration began to Calcutta (now Kolkata), the capital of West Bengal, and in the 1990s and the 2000s, people started moving across the country. 14 This phenomenon of outward migration from Bihar is intricately linked to poverty, the lack of livelihood opportunities, and the prevalence of feudalism in the agriculture sector. In Migration and livelihood in historical perspective: A case study of Bihar, India, Arjan de Haan 15 discussed a unique pattern of migration that existed for 100 years, where the work offered was relatively permanent in nature. Unskilled labourers migrated to the industries in Kolkata while their roots remained in the villages of their origin. Their savings were first spent on the basic needs of the family and then on asset creation, like buying agricultural land. 16 In his speech at the United Nations General Assembly in 2006 on international migration, the then Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, pointed out that “Migration is a courageous expression of an individual’s will to overcome adversity and live a better life”. 17 Mobility is the inherent characteristic of an individual. As the World Migration Report 2020, highlights, it “appears to be closely linked with the level of development in each country, which, in turn, is linked with the distribution of the population in each country”. 18 It is the result of the individual’s endeavour towards a social, political, spiritual, economic, and environmental balance. However, the proximate reasons for migration have always changed with time and space. Figure 2 shows the change in the reasons and destinations for migration over the period of a decade. Picture2jpg Source : Report of the Working Group on Migration, Govt. of India, 2017. 19 Migration and the migrants have always been a serious branch of inquiry among researchers and have fascinated policymakers. Development expert de Haan, in his work on migration 20 in Bihar, focused on “how migration has been caused by and in turn influences poverty and livelihoods for men and women”. Dutta and Mishra focused on the impact of male migration on the lives of the women in Bihar. 21 They pointed out that male migration functioned as the catalyst for enhancing women’s mobility, even as their burden of work increased in agriculture. Although most women remained in jobs that conformed to their traditional roles; in some communities, the women switched over to other occupations. In terms of changes in the pattern of household behaviour, the decision on spending of money was taken by the women even in castes placed lower in the social hierarchy. The Government of India sees migration as an opportunity. Its Report of the Working Group on Migration highlights the view that migrants “fuel the Indian economy by carrying human capital to regions where it is needed, and enabling the acquisition of new skills and a better standard of living”. 22 Definitional framework of migrants in India Studies on migration in India are shaped by official definitions. In addition to migration figures based on place of birth and duration of migration, data are also available on migration by place of last residence, which are more accurate in analysing current migration. According to the Census of India 2001’s Data Highlights - Migration Tables, 23 “A person is considered as migrant by place of birth if the place in which he is enumerated during the census is other than his place of birth. As a person could have migrated a number of times during his lifetime, migration by place of birth would not give a correct picture of the migration taking place currently. A person, on the other hand, is considered as migrant by place of last residence, if the place in which he is enumerated during the census is other than his place of immediate last residence. By capturing the latest of the migrations in cases where persons have migrated more than once, this concept would give a better picture of current migration scenario.” The National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO), in its 64 th survey, 24 defines migration and migrants 25 as follows: Those movements which resulted in change of the usual place of residence (UPR) 26 of the individuals were treated as migration and a household member whose last usual place of residence was different from the present place of enumeration was considered a migrant. [Emphasis added]. Return to Contents II. THE MIGRANTS FROM BAISI India’s internal migration numbers (from rural to other rural areas and urban areas) stood at 73.8 million during the decade ending 2001. 27 The COVID-19 pandemic has rendered India’s migrant workforce vulnerable, especially those working in the informal sector. In addition to comprehensive government support in health, cash transfer, and other social programmes, these migrants need protection from discrimination. 28 The plight of the migrant workers after the lockdown was imposed was traumatic: images and videos of the multitude treading the roads on foot or by any other means—children in tow, carrying whatever they considered valuable—to make their way home stirred the soul of the nation. The workers, who were termed the “fuel of the Indian economy”, were suddenly considered liabilities. The Union and State governments, as was required of them, did put in place some relief measures 29 but they were clearly overwhelmed by the sheer magnitude and suddenness of the reverse migration. Soon, the need to recount the figures of the migrants became an urgent requirement, exposing the manner in which the Inter-State Migrant Workmen Act, 1979, had been given the go-by in the past. As opinion-writers had correctly pointed out: “In the immediate aftermath of the lockdown, state governments were taken unawares by inter-state migrants who were desperate to return home. Many had lost jobs, would not be able to afford rent and were afraid of falling seriously ill away from their families. The full and proper implementation of this law would have meant that state governments had complete details of inter-state migrant workmen coming through contractors within their states. While this would still leave out migrants who move across states on their own, a large segment would be automatically registered due to the requirements of the Act. States would consequently have been better prepared to take steps to protect such workmen during this lockdown. However, almost no state seems to have implemented this law in letter and spirit.” 30 Decades of indifference to this important legislation to safeguard migrant labourers was evident when Governments were unable to provide even estimates, thereby affecting relief work. 31 Baisi’s migrants – patterns and reasons Baisi block in Bihar’s north-eastern Purnia 32 district is a remote block with 45,092 households and a population of 2,27,706. Illiteracy is acute, with only 73,825 persons registered as literate (32.42 per cent). 33 A majority of its population are Muslims and most of them are migrant workers. 34 The Mahananda River that flows through the block, floods its plains almost every monsoon leaving behind very fertile soil. A major chunk of the population are “non-workers”, who, in all probability, migrate mainly to Gujarat, Maharashtra, Rajasthan, Delhi, U.P., and Haryana. Some migration to 17 other States and Nepal also takes place. Picture3jpg Source : Government of Bihar [ https://purnea.nic.in/about-district/map-of-district/ ] The weighted mean of the distance travelled by the outward migrants from Baisi block is 1,727.23 km. The sector in which they find employment determines the duration of migration. Agricultural labourers migrate for 45 days-60 days in a year during the sowing and harvesting seasons; in the construction sector, migration is for 6 months-8 months depending upon the contractors and the contract; and in tailoring it is for 8 months-10 months. If migration from the villages is for a short period of time, it is either circular migration 35 or seasonal migration 36 (as in the case of agriculture). Although migration theories view such movement of the workforce simply as consequence of economic development, 37 reasons for migration may vary depending on the socio-economic condition of the individuals. For some it could be for medical purposes, marriage, or to earn money to repay loans, while for others it could be to shore up savings to construct a house, or for other forms of asset creation. Higher wages and easy availability of work are, therefore, also factors that attract migrants to venture out of the comfort of their villages/towns. Migrant workers in Bihar generally move in groups and follow familiar patterns. Workers from a particular village/town migrate to the same State and take up the same occupation (Table 2.); they sometimes find employment in the same company that is referred to them either by their family members or by the contractor. Migration to the same profession from the same village depends on the “caste structure” of that village. For example, members of the Sharma 38 community in Chopara often find employment as carpenters in Gujarat. The highest number of migrant workers engaged in carpentry is from the Chopara Panchayat, in tailoring from Minapur, and in construction from Bangaon (Table 1). Table 1: Profession and Panchayat-wise Percentage of Migrants Migrated From Agricultural worker Carpenter Construction Tailoring ASJA MAWAIA11.573.812.105.61 BANGAON0.523.9315.876.50 CHIRAIA12.1011.4511.467.98 CHOPARA12.6313.603.982.90 GANGHAR0.006.202.577.78 MALHARYA3.158.234.749.16 MINAPUR27.893.6915.7319.36 PURANAGANJ1.0513.249.5610.44 SADIPUR BHATHA3.1510.149.093.54 SIRIPUR MALLAHTOLI0.007.152.17.04 Other Panchayats27.9418.5622.8019.69 Grand Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 Source : Primary data collected by authors from migrant workers in quarantine. Although a majority of the migrants are employed in tailoring, construction, and carpentry, others take up different trades. Table 2 presents the professions generally taken up by migrants from the Baisi block. Table 2: Occupations of migrant workers from Baisi Block Migrant Occupation Number of Migrants Percentage Agricultural worker1903.83 Carpenter83816.85 Construction1,47429.63 Cook360.72 Driver80.16 Electrician90.18 House Keeping30.06 Marketing60.12 Mechanic100.20 Other711.43 Retail Sector140.28 Tailoring2,02940.79 Teacher10.02 Technician2855.73 Grand Total 4,974 100.00 Source : Official records maintained for the quarantine of the migrant workers. A major chunk of this migrant workforce is employed in tailoring (40.79 per cent), followed by construction (29.63 per cent) and carpentry (16.85 per cent). Migration begins at a very young age for the residents of Baisi; the youngest among the migrants were found to be 10-year-olds who migrated to Delhi and Rajasthan to work in the construction sector and/or tailoring units. Mohamed Afraz of Harintor Panchayat, a village of 784 houses and a population of 3,867, 39 migrated with his maternal uncle to Rajasthan to be employed in a sports tailoring unit when he was 14 years old. Initially, he worked with his maternal uncle and gradually acquired the skills required to move into the job market. Now he is 22 years old and stitches 8-10 pieces of sports material a day. He is paid on a piece rate basis and ends up earning, on an average, ₹15,000 to ₹20,000 per month. 40 He and his five brothers own less than half-an-acre of agricultural land in which he has a small share. The land is looked after by his elder brother. Mohamed got married at the age of 20 years and now his responsibility towards his family has increased. The story is similar for almost all labourers in the tailoring sector who migrated when they were very young. Initially, they spent time picking up skills and later started working, often with the same employer but on a higher wage. Most of them are either landless or have a paltry share of land. The needs of the family dictate the duration of migration. 41 The maximum numbers of outward migration came from those in the 20-29 years age group, followed by those in the 30-39 years age group. Table 3: Age Group Distribution of the Migrants Age Group Number of Migrant Percentage 10-1967013.47 20-292,33446.92 30-391,23224.77 40-4951610.37 50-591883.79 60-69320.64 70-7920.04 Grand Total 4,974 100.00 Source : Official records maintained for the quarantine of the migrant workers. As Table 3 shows, 46.92 per cent of the migrant workers are in the age group of 20-29 years. With an increase in age, there is a decrease in the percentage of migrants as the responsibility of earning is passed on to the younger generation and the elders remain at home and take care of the family. Amar Kumar Yadav, who used to migrate to Punjab for agricultural work, is now a farm hand in his village. He is 31 years old and lives with his family. For the past two agricultural seasons, he did not migrate for work in Punjab but lives in the village and takes care of his family. 42 It is now the turn of his younger brother, aged 24 years, who migrated to Pune this March as a contract worker in a construction firm. His earnings will enable him to contribute to the construction of his family house, which is in progress in Baisi. He plans to get married soon and it is his responsibility to provide financial support, as he will require a separate room after his marriage. If seasons, availability of food, and reproductive cycles determine the migratory patterns of birds, agricultural seasons and festivals are the deciding factors for Bihar’s agricultural workers. Normally, a labourer migrates for 9 or 10 months for work and spends 2 or 3 months at home. Generally, the migrants return home at the end of April when the harvesting of maize is at its peak and for the Ramadan celebrations. A migrant, Sahanawaz, returns home in mid-April every year to look after the harvesting needs at his small landholding and returns to his workplace after celebrating Ramadan with his family. Table 4: Baisi’s Migrants and the Agriculture/Festival Calendar January February March Sowing of Garma rice after harvesting of mustardMigrants at work Migrants at work Harvesting of maize starts at the end of the monthMigrants at work April May June Harvesting of maize, solarisation, and sellingStart of the month of RamadanMigrants start returning Ramadan and EidHarvesting of Garma riceReturn of migrants continues Start of monsoon and sowing of riceMigrants stay at home July August September Monsoon and floodsMigrants stay at home End of monsoon and floodsTransfer of flood relief amount (₹6000 per HH)BakridMigrants stay at home Transfer of agriculture loss compensationMigration resumes / begins October November December Sowing of maize (early variety) and mustardSome migrants migrate after the sowing of maize.Migrants at work Sowing of maize (late variety)Migrants at work Migrants at work Source : Based on the authors’ observations for two years. Return to Contents III. THE DISRUPTED MIGRANT ECONOMY What is the purpose of migration? Deshingkar et al., 43 attempt to derive the quantum of remittances using Money Orders sent from different States to Bihar. However, there are various other methods to transfer money, which has become easier over the years. After the implementation of the Pradhan Mantri Jan Dhan Yojana, many villagers have bank accounts. 44 A migrant now remits his savings either to his own account or to his wife’s account, albeit with caveats on spending. In Baisi, migrants generally use more than 50 per cent of their savings to either repay loans or redeem mortgaged jewellery; the rest is spent on agriculture, festivals, marriages, medical exigencies, or for establishing a small business. Migration had offered them good returns, enabling them to afford a few non-essentials after fulfilling their needs. The pandemic, however, resulted in several disruptions for the migrant economy. Changing priorities for borrowing Vishal, a moneylender in the Baisi local market, says that during this pandemic, loan disbursal had increased compared with previous years. Many women mortgaged their jewellery for petty loans. Often, such loans were to purchase rations, start a small business, or to meet medical expenses. Why would the women not sell their jewellery to derive the maximum value? They generally mortgaged their jewellery instead of selling them because someone from the family would migrate for jobs and soon be able to repay the loan and repossess the pawned jewellery. Although this is a common trend in Baisi, the lockdown changed things around. There are several loans that are not repaid, he said. “In February, I was afraid seeing the falling value of gold. If it continues, I am going to run into a big loss. Migrants are the major investors in the local markets.” 45 A vendor at a textile shop said that his annual income depended on the festival and marriage seasons (October to June). This year, the entire month of Ramadan was under lockdown. Although he could not estimate the decline in the number of customers, he is certain that his monthly income fell by 75 per cent. There was hardly any supply of new clothes and footfalls were also decreasing.The individual’s capacity to invest in the market reduced, consumption priorities changed, and people started buying groceries at higher market prices. The workers who lost their jobs and returned home due to the lockdown met the expenditures from their savings while waiting for the lockdown to end, so that they could return to work. Not surprisingly, by the end of April, buses from States like Punjab, Haryana, and Rajasthan were seen in the villages of Baisi Block to ferry back the migrant workers. Bihar is a predominantly maize-growing State, contributing 8.9 per cent of India’s total maize production. 46 It is a cash crop that requires high investments. Although many migrants do not own much agricultural land, some of them invest in maize cultivation or extend loans to family members. With the imposition of a nation-wide lockdown between March 24, 2020 and May 17, 2020, all shops were ordered to be shut down and only emergency services such as medical stores and ration shops were permitted to function. In Baisi, however, the lockdown was followed more in the breach. Barely a week into the lockdown, textile shops were functioning surreptitiously, vegetable vendors were back on the roads, mobile shops up and about, barber shops open, and many other activities going on. Farmers, for their part, waited for middlemen to sell harvested maize but disappointment was in store, as this year’s price of maize was at least ₹500 lower per quintal than the previous year. 47 Market prices of vegetables, however, remained constant or fell only marginally as locally grown vegetables were in abundance. This, in turn, affected the vegetable-growing farmers as they were paid less for their produce. The opportunity to market agricultural produce was lost due to breakdown in the supply chain during the lockdown. Loss of incomes resulted in drastic reductions in consumer spending. In addition to decreased remittances from the migrants, their investment in the rural economy fell. The economic consequences of the pandemic have, therefore, been adverse for Baisi’s rural economy on all fronts: income, expenditure, savings, and investment. Return to Contents IV. THE IMPACT OF THE PANDEMIC ON SPENDING PATTERNS The pandemic and the subsequent lockdown brought into sharp focus issues concerning public provisioning of food and access to government services. Bharat Yadav, a 45-year-old construction worker, has been working for the past seven months in a private construction firm in Purnia. He said the situation in Purnia city, where all shops were shut and there was no movement of people, was far different from what prevailed in the villages. He receives his monthly salary (₹12,000) either on a weekly or monthly basis. Construction work, however, stopped after the lockdown. There are six members in his family. He has access to the Public Distribution System (PDS) and there is no problem in accessing the ration shop, but he now has to purchase more than what is provided through the PDS, which includes 5 kg of rice, 3 kg of wheat flour, 4 kg potatoes, and 2 kg pulses.This exploratory study in Baisi, conducted during the month of April, finds that soon after the enforcement of the lockdown, the basic need for people was food and medicine. In many cases, only a single member in the family had access to the PDS, which was not sufficient for the rest of the family members. The required rations had to be purchased from the nearest PDS outlet, and some households were left with rations that lasted merely 4 or 5 days. Soon, the price of groceries started increasing in the market. Though the administration did try to put a check on such malpractices, it could not be enforced beyond a point. Supply was limited and people had little choice but to buy the commodities at a higher price. To meet such expenses, they began borrowing money from easily accessible informal sources, for instance relatives.Once support from relatives dried up, they had to fall back on moneylenders. Those who had jewellery for mortgage could borrow at 4 per cent interest but others, without collateral, had to pay anywhere between 6 per cent and 10 per cent. A customary practice in Baisi block is that the women generally borrowed money by mortgaging their jewellery. They get an amount equivalent to half the current value of the jewellery. In an interview, a local moneylender said during the lockdown people borrowed extensively to purchase rations and migrants often took loans to meet their daily expenses.Meanwhile, the Government of Bihar provided some welfare measures: offering free ration for a month to all ration cardholders, a one-time cash transfer of ₹1,000 to ration cardholders, payment of pension for three months in advance to all pensioners, including old age pensioners, widows, and the physically challenged, and releasing pending scholarships to all students (Surya, 2020). The monetary benefits were deposited directly into the beneficiary’s account. Once the cash transfers were made, people began thronging banks in the hope of withdrawing the sum to buy essentials. Lockdown restrictions, however, ensured that their access to money in the bank was severely curtailed. Bihar holds the dubious distinction of having the highest number of people excluded from the National Food Security Act (NFSA): almost 14 lakh people in the State do not have a ration card. 48 Administrative lapses coupled with the indifferent attitude of officials and political corruption relegated these people to a state of exclusion. Recognising the need to act in a hurry, the State government took some steps to issue new ration cards during the pandemic. It was, however, too little too late. The inability of migrants to return to their villages in the early days of the lockdown resulted in a new difficulty to their families. Across Bihar, it is almost always men who visit government offices for any official work that needs to be done. Even before the lockdown, interactions with families of migrant labourers revealed that women knew little about government procedures and documents. In the absence of the men who could not return to their villages, this responsibility of interacting with government officials fell on the women who had no exposure to the workings of officialdom. They were either guided from afar by their husbands or sought help from tola sevaks (volunteers who assist children with their education and prepare them for enrolment in mainstream school, provide basic literacy to women, and create awareness about social security and welfare schemes among them) or relied on touts who had to be paid for their services. The lockdown brought another additional burden for the women in Bihar. In families owning agricultural land, the men often returned from their places of employment to work in their fields during the Rabi crop harvest season or the Kharif crop sowing season (see Table 4). This year, the lockdown put paid to their plans. The responsibility of managing such farm-related operations also fell on the women who were already saddled with running their households under uncertain conditions. They had to either seek help from neighbours or spend money hiring farm labour for sowing/harvesting. Many of those interviewed said that they did not know where their husbands worked as it had never been important for them; some of them only knew the name of the State where their husbands had gone in search of employment. Return to Contents V. REVIVING RURAL BIHAR – AN UPHILL TASK The International Labour Organisation (ILO) in its latest 49 briefing note, COVID-19 and the World of Work, observed that [w]orking-hour losses are expected to remain high in the third quarter of 2020, at 12.1 per cent or 345 million full-time equivalent (FTE) jobs. Moreover, revised projections for the fourth quarter suggest a bleaker outlook than previously estimated. In the baseline scenario, working-hour losses in the final quarter of 2020 are expected to amount to 8.6 per cent, or 245 million FTE jobs. 50 However, developing economies were witnessing weaker economic growth even before the onset of COVID-19. In India, the real gross domestic product (GDP) had fallen over nine consecutive quarters (EPW, 2020). According to Dev and Sengupta, 51 industry’s contribution to GDP, which was normally in the range of 30 per cent, had shrunk by 0.58 per cent in the fourth quarter of 2019-20, unemployment reached a 45-year high, investments in the private sector decreased, and rural consumption was also on the decline due to the effect of demonetisation. The pandemic, which came at a time when the economy was already slowing down, aggravated the downslide and the prolonged lockdown severely affected the labour market in India through overnight loss of livelihood for many especially those in the informal sector. A nation-wide lockdown started on March 24, 2020, and continued until May 17, 2020, with conditional relaxations after April 20. Much research was conducted on the effectiveness of the lockdown; a group of scholars came together to study the policies of five State governments—Maharashtra, Delhi, Tamil Nadu, Gujarat, and Punjab—and observed that enforcement of lockdown was done in places where there was high incidence of symptomatic infection among the population. They felt that the governments should conduct more tests in those areas (Sardar, T., et al.). Soon after the lockdown was announced, all modes of transport were suspended, and migrant labourers were stranded at their places of employment with no work and meagre savings. As the number of cases began increasing, so did discrimination against the labourers, forcing the migrants to resort to desperate means to return home. The first COVID-19 positive case in Bihar was reported on March 21, 2020. With numbers rising, a central team visited the State. 52 The number of government hospitals, the numbers of beds, doctors, and nurses available became a matter of concern. This is not surprising given the record of the State Health Department’s utilisation of funds from the Centre and the State. On average, the State’s Health Department managed to utilise only 53.86 per cent of the funds made available to it from the State and central pool from the financial year 2012-13 (Annual Report, 2018-19). These data clearly point to the State’s inefficient absorption capacity and its failure to use the available funds to improve infrastructure and services. Against this backdrop, the imposition of the total lockdown by the government was perhaps a mistake. Instead, the government could have initially implemented a partial lockdown allowing the migrant workers from other States to return home. A total lockdown could have been enforced once the movement of the migrants had stopped or declined. A strict quarantine policy for the returning migrants could have eased the possible spread of the virus among the local population. Improper facilities at quarantine centres also resulted in truancy whereby migrants slipped out during the nights owing to lack of any basic facilities except “free food”. 53 Merely offering subsidies to increase purchasing capacity may not be enough, as was experienced during the Bengal famine in 1943. The then colonial government, faced with severe scarcity of food grains, had allowed grain markets to sell the available grains at cheap prices. But the absence of regulation resulted in spiralling prices , 54 which worsened the fallout of the famine. It may be argued that comparing a famine and a pandemic is like comparing apples and oranges. However, lessons can definitely be learnt from the past. The Bihar government had announced a one-time subsidy of ₹1,000 and additional rations for all ration cardholders but the large-scale exclusion from PDS facility resulted in these benefits not reaching the people. To overcome this failure, the government employed the services of self-help groups like Jeevika to identify families who were eligible for the subsidy but did not have ration cards. 55 Even after such an exercise, the number of deserving beneficiaries who would remain excluded is still anybody’s guess. Ideally, the State Government should have provided free rations to all residents for a brief period, as was done by the Governments of Kerala 56 and Tamil Nadu, 57 to name two, and supplemented this by creating livelihood opportunities to boost consumer demand. The State Government now faces an uphill task of reviving the rural economy. In Bihar, 92.8 per cent of the farmers are small and marginal, which is higher than the national average of 83.5 per cent. 58 The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS) fits into the scheme of things here quite well, satisfying both individual and societal needs and is the most easily available option before the government. Although the performance of the State Government in the implementation of the programme has not been very encouraging, (Chopra, 2016), the fact that it had enormous potential was not lost on them. The Jind district in Haryana had shown positive results with a 135 per cent increase in physical performance and 36 per cent compound annual growth in financial performance (Sharma & Didwania, 2013). Tragically, the Union government has reduced the total fund allocation under the MGNREGS by 13 per cent this year. 59 Revising budgetary allocations and establishing efficient monitoring mechanisms to oversee resource utilisation and implementation of ongoing schemes will help in boosting the rural economy in the short term, especially during unforeseen emergencies such as the COVID-19 pandemic. A series of corrective measures to address institutional weaknesses, if required through effective utilisation of community and local grass-roots institutions, can help in the long run to both upscale rural economies like Baisi and meet the challenges posed by sudden disruptions. Return to Contents [ Girija Shankar graduated in Agriculture Rural and Tribal Development from Ramakrishna Mission Vivekananda University in 2016 and joined the Tata Institute of Social Sciences for post-graduate degree in Development Policy Planning and Practices with Rural Planning as a Special interest. He did his field work in the villages of Jharkhand, Rajasthan, and Maharashtra and, as a part of his post-graduate curriculum, worked as a research assistant in a project titled “The emerging trend of formal to informal outsourcing – A study of textile industry in Maharashtra” funded by the Goa Institute of Management. He also interned with the Foundation for Ecological Security (FES) and is currently working with BRLPS (Bihar Rural Livelihood Promotion Society) as a YP-BPM (Young Professional, Block Project Manager). As a Public Policy Scholar at The Hindu Centre for Politics and Public Policy, Girija studied the working of Farmer Producer Companies in Osamanabad, Maharashtra. Read Policy Report, Farmer Producer Companies: Preliminary Studies on Efficiency and Equity from Maharashtra in January 2019. He can be contacted at [email protected] . Rakhi Kumari graduated in Economics from Tilka Manjhi Bhagalpur University in 2020, and is pursuing her Master’s degree in Public Administrations from Central University Jharkhand. She has conducted research on women’s participation in agriculture and is currently working on the research topic “Agricultural labour migration in Khagaria District, Bihar”. She can be contacted at [email protected] ]. References: Annual Report (2018-19) . State Health Society, Bihar. Bhattarai, M., Vishwanathan, P., Mishra, R. N., & Bantilan, C. (2018) . Employment Guarantee Programme and Dynamics of Rural Transformation in India Challenges and Opportunities. doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-6262-9 Chatterjee, K., Chatterjee, K., Kumar, A., & Shankar, S. (2020) . Healthcare impact of COVID-19 epidemic in India: A stochastic mathematical model. Medical Journal Armed Forces India 76 , 147-155. Chopra, D. (2016) . Political Commitment in India’s social policy implementation: shaping the performance of MGNREGA. School of Environment and Development. Effective States and Inclusive Development Research Centre (ESID). Sardar, T., Nadim, S. S., Rana, S., & Chattopadhyay, J. (2020) . Assessment of Lockdown Effect in Some States and overall India: A Predictive Mathematical Study on COVID-19 Outbreak. Chaos, Solution & Fractals . doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chaos.2020.110078 Sharma, R., & Didwania, M. (2013) . Performance Analysis of MGNREGA: A case study of District Jind. Zenith International Journal of Business Economics & Management Research . Surya, S. (2020) . Government of Bihar’s Response to COVID-19 (till April 19, 2020). PRS Legislative Research. Endnote: [ All URLs are last accessed on December 10, 2020 ] 1. Although in the initial stages of outmigration, the region comprising present day Bihar (which was created in 1912) was a source for military recruits for the Mughals and the East India Company, after the Permanent Settlement Act of 1793, a mix of factors resulted in distress migration. ( Draft Policy Framework for Improving the Conditions of Labour Migrants from Bihar , Prepared by Aajeevika Bureau and TISS for the ILO-supported State Consultative Meeting on Labour Migration from Bihar, October 12, 2017.) [https://tiss.edu/uploads/files/Policy_Brief_-_State_Consultative_Meeting_on_Labour_Migration__from_Bihar.pdf]. Return To text. 2. Government of Bihar (n.d.) . Distribution of Population Decadal Growth Rate, Sex Ratio, Density and Literacy by State - 2011 . [https://state.bihar.gov.in/main/cache/1/Figures/Table-001.pdf]. Return to Text. 3. GDP/GSDP: Gross Domestic Product/Gross State Domestic Product is the standard measure of the value-added created through the production of goods and services in a country/State during a certain period. Return to Text. 4. Government of Bihar. 2020 . Bihar Economic Survey 2019-20 , Finance Department, p. 5. [http://finance.bih.nic.in/Reports/Economic-Survey-2020-EN.pdf]. Return to Text. 5. Electric, gas, water supply and other utility services. Return to Text. 6. BIMARU is a term coined by the demographer Ashish Bose in 1985 for the States of Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh “to pinpoint India’s demographic malady” when he was “asked to brief the then Prime Minister [Rajiv Gandhi] on India’s family planning programme.” (See: Ashish Bose, Beyond Population Projections: Growing North-South Disparity , Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 42 No. 15. April 14-20, 2007. p. 1328.) In the Hindi dialect of eastern U.P., bimaru means ‘sick’ (or ‘sickly). (See: Ashish Bose, National Population Policy, 2000: Swaminathan to Shanmugam , Economic and Political Weekly , Vol. 35, No. 13 (Mar. 25-31, 2000), p. 1059.). Return to Text. 7. de Haan, A. 2002. Migration and Livelihood in Historical Perspective: A Case Study of Bihar; India, The Journal of Development Studies , pp. 115-142. Return to Text. 8. Datta, A., and Mishra, S. K. 2011 . Glimpses of women’s lives in rural Bihar: Impact of male migration, The Indian Journal of Labour Economics , Vol. 54. Return to Text. 9. Rasul, G., and Sharma, E. 2014: Understanding the poor economic performance of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, India: a macro-perspective, Regional Studies, Regional Science , Vol. 1, No. 1, 221-239, DOI: 10.1080/21681376.2014.943804. Return to Text. 10. Net Value added: Net value added is the value of output less the value of both intermediate consumption and consumption of fixed capital. Return to Text. 11. Sharma, A. N. 1995 . Political Economy of Poverty in Bihar, Economic and Political Weekly , October 14, Vol. 30, No. 41-42, pp. 2587-2602. Return to Text. 12. Op. cit. Government of Bihar. (2020). Return to Text. 13. Sharma, K. 2017. India has 139 million internal migrants. They must not be forgotten , World Economic Forum , October 1. [https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/10/india-has-139-million-internal-migrants-we-must-not-forget-them/]. Return to Text. 14. Datta, A., and Mishra, S. K. 2011 . Glimpses of women’s lives in rural Bihar: Impact of male migration, The Indian Journal of Labour Economics , Vol. 54, p. 458. Return to Text. 15. Arjan de Haan is the director of IDRC’s Inclusive Economies Programme and a development expert who focuses on poverty and public policy. Return to Text. 16. Op. cit. Return to Text. 17. United Nations. 2006. The Secretary-General[‘s] Address to The High-Level Dialogue of the General Assembly on International Migration and Development , September 14, New York. [https://www.un.org/migration/sg-speech.html]. Return to Text. 18. International Organization for Migration (IOM). 2019. World Migration Report 2020 , UN, New York, p.5. [https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/wmr_2020.pdf]. Return to Text. 19. Government of India. 2017. Report on the Working Group on Migration , Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation, January. [http://mohua.gov.in/upload/uploadfiles/files/1566.pdf]. Return to Text. 20. Op. Cit. Return to Text. 21. Op. Cit. Return to Text. 22. Government of India. 2017. p. 7. Return to Text. 23. Census of India. 2001. Data Highlights, Migration Tables , Government of India. [https://censusindia.gov.in/Data_Products/Data_Highlights/Data_Highlights_link/data_highlights_D1D2D3.pdf]. Return to Text. 24. National Sample Survey Office, 2010: Migration in India, 2007-2008, NSS 64th Round (July 2007-June 2008) , Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, Government of India, June. [http://mospi.nic.in/sites/default/files/publication_reports/533_final.pdf]. Return to Text. 25. The NSSO’s 64 th Round surveyed households across India on employment-unemployment and migration, enumerating people who migrated to the place of enumeration during the past 365 days. Return to Text. 26. Ibid : Footnote 1 “A household member whose last usual place of residence (UPR) was different from the present place of enumeration was considered as a migrant member in a household. In this survey, usual place of residence (UPR) of a person was defined as a place (village/town) where the person had stayed continuously for a period of six months or more.” p. H-i Return to Text. 27. Op. cit. Census of India, 2001. Return to Text. 28. World Bank. 2020 . COVID-19 Crisis Through a Migration Lens, Migration and Development Brief no. 32 , World Bank, Washington, DC, April. [https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/33634/COVID-19-Crisis-Through-a-Migration-Lens.pdf?sequence=5&isAllowed=y]. Return to Text. 29. The Economic Times . 2020 . More than 21,000 camps set up for over 6,60,000 migrants: State governments , April 1. [https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/more-than-21000-camps-set-up-for-over-660000-migrants-state-governments/articleshow/74920798.cms]. Return to Text. 30. Krishnan., et al. 2020. Migrant Workmen Act, 1979, must be rationalised to remove requirements that disincentivise formalisation , The Indian Express , May 9. [https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/india-lockdown-inter-state-migrant-workmen-act-6400710/]. Return to Text. 31. Raghu, C. 2020. Lack of identity of migrant workers , countercurrents.org , June 4. [https://countercurrents.org/2020/06/lack-of-identity-of-migrant-workers/]. Return to Text. 32. Purnia is also spelt as Purnea. The Census of India uses the former spelling, and the Government of Bihar’s District website uses the latter. In this Policy Watch, the spellings in the Census of India are used for all place names. However, in the District Map, which is reproduced from the Government of Bihar’s website, the spelling used on the website is retained. Return to Text. 33. Directorate of Census Operations, Bihar. 2014. Census of India, 2011 – Bihar, Series-11, Part XII-B, District Census Handbook Purnia, Village and Town-wise Primary Census Abstract (PCA) . [https://www.censusindia.gov.in/2011census/dchb/1009_PART_B_DCHB_PURNIA.pdf]. Return to Text. 34. Deshingkar, P., et al. 2006 . The Role of Migration and Remittances in Promoting Livelihoods in Bihar , Overseas Development Institute, London. December. [https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/2354.pdf]. Return to Text. 35. Circular migration, also known as repeat migration, is temporary and usually repetitive movement of a migrant worker between home and host areas. For further reading on impact of lockdown on seasonal migrants, read Ravi Srivastava’s Understanding Circular Migration in India: Its Nature and Dimensions, the Crisis under Lockdown and the Response of the State (Institute for Human Development, WP 04/2020). [http://www.ihdindia.org/Working%20Ppaers/2020/IHD-CES_WP_04_2020.pdf]. Return to Text. 36. Seasonal migration is the movement of population from their place of origin for short periods depending on the sector in which they work as migrants. Return to Text. 37. de Haan, A. 2002. Op. cit. Return to Text. 38. The Sharma community is involved in carpentry in Bihar, and they are classified as an Other Backward Class. Return to Text. 39. Census 2011 . Harintor Population - Purnia, Bihar , Census Population 2020 Data. [https://www.census2011.co.in/data/village/223988-harintor-bihar.html]. Return to Text. 40. From an interview with the respondent. Return to Text. 41. The major reason for the migration is in search of livelihood opportunity, however, short-term migration is basically for the need of the family either for the medical purpose, marriage or for repaying debts. Return to Text. 42. From an interview with the respondent. The migrant starts as a second/additional earner in the family and then becomes the primary source of income. Return to Text. 43. Op. cit. Return to Text. 44. Under Pradhan Mantri Jan Dhan Yojana, total number of accounts in the rural/semi-urban areas is 31,396,414. [ https://pmjdy.gov.in/statewise-statistics ]. Return to Text. 45. In Baisi, women invest a large amount in purchasing jewellery if they have money in hand to spare. Return to Text. 46. Department of Agriculture, Cooperation and Farmers Welfare. (n.d.) . Farmer’s Portal – Maize , Ministry of Agriculture and Farmers Welfare, Government of India. [https://farmer.gov.in/m_cropstaticsmaize.aspx]. Return to Text. 47. In 2019 the price of maize was ₹1,700/- to ₹1,900/- per qtl and in 2020 it is ₹1,100/- to ₹1,200/- per qtl. Return to Text. 48. PTI. 2020. 14 lakh people in Bihar not getting benefits under food security act: Paswan , The Economic Times , April 23. [https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/14-lakh-people-in-bihar-not-getting-benefits-under-food-security-act-paswan/articleshow/75323510.cms]. Return to Text. 49. As on December 7, 2020. Return to Text. 50. International Labour Organization. 2020. ILO Monitor: COVID-19 and the World of Work, Sixth Edition, Updated estimates and analysis , September 23. [https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/documents/briefingnote/wcms_755910.pdf]. Return to Text. 51. Dev, M.S., and Sengupta, R. 2020. Covid-19: Impact on the Indian Economy , Indira Gandhi Institute for Development Research, Mumbai, April. [WP-2020-013.pdf (igidr.ac.in)]. Return to Text. 52. Tewary, A. 2020 . Coronavirus | Central team visits Bihar as COVID-19 cases rise , The Hindu , July 19. [https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/other-states/as-cases-surge-central-team-visits-bihar-to-assess-the-covid-19-situation-and-preparedness/article32130388.ece]. Return to Text. 53. Tewary, A. 2020 . Coronavirus | Migrant workers slip of out Bihar quarantine centres at night, return by day , The Hindu, April 8. [https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/coronavirus-lockdown-many-quarantined-bihar-villagers-missing-from-centres-at-night/article31291139.ece]. Return to Text. 54. Brennan, L. 1988. Government Famine Relief in Bengal, 1943, The Journal of Asian Studies , August, Vol. 47, No. 3, pp. 541-566. Return to Text. 55. Kumar, M. 2020. Bihar: Ration card-less families identified as eligible by as eligible by ‘Jeevika’ to be paid assistance of Rs 1,000, says CM , Times of India, April 21. [https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/patna/bihar-ration-card-less-families-identified-as-eligible-by-jeevika-to-be-paid-assistance-of-rs-1000-says-cm/articleshow/75279178.cms]. Return to Text. 56. The Hindu. 2020. COVID-19 | Kerala to provide free ration to all . March 25. [https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/kerala/covid-19-kerala-to-provide-free-ration-to-all/article31160410.ece]. Return to Text. 57. PTI. 2020. Tamil Nadu to continue free Covid ration for family cardholders in June , The Economic Times, May 27. [https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/tamil-nadu-to-continue-free-covid-ration-for-family-cardholders-in-june/articleshow/76032890.cms]. Return to Text. 58. Behera, D., et al. 2013. Enhancing agricultural livelihoods through community institutions in Bihar, India (English) , South Asia rural livelihoods; Series 3 note no. Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group. April 1. [http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/467261468258525242/Enhancing-agricultural-livelihoods-through-community-institutions-in-Bihar-India]. Return to Text. 59. PTI. 2020. Budget 2020: MGNREGA funds down by 13%, marginal dip in other rural development schemes , The Economic Times, February 1. [https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/policy/budget-2020-mgnrega-funds-down-by-13-marginal-dip-in-other-rural-development-schemes/articleshow/73847723.cms]. Return to Text. Related Resources COVID-19: Press Releases and Updates by the Government of India and WHO [HTML and PDF] . Source : Press Information Bureau, Government of India. Full Text: World Migration Report 2020 . Source : International Organization for Migration, November 2019. [https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/wmr_2020.pdf]. World Bank Report: COVID-19 Crisis through a Migration Lens [PDF 1.69 MB] . Source: The World Bank Group (April 2020). [http://hdl.handle.net/10986/33634]. NSSO Data: Migration in India, 2007-2008 [PDF 4.5 MB] . Source : National Sample Survey Office Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, Government of India (June 2010). Related Articles Chaturvedi, S. 2020 . Pandemic Exposes Weaknesses in India’s Disaster Management Responses , The Hindu Centre for Politics and Public Policy, September 3. Mudliar, P. 2020 . A Reality Check on India’s Search for Digital Utopia , The Hindu Centre for Politics and Public Policy, August 28. Ebenezer, R. 2020. Ensuring Zero Tolerance for all Forms of Forced Labour , The Hindu Centre for Politics and Public Policy, July 14. Ngullie, O. G. and Ansari, A. A. 2020 . India’s Public Distribution System and the Pandemic – Revisiting Delhi’s Beneficiaries , The Hindu Centre for Politics and Public Policy, June 26. Vijay, G. and Gudavarthy, A. 2020 . A Pandemic as a Political Reality Check , The Hindu Centre for Politics and Public Policy, April 15.

Never since the founding of the Indian republic have so many millions depended directly on India’s government machineries for sustenance. One reality that the COVID-19 pandemic has driven home is that the welfare state cannot be replaced and needs to be strengthened. In addition to market failures, the inability of markets to operate under extraordinary circumstances – such as the ongoing pandemic – places the onus on governments to emerge as providers of the last resort. In this interview-based empirical study, O. Grace Ngullie and Arib Ahmad Ansari, Independent Researchers, revisit beneficiaries who were respondents in a previous study by the first author on the Public Distribution System (PDS) in Delhi. (The names of all respondents have been changed to protect confidentiality.) While the earlier study focussed on the comparative benefits of cash transfers vis-à-vis provisioning of ration, the present exploratory study aims to find out the manner in which the PDS has worked for the poor in times of COVID-19 pandemic. This preliminary inquiry finds that the pre-existing problems with the PDS persist, thereby worsening the woes of the vulnerable who have been promised food security during the pandemic. For instance, there were differences reported in the quantity or rations received and promised, the quality of the food grains, exclusion, and access. The authors suggest a set of policy recommendations addressing each of the problems. The recommendations include utilising modern and emerging technologies to address supply chain issues, the creation of new cadre for monitoring, and upwardly revising the allocation. CONTENTS I. REVISITING DELHI’S PDS BENEFICIARIES II. QUANTITY, QUALITY, ACCESS – THE PROBLEMS PERSIST DURING THE PANDEMIC III. IMPACT OF THE PANDEMIC ON ACCESS TO FOOD IV. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS V. CONCLUSION I. REVISITING DELHI’S PDS BENEFICIARIES The severe and unprecedented economic distress caused by the COVID-19 pandemic has made millions of people lose their livelihoods and become helpless making them rely increasingly – in some instances entirely – on government welfare schemes for their basic needs. The purpose of this exploratory empirical study is to assess the efficacy and the resilience of the Public Distribution System (PDS) in India as a provider of food security for the poor in times of debilitating emergencies of the nature of the COVID 19 pandemic. Though there has been plenty of good research 1 on the implementation of India’s PDS over the years with social scientists suggesting many relevant interventions, which facilitated gradual improvement in the overall strength of the PDS; none of these envisioned a time when the PDS would assume such a central role in the Indian state’s response to the extreme economic hardship brought about by this deadly pandemic. In times like these the market economy loses its automatic resource allocation ability and the responsibility of saving a sinking economy falls squarely on the state. Under such circumstances, the steps that governments take hold the only promise of hope for the struggling millions. This makes government initiatives the most crucial cogs in the overall response to a pandemic. The viability and the success of such programs depend on how aligned they are with the needs and the problems faced by the most vulnerable section of the population. Structure of the Delhi inquiry The importance of this study lies in getting first-hand evidence of the most acute problems faced by the people hit hardest by the pandemic – the poor who have lost their means of income because of either closure of workplaces, loss of jobs, or the inability to reach workplaces owing to the lockdown and need state support to live – through direct interaction with them. We begin with the principle that any initiative to alleviate the suffering of the poor has to primarily learn about the nature of their suffering. To this end, we ask how the PDS has worked during the time of the pandemic in providing relief to the vulnerable: where it is falling short, what are the aspects left unaddressed, where and to what extent PDS is misdirected, and so forth. Once we establish an understanding of the above, we aim to go forward to suggest ways, based on the information collected directly from the respondents, through which welfare policy measures such as the PDS can be made more effective and inclusive to help people tide over the periods of crisis.Accordingly, this empirical inquiry was structured under four themes. First, we tested people’s awareness about the government announcement on the increase of food grains allotment through the PDS due to the pandemic. The Government of Delhi, where this inquiry was conducted, announced a total of 7.5 kg food grains per person per month and the central government announced 10 kg of food grains per person per month. Second, we examined access to PDS during this pandemic. We verified the sought information on the food grains received by the respondents and identified problems faced by the people when accessing the PDS during this pandemic. Third, we assessed the impact of the PDS in reducing the hardship of the poor by examining the adequacy and quality of ration received by the beneficiaries in the context of attaining food security. Fourth, we studied the impact of the pandemic on livelihood and food access and explored government interventions that could alleviate the problems of job loss and food insecurity during this pandemic. Revisiting beneficiaries Constrained by the ongoing pandemic, which necessitated keeping a physical distance from respondents, we conducted telephonic interviews in June with PDS beneficiary households we came in contact with from a previous study (Ngullie 2017). These residents of households live in the districts of Northeast (Karawal Circle), Northwest (Kirari Circle), West (Vikaspuri Circle), and South West (Matiala Circle) in Delhi. The rationale for the selection of sites relied on the maximum number of PDS households in each district and circle. At the time of the sampling for the first study (in February 2015), Kirari had 44,449 PDS households, Karawal had 38,763 PDS households, Vikaspuri had 41,228 PDS households, and Matiala had 40,340 PDS households. At the time of the study, the list of households’ name with the house address was available at the website of the National Food Security, Delhi. To choose a sample of 40 PDS households, we adopted Systematic Random Sampling to make the survey evenly representative. For example, we divide the total number of beneficiaries in a Circle (say 1,000) by ten (to select 10 households from each Circle), which gives us 100. Subsequently, our target households would be 100 th , 200 th , 300 th and so on. This method enables us to make an unbiased selection from the entire list of beneficiaries. In case a particular beneficiary is not traceable or unavailable for some reason, the preceding beneficiary of the first selection is taken, that is, the 99 th if 100 th is not available, the 199 th if 200 th is absent, and so on. This method seeks to find the nearest possible alternative to the chosen beneficiary in case of her absence. We traced the households’ addresses, conducted the survey, and requested their phone numbers (with consent) for follow-up purposes. This time, out of 40 households contacted, 18 households, comprising 102 individuals, responded and enthusiastically consented to participate in the interview to study the working and the impact of the PDS in the current pandemic. Out of the 18 households, six are from the Scheduled Caste (SC) category, five are from the General category, three are from the Muslim community, two are Other Backward Caste (OBC-Hindu), and another two are OBC-Muslim. The respondents, who spoke on behalf of their households, comprised of 14 females and four males (husband or son) of the head of the household. The senior female in the family is the head in the ration card. Each interview lasted about 30 minutes. Return to Contents II. QUANTITY, QUALITY, ACCESS – THE PROBLEMS PERSIST DURING THE PANDEMIC We find it interesting that all the respondents were aware of the enhancement of food allocation owing to the lockdown under the PDS announced by both the State and the central governments. However, not all households received the same amount of food grains. Variations were reported in the quantity of food grains received from the PDS versus that which was announced. Out of 18 households, only eight households received the announced amount of 10 kg per person; eight households received 8 kg per person; one household received 5 kg per person; another household received only 4 kg per person for each month.For example, Sumitra, a resident in Kirari, North West Delhi received only 20 kg of ration for her four-member household at the rate of 5 kg per person. Gitanjali Devi and Vidhya Devi, residents in Karawal, North East Delhi received 8 kg of food grains per person per month for their family. As in normal, non-pandemic, times, the beneficiaries in Delhi received wheat and rice in the ratio of 4:1. For example, for a person receiving a total of 10 kg of food grains, the allocation would include 8 kg of wheat and 2 kg of rice, and for a person receiving 8 kg of food grains, it would be 6.4 kg of wheat and 1.6 kg of rice. As a special arrangement for the pandemic, the beneficiaries received special kits containing the following items: one litre of refined oil, a pair of soap, and a packet each of salt, sugar, chilli powder, and channa or chhole . Yet again, the distribution was not uniform as one-half of the respondents received it only once in the last two months and the other half received it twice. Exclusion – a major setback We found the exclusion of eligible members as a major setback in the PDS. Out of 102 individuals from 18 households, only 78 are registered in their respective family’s ration cards. For example, Naina Singh has eight members in her household but only five are listed in the ration card, which reduces the food entitlement for the family. Sangeeta Devi, an intermittent informal labourer is a sole breadwinner in a family of five, whose husband is bedridden due to a chronic illness she chose not to disclose, and who received a total of 24 kg of food grains for three members registered in the ration card. These cases reflect the extent of exclusion in the food distribution system. Denial of food entitlement to some eligible members not enlisted in the ration card was found to be pervasive. All the respondents have been struggling to register new members in the family’s ration card. With many citing bureaucratic hurdles, it indicates that government agencies are reluctant to update their ration cards. Whenever they approach the Fair Price Shops (FPS) or the rations office to register new members, they are either turned away or are asked to come at a later date making them give up the hope of getting it done. Eventually, they make peace with whatever reduced amount of ration they receive.In an exclusive case, a man used his Aadhaar card to collect his share of the ration after failing to add his name to the family’s ration card. Shalini Devi’s husband told her that he had filled up the ration card form and submitted it to the ‘government’ a ‘hundred times’ to get it updated; yet, it failed. Her husband managed to collect ration for the last two months based on his Aadhaar card. In this context, technological up-gradation embodied in the shift from ration card to Aadhaar card as the eligibility for receiving ration might work for the excluded individuals. On the other hand, several respondents informed about the low coverage of Aadhaar cards since not all family members possess one. For instance, only three out of five in a family or only five out of eight in another family possessed Aadhaar cards. Absence of behavioural norms at Fair Price Shops We find it alarming to learn that beneficiaries are troubled by the long queues and congestion at the Fair Price Shops in this time of the pandemic. Geetanjali Devi, a mother of three from Karawal, North West Delhi, was deeply concerned about the risks associated with the collection of rations in overcrowded spaces. Being a widow, she had no helping hand other than her children but she never allowed her children, despite their insistence, to collect ration. The problem of overcrowding was conspicuous and they evoked concern about the near-complete disregard for physical distancing norms. Though the beneficiaries expressed remarkable awareness of the protective measures to be undertaken during the COVID-19, they helplessly put themselves at risk because of the indispensable need for food. Respondent Shahana Khatoon reasoned that the constant increase in cases in Delhi might be due to people having to step out of their houses to fulfil their basic needs and hence, suggested the government deliver these basic needs at their doorstep. Inadequate quantity of disbursement Interrogating whether the ration from the PDS satiates the recipients’ needs for a month elicited the sharpest responses from the beneficiaries. While some responses expressed shock, some were clothed in amusement, and still, others bordered on anger upon an assumption that the entitled ration would ensure their basic monthly food needs. Najma Khatoon said “ Majak kar rahe ho kya?” (Are you joking?). Mahesh, son of beneficiary Prabhawati Devi retorted “ Aap khud sochiye, kaise poora hoga itna kam ration” (Please think for yourself how can such a meagre quantity suffice for the whole family). He illustrated that all his six family members physically labour throughout the day and their minimum wheat consumption is about 2.5 kg per day, amounting to 75 kg per month, whereas they receive only 8 kg per month per person amounting to only 48 kg per month from the PDS as the maximum amount. The beneficiaries admitted the benefit of doubling the ration in times of pandemic and expressed satisfaction and preferred frequent distribution of the kits, favouring such diversification of items that include cereals and other food essentials. With some members of the households excluded from the PDS, there was complete unanimity amongst the respondents on the need to increase the allocation of ration per household. The current food allocation lasts in the range of 12 to 15 days. The food grains and the free-of-cost kits during this pandemic has only given them temporary relief in an overarching climate of extreme hardship. Inconsistent quality The majority of the respondents reported that the quality of ration is inconsistent— sometimes it is fine, sometimes it is awful. Some expressed disappointments with the quality of wheat. Sugandha Devi explained, “ Bohot kharab gehu hai, roti kaari kaari banti hai aur swaad bhina hi hota” (the quality of the wheat is substandard; roti made from the wheat looks black and without taste). Another respondent, the son of beneficiary Nirmala Devi, reported that sometimes the packet of wheat contains a lot of thorns in it. The residue wheat after removing the thorns is a much-reduced quantity. The complaints were mainly of bad quality of wheat. Most of the respondents were satisfied with the quality of rice. Water woes and poor hygiene A pertinent issue that arose on the sidelines of our discussion over the telephonic interviews was the acute water crises across different locations in Delhi during this lockdown. Households residing in Kirari (North West) and Karawal (North East) in particular were the worst affected by the water crises. According to them, the water supply has been disrupted ever since the lockdown began and it only comes for half an hour in a day which is grossly inadequate. Water tankers came initially after complaints by residents but as the lockdown extended those tankers also stopped their service. Dhapar, a father of two, daily wage labourer and a resident of Kirari said, “ Ration chhod dijiye, paani ka samasya hai, jab paani hi nahi milega to jiyenge kaise” (Do not ask about ration, water is the main problem here: unless we get water how will we live). Asha Rani exclaimed, “How can the authorities expect us to follow the sanitization norms when we do not have enough water!” She indicated a lack of adequate water as a contributing factor behind the rise in cases. This particular issue we feel requires urgent remediation by government authorities if we are to get even close to our mitigation targets. Loss of livelihood due to lockdown All the respondent households suffered either a lay off from the employer or loss of income as a result of the pandemic. Out of 14 respondents who worked as labourers, seven did not get even a single day of work due to lockdown. The income of some respondents who were self-employed reduced to a negligible amount under the effect of the lockdown. Phoolwati’s husband narrated that they earn a livelihood by rearing buffalos and selling milk. However, for the last two months, buyers are unable to pay for the milk but are borrowing milk on credit and making promises to pay later when they regain their incomes. This has foreclosed any hope of income that they had from their animal rearing livelihood. This appears to be a representative case for many others who are self-employed, having exhausted their income owing to the macroeconomic shock that this pandemic has produced. Emphasising that a “labourer is the pillar of the economy; the government needs to take care of the labourer”, Priyank, a respondent, suggested that the government could provide employment assurance or subsistence allowance during such economic crises. He reflected that the government could have established manufacturing units for masks, sanitizers, protective equipment, and other such high demand medical equipment in rural areas to address the shortage of these essentials on one hand and employ rural residents on the other. Return to Contents III. IMPACT OF THE PANDEMIC ON ACCESS TO FOOD The loss of livelihood induced by the pandemic has severely hampered people’s access to food. Given the fact that massive unemployment and loss of livelihood has already engulfed the working millions due to the pandemic, and that some members of the households are excluded from the PDS, the quantity of ration provided by the government cannot act as a bulwark against hunger and want. It naturally leads us to the question of how they survive for the rest of the days without any source of income. Most of the respondents borrowed money to meet their food requirements. Thereafter consuming the ration from the PDS that lasts up to 15 days, they borrow money from their neighbours and friends. Similarly, those who received the kits only once in the last two months used their savings and borrowed money to buy these items again. Few are surviving on meagre savings while the rest are borrowing money from friends and neighbours. None of them could access bank credit due to lockdown. Each had developed their networks of informal borrowing, which they relied upon in times of extreme distress. In such a scenario, they expressed their anguish at falling deeper into a debt trap and not having a clue as to when they will be able to come out of it. The respondents declared that their meagre savings, ration from the PDS, and borrowed money from neighbours and friends are their only hopes of survival. The high share of food expenditure To fully understand the impact of the pandemic on economic access to food in Indian households, one has to consider the overall share of expenditure on food that Indian households incur on average. The average share of food in household total spending amounts to 43 per cent in urban India and rises to 53 per cent in rural India (NSSO 2011-2012: 106-107) 2 . For perspective, we can compare it to French households that spent only 13.2 per cent of their total expenditures on food and non-alcoholic beverages in 2017 (Eurostat 2018). These statistics while confirming Engel’s law— the poorer a household, the larger the share of total expenditures spent on food— also point to the uneven impact of economic hardship on access to food. The kind of economic shock generated by the COVID-19 might be the same for France and India, but its effect on the access to food is graver on the Indian population. Persistent problems aggravate suffering Our empirical studies prove that most of these problems have been occurring from way back (Ngullie 2017, 2018). Corruption, thus, has not been rooted out in Delhi, even though the Arvind Kejriwal government hiked the FPS dealers’ commission by 300 per cent in January 2018. The implementing machinery of the government has not yet established a proactive accountable system for the people. That many eligible individuals are excluded from the PDS has been enumerated time and again. Similarly, long wait and queue at the Fair Price Shops is a commonly reported problem. The lack of water and poor hygienic practices leading to food insecurity has been stressed many times. Moreover, the allocation norm of 5 kg of food grains per person per month under the National Food Security Act (NFSA) 2013 is grossly inadequate to meet basic monthly food needs. During this pandemic, PDS with enhanced ration has been a relief to the poor but with many shortcomings such as unequal distribution, exclusion, absence of social distancing norms at Fair Price Shops, and inadequate ration for the households alongside inconsistent quality. These problems have remained unaddressed for long. However, these lacunae in the PDS have never affected the vulnerable section so adversely as they do now. We have to examine these problems with one eye on the surrounding circumstances which have changed drastically for the worse in the wake of the pandemic. Earlier, even when the quantity was inadequate, distribution unequal, exclusion pervasive, quality inconsistent, people had other sources of income to supplement the ration they received under the PDS. One or two individuals from the household sending remittances from the city, income from various kinds of self-employment, and so on, provided succour to the poor in times of difficulty. Given the fact that all these sources have completely dried up, the situation is grim. Under such an overarching climate of hardship, we believe that any set of recommendations to be effective will have to speak to this new reality. Conscious of the above exigencies, we have attempted to make recommendations with a focus on the immediate measures that can be taken to reduce extreme hardship. Return to Contents IV. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS We propose to make recommendations corresponding to the specific problems identified during the course of this exploratory empirical study. It is submitted that these suggestions are not exhaustive. Problem 1: Unequal/Uneven distribution For tackling the issue of unequal distribution we suggest taking the help of the new blockchain technology to reduce leakages and enhance transparency. The PDS involves a long chain of transactions right from the procurement of the food grains by the government agencies to the disbursement to the beneficiaries.The reasons for one household receiving 10 kg per person and another household in the same locality receiving 5 kg per person could go back to the PDS supply chain. The entire supply chain has various junctures, which are prone to manipulation leading to leakages, theft, and eventually culminating in the unequal distribution. Food grains are first procured by the government under the Minimum Support Price. Then, they go to millers identified by the government for hulling and are returned to the government. Next, food grains are moved to the State godowns from where they are further moved to the Block godowns within the State by selected transporters. Finally, from the Block godowns, food grains are sent to the Fair Price Shops for distribution. 3 This entire supply chain can be a part of blockchain using the distributed ledger technology. With the help of blockchain technology, every point where the product is moved and then stopped for collection or storage gets stored in the electronic ledger. This way the food grain can be tracked from the place where it is despatched to its destination. At present, we have the GPS tracking of trucks carrying PDS supplies from the FCI godowns. Installation of GPS was taken up for the first time in the 11 th Plan (2007-2012) on a pilot basis in Tamil Nadu and Chhattisgarh for tracking movement of vehicles transporting rations ( The Hindu Business Line , December 4, 2012). More recently, Delhi and Telangana Governments had issued directives that all trucks carrying ration items will have to have a GPS Tracking Device in them. Within Delhi, the Delhi State Civil Supply Corporation (DSCSC) had been entrusted with the installation of GPS trackers on trucks carrying rations ( The Hindu , July 29, 2015). While the GPS technology did help to an extent in preventing the diversion of grains in movement or during transportation, but it could not prevent the diversion of grains from the godowns or the FPS under the watch of officials. It is here that we could upgrade to blockchain technology. Given the Government of India’s emphasis on digitization and adoption of new technologies, there cannot be a better and a more opportune time to inaugurate the blockchain technology. However, as with every new technology, the full development of blockchain infrastructure might take time. Therefore we need some more immediate measures.One such mechanism for checking and making the process of distribution more accountable was suggested in mid-June by the Delhi High Court in a petition filed by Delhi Rozi Roti Adhikar Abhiyan which sought time-bound redress of complaints regarding non-supply of rations and transparency in the distribution of food grains. A Bench comprising Justice Hima Kohli and Justice Subramonium Prasad directed the Sub-Divisional Magistrates in every district to conduct a surprise visit at the FPS coming under their territorial jurisdiction and ensure proper functioning.We suggest that a separate cadre of government employees be established for this purpose and stationed at all the FPS. They could be called Ration Inspectors and their job would be to ensure impartial and hassle-free delivery of food grains from the FPS. The formation of such a cadre only needs a notification by the Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Food and Public Distribution, and the legislation can take place later. We do have a provision for periodic inspection of FPS by the Circle food supply officers and Special Commissioners as ordered by the Delhi government in response to numerous complaints received by the beneficiaries in 2015. Unfortunately, with no accountability and lack of supervision of these officers, inspections have been few and sporadic, and consequently, progress on the ground has been negligible. Therefore, having a cadre of officers permanently stationed at the FPS would have an impact.To ensure impartial discharge of duties by such ration inspectors, the existing Lokpal framework can be utilized. Any collusion or discrimination by the ration inspectors can be reported by any member of the public to the State Lokayukta who will initiate summary proceedings and adjudicate upon the guilt of the official. The period for disposing a complaint by the Lokayukta can be fixed at one month by making minor changes in the Delhi Lokayukta and Uplokayukta Act, 1995. Problem 2: Exclusion For including the excluded in the PDS during this pandemic, Abhijeet Banerjee, Amartya Sen, and Raghuram Rajan have gone on record recommending a temporary ration card for a period of six months to everyone who is in need with minimal checks. They have rightly remarked: “The cost of missing many of those who are in dire need vastly exceeds the social cost of letting in some who could perhaps do without it.” 4 We support this mechanism as it is an expedient remedy to counter an immediate situation. The Delhi government has initiated this type of temporary e-coupon system; this facility is available in Delhi government’s website, which allows an applicant to login with the mobile number providing details of family members and Aadhaar and generate e-coupon to collect ration from designated relief centres. We have not verified this initiative. For many years, many eminent scholars have been proposing universal food security legislation instead of a targeted one that excludes many deserving persons (see Swaminathan, M 2000; Sen, A 2009; Himanshu and Sen 2011; Ghosh 2010). Similarly, K.R. Venugopal, former Secretary to the Prime Minister 5 suggested that ration should be issued to every person even without a Ration Card or Aadhaar Card based on a spot summary enquiry. Such a method would enable government officials to know the beneficiaries while dispensing with the necessity of possessing an identity card. This will help the cause of their dignity as well. The emphasis should be on giving something to everyone who has come to collect ration throughout the period of lockdown. Doing away with the need of Ration Cards is particularly important in the current situation because of at least two facts: (i) lakhs of migrant workers stranded outside their home States do not have a ration card, (ii) lakhs of people who never applied and never possessed a food card have become needy due to the lockdown. A recent petition by the former Environment Minister Jairam Ramesh in the Supreme Court has argued for universal coverage of food security. They contended that despite the government’s move to double the entitlement under the PDS, a large number of people who do not have food cards or who do not have it at the time of need are being left out. The Supreme Court declined to pass any directions and instead directed the petitioners to first make a representation to the government. Interestingly, in a 2016 judgment in Swaraj Abhiyan v Union of India 6 , the Supreme Court had ordered all the State governments affected by drought to provide 5 kg of grains per person per month to everyone who wanted it including those who do not hold a ration card. State governments have not yet implemented this judgment in letter and spirit. Something along these lines needs to be done. This verdict should be deemed to include all State governments irrespective of their drought status and carried into effect without any further delay. The government officials would do well to remember the important principle given by the three stalwarts of economics – the cost of missing many of those who are in dire need vastly exceeds the social cost of letting in some who could perhaps do without it. The proposed One Nation One Ration Card scheme should become operational immediately. Had it been in place, much of the misery experienced by migrant workers, who found themselves ineligible to take rations in the States where they worked, could have been avoided. Problem 3: Absence of social distancing norms and congestion at the collection points Aiming to weed out corruption and diversion of food grains, and to attain transparency in service delivery, on March 6, 2018, the Aam Aadmi Party government in Delhi approved a proposal for doorstep or home delivery of ration to bring ‘maximum ease’ for the PDS beneficiaries 7 . Meanwhile, the central government’s stand on the doorstep delivery is contradictory; even as the central government supports the idea, the Lieutenant Governor (LG) rejected the Delhi government’s proposal. This power struggle between the central government and the State government was simplified by the Supreme Court ruling on Article 239AA of the constitution— that in the matters within the legislative competence of the State Legislature, that is, every matter except Police, Public Order and Land as provided under Art 239AA clause 3 the LG has to act on ‘aid and the advice’ of the elected government 8 Following the ruling, the Delhi government approved it again but it has not been implemented yet. In the context of the COVID-19 crisis, doorstep delivery of packaged ration might ease the problems of beneficiaries and prevent transmission of the disease. During this pandemic, all the respondents complained of overcrowding at the ration collection points. They also expressed fear of catching the disease due to the complete absence of social distancing norms, but still went ahead to collect the ration. This act of risking infection for food at FPS reflects the humanitarian crisis. Desperate queues and huge congestion for free ration have proven the indispensability of the PDS and the need to strengthen it especially in terms of ensuring coverage of eligible individuals while taking into account behavioural norms strategy such as doorstep delivery of ration in the context of this pandemic. If the doorstep delivery takes time to be rolled out, the government can consider increasing and diversifying distribution points. Government schools have already been used as PDS delivery points but other public spaces such as sports stadia, public parks, post offices can be roped in to distribute ration as an emergency measure. Problem 4: Loss of livelihood and Income We suggest the government should consider increasing both the coverage and the amount of cash transfers to all the vulnerable groups. 9 The Rs. 500 direct benefit transfer to the female accounts under the Pradhan Mantri Garib Kalyan Yojana which has been recently rolled out is grossly insufficient. The financial inclusion infrastructure put in place by the Jan Dhan Yojana can come handy at this time. The Union government can start with transferring either a one-time lump sum amount or smaller periodic amounts to all Jan Dhan Account holders. Thomas Reardon et al. have suggested cash for work schemes to employ workers to distribute emergency food rations, to upgrade sanitation in markets and other public spaces. 10 We support this suggestion. Problem 5: Inadequate Quantity If the problems listed under the heads of ‘Exclusion’ and ‘Unequal distribution’ are addressed, the core of the problem of inadequate quantity would be addressed. In a previous study in Delhi, on average, a person required 6.18 kg of wheat and 2.96 kg of rice per month (Ngullie 2017).In this connection, 10 kg of food grains consisting of wheat and rice are suitable, during all times, and not just due to COVID-19.Secondly, various State governments should consider establishing community kitchens providing free food as done by the Kerala government to cater to the hungry as an immediate measure. Kerala’s community kitchens have been quite successful in the current situation. Problem 6: Inconsistent quality On this issue, we think that technology-driven solutions have the potential to resolve immediate challenges as well as long term challenges. Use of upcoming technologies like Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning, and the Internet of Things could be urgently adapted to eliminate the menace of adulteration and bad quality food grains. The monitoring of the quality of drinking water using machine learning has already been established by scientists. 11 Machine learning used in combination with sensor technology is used to measure the pH, colour, and turbidity of water and the result is recorded in a database. The system sends alert messages to the user whenever a recorded parameter is lower than the recorded values. Likewise, machine vision systems have shown to be effective in monitoring and evaluation of grain quality. 12 Such technologies should be promoted and employed as soon as possible for the purposes of monitoring PDS food grains. Return to Contents V. CONCLUSION An infectious respiratory disease, COVID-19, has again driven home the importance of well-designed and meticulously implemented food security policies that provide for timely access to adequate quality and quantity of food (and water), and good hygienic norms in times such as the ongoing pandemic.Most of the problems that India’s poor are encountering could be attributed to a lack of implementation of the existing food security framework, although the ‘law may look good on paper’ (Basu 2015). Barring a few recommendations like providing rations to needy people even without food cards and opening community kitchens, most other recommendations involve strengthening the existing PDS and other levers of food security.For instance, sections 14, 15, and 16 of the National Food Security Act (NFSA), 2013 mandate all State governments to set up grievance redress mechanisms and a State Food Commission to oversee the proper implementation of the law. However, States have not ensured such a mechanism to date. Some States have constituted their food commissions but they do not function fully. The NFSA also entitles persons who could not get their supply of food grains or meals to a food security allowance. It also entitles pregnant and lactating mothers to a maternity benefit of not less than Rs. 6,000 in addition to meals. If these provisions of the NFSA had been implemented, a lot of suffering could have been avoided. Return to Contents [ Dr. O. Grace Ngullie did her MPhil and Ph.D from the Centre for the Study of Law and Governance, Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi, under the supervision of Prof. Niraja Gopal Jayal. She is interested in the theoretical and empirical approaches to understanding the links between Politics, Governance, and Public Policy especially with problems related to Poverty, Inequality, and Gender issues. The policy interventions she has researched in depth are in the areas of Self-Help Groups, Public Distribution System, and Cash Transfers. She has worked as a Research Officer at the Indian Institute of Public Administration for the projects of Government of India on Concurrent Evaluation of Government Welfare Schemes. As a Public Policy Scholar at The Hindu Centre for Politics and Public Policy, Dr. Ngullie authored the Policy Report, The Politics and Governance of Social Policies in Delhi: Comparing Cash and In-kind Transfers in July 2018. Her recent work is on Gender Study in the Indian Administrative Service which she wrote for the Lal Bahadur Shastri National Academy of Administration. She can be contacted at [email protected] . Dr. Arib Ahmad Ansari completed his schooling from Cambrian Hall, Dehradun. He graduated with a Bachelor in Law at the Aligarh Muslim University. He worked as a practising lawyer in Delhi for some time but his interest in multidisciplinary research led him to pursue M.Phil and Ph.D from the Centre for the Study of Law and Governance, Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi. In his doctoral work, which he completed under the supervision of Prof. Niraja Gopal Jayal, he examined the ideas of nation and the judicial constructions of national identity in India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. His Ph.D got awarded in 2018. He currently works as a freelance researcher. His areas of interest include Rights, Citizenship, Nationalism, International Law, Constitutional law, Law and Economics, and Politics of Recognition and Redistribution. He can be contacted at [email protected] ]. Endnote: [Note: A typographical error in Endnote 9 was corrected on June 27, 2020, in the HTML version.] 1. A collection of literature is available at the Right to Food Campaign ’s website. [http://www.righttofoodcampaign.in/food-pds/articles]. Last accessed June 26, 2020. Return To text. 2. A more recent household consumption survey was conducted in 2017-18 but the data has not been released yet. Return to Text. 3. Centre of Excellence in Blockchain Technology, National Informatics Centre, Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology . 2020 . Public Distribution System (PDS) . [https://blockchain.gov.in/pdspage.html]. Last accessed on June 25, 2020. Return to Text. 4. Sen, A, et al. 2020 . Huge numbers may be pushed into dire poverty or starvation…we need to secure them , The Indian Express , April 17. [https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/coronavirus-india-lockdown-economy-amartya-sen-raghuram-rajan-abhijit-banerjee-6364521/]. Return to Text. 5. Venugopal K. R. 2020 . The Problem Of Plenty: Steps To Beat The Hunger Pandemic , Outlook Poshan , April 21. [https://poshan.outlookindia.com/story/the-problem-of-plenty-steps-to-beat-the-hunger-pandemic/351199]. Return to Text. 6. WRIT PETITION (C) NO. 857 OF 2015. Return to Text. 7. Aam Aadmi Party’s Website. 2018 . Cabinet approves doorstep delivery of ration under PDS , March 6. [https://aamaadmiparty.org/cabinet-approves-doorstep-delivery-of-ration-under-pds/].Last accessed June 23, 2020. Return to Text. 8. Govt of NCT of Delhi v. Union of India, Civil Appeal no 2357 of 2017. Return to Text. 9. Mander, H. et al. 2020 . A plan to revive a broken economy , The Hindu , May 14. [https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/a-plan-to-revive-a-broken-economy/article31577261.ece]. Return to Text. 10. Reardon T. et al. 2020 . Covid 19’s Disruption of India’s transformed food supply chains , Economic and Political Weekly , May 02, Vol. LV, No. 18. [https://www.epw.in/journal/2020/18/commentary/covid-19s-disruption-indias-transformed-food.html]. Return to Text. 11. Ashwini C. et al. 2019 . Water Quality Monitoring Using Machine Learning And lot , International Journal of Scientific and technological Research , Vol. 8, Issue 10. [http://www.ijstr.org/final-print/oct2019/Water-Quality-Monitoring-Using-Machine-Learning-And-Iot.pdf]. Return to Text. 12. Vithu P. and Moses J. A. 2016 . Trends in Food and Science Technology, Elsevier , Vol. 56, pp. 13-20. Return to Text. References: Ashwini C. et al. 2019. Water Quality Monitoring Using Machine Learning And lot , International Journal of Scientific and Technological Research , Vol. 8, Issue 10. [http://www.ijstr.org/final-print/oct2019/Water-Quality-Monitoring-Using-Machine-Learning-And-Iot.pdf]. Basu, K. 2015 . The Republic of Beliefs: A New Approach to ‘Law and Economics’ , Policy Research Working Paper 7259, World Bank Group, Development Economics Vice Presidency, Office of the Chief Economist. [https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/21991]. Himanshu and Sen, A. 2011 . Why not a universal food security legislation?, Economic and Political Weekly , Vol. 46 (12), pp. 38-47. Rajagopal, K. 2020. Supreme Court orders Centre and States to immediately provide transport, food and shelter free of cost to stranded migrant workers , The Hindu , May 26. [https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/supreme-court-takes-suo-motu-cognisance-of-migrant-workers-issue/article31679389.ece]. Ghosh, J. 2010 . The Political Economy of Hunger in 21 Century India , Economic and Political Weekly , October 30, Vol. xlv (44), pp. 33-38. [https://www.epw.in/journal/2010/44-45/perspectives/political-economy-hunger-21st-century-india.html]. Ngullie, O. G. 2017. Food for the Poor: A Comparative study of the Public Distribution System and the Cash Transfer Scheme in Delhi , Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. Ngullie, O. G. 2018. The Politics and Governance of Social Policies in Delhi: Comparing Cash and In-kind Transfers , Policy Report No. 22, The Hindu Centre for Politics and Public Policy, Chennai. [https://www.thehinducentre.com/publications/policy-report/article24542070.ece/BINARY/Policy%20Report%20No.%2022.pdf]. National Sample Survey Office (NSSO). 2011-2012. “Level and Pattern of Consumer Expenditure 2011-2012”, Tables 6C-R and 6C-U, p. 106-107. More recent household consumption survey was conducted in 2017-18, but the data has not been released yet. Eurostat. 2018. How much are households spending on food? , April 12, 2018. [https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/-/DDN-20181204-1?inheritRedirect=true%20]. Lasania, Y. Y. 2015 . GPS to Track PDS Anomalies , The Hindu , July 29. [https://www.thehindu.com/news/cities/Hyderabad/gps-to-track-pds-anomalies/article7474647.ece]. Press Trust of India . 2009. Amartya Sen favours universal PDS . Business Standard , August 8. [https://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/amartya-sen-favours-universal-pds-109080803035_1.html]. Last accessed June 26, 2020. Swaminathan, M. 2000. Weakening Welfare: The Public Distribution of Food in India , LeftWord Books, New Delhi. Vithu P. and Moses J. A. 2016. Trends in Food and Science Technology, Elsevier , Vol. 56, pp. 13-20.

The call for a Uniform Civil Code (UCC) has long featured on the agenda of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and found mention in its manifesto for the 2019 Lok Sabha election. The issue is not new either for the BJP or for Indian politics: it has been at the centre – and sidelines – of political and legislative debates for well over a century and a half. The BJP was the first party in the country to promise the implementation of UCC if it were to be elected into power. Now that it holds the reins of power, it may be a matter of days before the subject leapfrogs from the cycle of debates to actual law. The urgency seems unavoidable given the ruling party’s recent history with regard to the revocation of Article 370, rendering all forms of talaq to be void, in the context of the talaq-i-biddat, and the determination it has shown towards the construction of the Ram temple in Ayodhya. PDF [498 KB] Keeping in mind the right wing political narrative dominant in the country, the recent pronouncements made in political quarters as well as by the Supreme Court, C.K. Mathew, who was Chief Secretary of Rajasthan before retiring from the Indian Administrative Service (IAS), traces the trajectory of the UCC debate, linking it to the contentious evolution of the Hindu Code Bill, and other key developments since independence, such as the Shah Bano case. He draws also attention to international experiences from Rome, France, and the UK and other countries, including the Islamic nations. Mathew accepts that UCC has been a long-pending matter and also that it is arguably a necessary push in the direction of equity and freedom, especially with regard to gender. And yet he advises caution in applying it to a diverse people with varying degrees of religious sensibilities. The way forward, he says, is not to force it on an unwilling people but to follow the middle path of voluntary adoption, as once suggested by the Chairman of the Drafting Committee of the Constitution of India and the country’s first Law Minister, B.R. Ambedkar: “It is perfectly possible that the future parliament may make a provision by way of making a beginning that the Code shall apply only to those who make a declaration that they are prepared to be bound by it, so that “ [Emphasis by author.] CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND III. DEVELOPMENTS BEFORE AND AFTER INDEPENDENCE IV. THE FOUR HINDU ACTS V. A SECULAR MARRIAGE ACT AND SHAH BANO VI. THE GOA FAMILY LAW VII. THE HINDU CODE: DEBATES, DILUTIONS, AND THE CALL FOR A UNIFORM CIVIL CODE VIII. COMMON CIVIL CODES: SOME INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCES IX. THE PATH AHEAD X. AMBEDKAR’S COUNSEL I. INTRODUCTION The ongoing political narratives in India, seen in newspaper columns, heard in drawing rooms, and bolstered by specific statements by political leaders from the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and its allies are pointers towards moves to put in place a Uniform Civil Code (UCC) by the nationalist right wing on India’s proud, plural, and diverse country and society 1 , 2 . This, however, is not a new debate. The movement for the creation of a UCC for the country is over a 180 years old (if, as we shall see, we take the starting point of this momentous debate as the report of the Second Law Commission of 1835) and has been debated and discussed widely, albeit intermittently, in public and political discourses ever since. The ruling party at the Centre, the BJP, is already speaking of a UCC, which merited a specific subhead in its manifesto for the 2019 Lok Sabha elections: “ 11. Uniform Civil Code Article 44 of the Constitution of India lists Uniform Civil Code as one of the Directive Principles of State Policy. BJP believes that there cannot be gender equality till such time India adopts a Uniform Civil Code, which protects the rights of all women, and the BJP reiterates its stand to draft a Uniform Civil Code, drawing upon the best traditions and harmonizing them with the modern times.” 3 An ideologue of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), Seshadri Chari, as recently as August 19, 2019, made the case for the BJP government to bring in a UCC on the heels of the revocation of Article 370. “The Uniform Civil Code (UCC) was part of the BJP manifesto and had been of the Jan Sangh’s manifesto too. The RSS has also been claiming it. In fact, the UCC and abrogation of Article 370 have been the longest-­standing demands of the Jan Sangh right from its formation. The only addition in the BJP manifesto is Ram Janmabhoomi.” 4 The present is, therefore, is an appropriate moment to look at the past. The intention to bring in the UCC has been articulated. What we have seen from the government so far is a track record of enforcing legislation as a solution to contentious issues, (Article 370 being the most recent example). Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the Union Home Minister, Amit Shah have shown a steely determination to push ahead with their decisions. The choice of issues addressed also suggests that much thought and deliberation have gone into the process: the criminalisation of Triple Talaq is a prime example. But for some stray objections which a flailing Congress party could summon up, there was general approval for the steps taken. The government of the day, it appears, chooses it battles carefully, and then steps in relentlessly, leaving the bewildered Opposition disunited and in disarray. Therefore, this seems to be an opportune moment for the government to address the long pending matter of a UCC. A careful look at the manner in which the issue of the UCC evolved in India will be fruitful for all of us and shall assist us in arriving at a better understanding the complex issues involved. Return to Contents II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND The Second Law Commission, constituted by the British Government, which submitted its report in 1835, which stressed the need for uniformity in codification of Indian law relating to crimes, evidences and contracts, however, specifically recommended that personal laws of Hindus and Muslims should be kept outside such codification. “In their Second Report the Commission examined the problems of Lex Loci and codification and came to the conclusion that ‘what India wants is a body of substantive civil law, in preparing which the law of England should be used as the basis, but which, once enacted, should be the law of India on the subject it embraced. And such a body of law, prepared as it ought to be with a constant regard to the condition and institutions of India, and character, religions, usages of the population, would, we are convinced, be of great importance to that country.’ “ [Emphasis by author] The Report was informed by the views of J.H. Harington, member of the Viceroy’s Council in Bengal, who argued against a more general application of British laws to the inhabitants of the country. He did so on three grounds: first, that the fixed habits, manners and prejudices and the long established local customs were totally opposite in principle and practice to that of England; second, that the people here are not only ignorant of the language in which these laws were written, but could not possibly acquire a knowledge of “our complex, though excellent, system of municipal law”; and third, that the laws of England could not be applied here, as they ought to be “suitable to the genius of the people and all the circumstances in which they may be placed”. 6 The conscious decision taken by the 1835 Report was to separate the personal laws of the various religions and communities of India and keep it out of the proposed codification. Ultimately, this was reflected in Queen Victoria’s Proclamation of 1858 – issued when the British government took over the sovereign power of the administration of the country after displacing the East India Company in the wake of the 1857 revolt – promising absolute non-interference in religious matters. “We do strictly charge and enjoin all those who may be in authority under Us, that they abstain from all interference with the Religious Belief or Worship of any of Our subjects, on pain of Our highest Displeasure.” 7 This specifically meant the clear separation of the two spheres of law. The public sphere, governed by the British and Anglo-Indian law, in crime, land relations, laws of contract and evidence, which applied equally to every citizen irrespective of religion; and the personal laws of the people on matters such as inheritance, succession, marriage, and religious ceremonies and so on. Three contextual issues There are three issues that immediately crop up:1. One; it could be argued that it was probably wise in 1858 for a foreign colonial power to stay clear of the dangers of dabbling in areas related to religion and personal custom in the overall interest of maintaining peace and tranquillity in the nation. This emphasises the wisdom inherent in the Queen’s Proclamation, for it was then necessary to soothe the troubled storm waters of the 1857 turmoil. In the present context, it could be further argued that in independent India, where sovereignty rests with the people under a constitutional democracy, there is no external constraint that can prevent the Indian government – duly and successively elected to power on the principle of universal suffrage for seven decades – to legislate on a common uniform personal code to govern the personal sphere of law such as marriages and succession etc. 2. Two; it is not only non-Hindus who may have severe objections to the promulgation of a law that will govern their most inherent beliefs and faith as well as customs and practices. There has been opposition to the principle in question amongst sections of the Hindus as well because of wide variations in customs amongst its many castes and communities. In fact, when the issue was being hotly debated in the Parliament during the discussions on the Hindu Code, some apologists for the status quo referred to the Vedas and the dharmashashtras , stating that the rule of conduct is the highest law: they tried to place custom and tradition on a pedestal even above the protection of human rights. Other speakers, while supporting the need for a UCC, cleverly disguised their opposition by emphasising the need to respect diversity amongst the various communities and castes within the Hindus. Of course, some of the more vocal critics spoke about the dangers to the Hindu religion if the UCC was approved. 8 3. And three, and in favour of the UCC, it is also well known that the Hindu law for a long time discriminated against women by depriving them of inheritance, remarriage and divorce. Their condition, especially those of Hindu widows and daughters, was poor due to this and other prevalent customs. Could religious practices be employed to deny basic fundamental rights and freedoms to women? Could not the UCC be employed to rectify the errors of a rigid discriminatory society and bring greater equity and compassion into social life? Of course, the question applied to other religions as well, especially the inconsistencies obvious within Muslim law that discriminated against women in more obvious and apparent ways. It is also understood that the general mood of the country recognises the urgent imperative to enable the Muslim woman to find her own identity and establish herself as an individual. Return to Contents III. DEVELOPMENTS BEFORE AND AFTER INDEPENDENCE Progressive sections in British-ruled India and women’s organisations protested the discrimination against women and this led to a spate of laws passed with respect to the Hindus which were beneficial to women, such as the Hindu Widow Remarriage Act of 1856, Married Women’s Property Act of 1874, with its Amendment Act of 1923, and the Hindu Inheritance (Removal of Disabilities) Act of 1928, which in a significant move, permitted a Hindu woman’s right to property. 9 So also the Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act of 1937 was a significant step for assuring rights to women. Earlier the share of the deceased husband used to pass on to the other co-sharers of the property. With the promulgation of this Act, its most important provision was to give the widow the same rights which her husband had enjoyed while he was alive. The growing tide of legislation that delved into personal issues of ordinary men and women of the country, generated debate and controversy and required a reasoned and measured response from the government of the day. B.N. Rau Committee and Codifying Hindu Law This finally led to the setting up in 1941 of the B.N. Rau Committee – officially the Hindu Law Committee – whose task it was to examine the question of the necessity of common Hindu laws. Rau was an Indian civil servant, jurist, diplomat and statesman known for his key role in drafting the Constitution of India as Adviser to Constituent Assembly.The B.N. Rau Committee recommended a codified Hindu law, which would give equal rights to women in keeping with the modern trends of society. However, it must be mentioned that its focus was primarily on reforming the Hindu law in accordance with the scriptures. The committee reviewed the 1937 Act and recommended a civil code of marriage and succession for Hindus. After much study, it presented the government with two draft Bills on March 1942 regarding intestate succession and marriage. Unable to clinch the matter, the Rau Committee was revived and reconstituted once more in 1944: it finally sent its report to the Indian Parliament with a draft Bill in February 1947.The Rau Committee report dealt comprehensively with Intestate and Testamentary Succession including Maintenance, Marriage and Divorce, Minority and Guardianship and Adoption. As procedure demanded, the draft went before a select committee again, this time chaired by Ambedkar himself. When it finally came up for discussion in February 1951, India was already a free nation. Discussions continued, but were endless, the Hindu Code Bill lapsed and was re-submitted only in 1952. The provisions had to be broken up into separate parts, apparently to nudge through the radical changes in smaller steps, rather than as a wholescale transformation. The Hindu Marriage Bill was passed in May 1955, and the Hindu Succession Act in June 1956. Later, the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Bill was passed in August 1956 and the final component, the Adoptions and Maintenance Bill in December 1956. The Hindu Code and the “curious” call for a UCC The question remains to this day: why was the personal law of the Hindus alone being codified and why a uniform code for the entire populace was not being attempted by the framers of the Constitution? G.R. Rajagopaul, himself a witness to the developments of those momentous days, as a member of a “small committee” set up by Ambedkar “to examine” the Hindu Code Bill when it was pending in the Constituent Assembly in 1948, attempts an answer: “…it was felt that an attempt should be made to codify the Hindu law and if this succeeded, and of the measures produced thereby had in themselves intrinsic merits commending them for universal application, the time would not be far off when other communities might like to follow suit and ask for reconsideration of their own law in the light of changed situations.” 10 It was a pious hope, but that one that did not materialise. The Hindu Code that had been prepared in this context had the stamp of Ambedkar who, as a radical thinker, had criticised the Hindu law on many an occasion. The draft Hindu Code Bill received much criticism and the issues that were opposed pertained to monogamy, divorce, abolition of coparcenary (women inheriting a shared title) and inheritance to daughters. The first President of the country, Rajendra Prasad, opposed these reforms; other critics included Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, a few senior members and Hindu fundamentalist parties. The fundamentalists called it “anti-Hindu” and “anti-Indian”. In order to deliberately stall the proceedings, they demanded a UCC applicable to all religions and not only for the Hindus 11 . In fact, the opposition to the Hindu Code Bill, in the form presented to the Parliament, came from an array of members representing various factions of the Hindu majority and others within and without the Parliament. As mentioned above, the most important of them were conservative hardliners of the Congress party, among them veterans like Vallabhbhai Patel, Rajendra Prasad, and J.B. Kripalani who had a completely different world view from Nehru’s. Rajendra Prasad even threatened to refuse Presidential assent to the Bills: Patel concurred in private, but was disinclined to argue with Nehru. The other critics included “the Hindu fundamentalists within the Congress Party who were substantial in number led by Deputy Speaker M. Ananthasayanam Ayyangar” 12 ; the Hindu Mahasabha and its women’s wing, “with representatives like Shyama Prasad Mukherjee, N.C. Chatterjee and others who opposed the Bill strongly for threatening the so-called religious foundations of Hindu society.” 13 Importantly, Som throws light on how the UCC came into the political narrative, and why and how Ambedkar responded to this move for a common code: “By using inverse logic the Mahasabha leaders tried to suggest that the Hindu Code was, after all, a communal measure and a uniform Civil Code should have been made instead, to give effect to the secular ideals of the country. The motives of the Mahasabha, however, were betrayed when Dr Shyama Prasad Mukherjee made the suggestion that the Hindu Code be optional. Ambedkar was provoked into dismissing S. P. Mukherjee’s remarks as not worth serious consideration since he had after all, as member of Nehru’s Cabinet, whole-heartedly supported the Code which he was now opposing. Ambedkar also pointed out that innocuous suggestion that a uniform Civil Code be initiated seemed curious, as he wondered how could opponents of the Bill turn overnight into protagonists of a Civil Code.” 14 Som also gives details of the other groups which opposed the Hindu Code: the Sikh group “who resented being clubbed with the Hindus” and feared that the Code would be an attempt to absorb them into the Hindu fold; the Muslim group who “were obviously encouraged by the Hindu fundamentalist group within the Congress to tilt the scales in their favour”; and finally, the women parliamentarians, not because they were opposed to the Code, but because they felt that the measures “were not going far enough”. The arguments they pushed forward included the following: the need to protect the hallowed traditions of the Hindu shastras ; the resentment arising from the fact that the Muslim Personal Law remained untouched; the proposed measures affecting the bulk of the population had not been circulated so as to ascertain public opinion and was being pushed through hastily; and, most importantly, the grant of equal property rights to women threatened the well-entrenched economic rights of the male in the society. It was the powerful voice of Nehru that kept the discussion going. He was disgusted by the repeated by the pristine references to the Hindu shastras . “For Nehru, the Hindu Code was a necessary reform measure which fitted into his larger perspective of all-round national development. As he put it, ‘we talk about Five Year Plans, of economic progress, industrialization, political freedom and all that. They are all highly important. But I have no doubt in my mind that the real progress of the country means progress not only on the political plane, not only on the economic plane, but also on the social plane. They have to be integrated, all these, when the great nation goes forward.’” 15 The women Members of Parliament, had previously thrown their weight with the fundamentalists; but now, probably influenced by Nehru, they began to understand the contradictions they would have to confront as the Hindu Code was going a long way in granting them significant rights. In a significant political move, they reversed their position, and backed the Hindu law reform. They feared that publicly allying with the conservative Hindu group would cause a further setback to their rights and seriously damage their future attempts to gain equality with their men folk in all other matters. Ultimately, therefore, an abridged and diluted version of this Bill was passed by the Parliament in 1956, which while excluding non-Hindus from the ambit of the reform, brought into the statute books four separate Acts, namely the Hindu Marriage Act, the Hindu Succession Act, Minority and Guardianship Act and the Adoptions and Maintenance Act.In a gesture to indicate the willingness of Parliament to consider the issue of a uniform code at some later point in time, it was decided to add the implementation of a UCC in Article 44 as a Directive Principle specifying that “The State shall endeavour to secure for citizens a uniform civil code throughout the territory of India.” This decision to include the UCC only as a non-justiciable Directive Principle rather than as a justiciable Article was opposed by progressive women members like Rajkumari Amrit Kaur and Hansa Mehta. Aparna Mahanta writes that the “failure of the Indian state to provide a uniform civil code, consistent with its democratic secular and socialist declarations, further illustrates the modern state’s accommodation of the traditional interests of a patriarchal society”. IV. THE FOUR HINDU ACTS The four laws that came into existence in 1956 may be quickly examined for our understanding. A “remarkable” 17 role was played by H.V. Pataskar, Minister of State in the Law Ministry in not only piloting these Bills through both Houses of Parliament, but also by conducting “frequent informal meetings to encourage accommodation.” 18 A: The first of them, the Hindu Marriage Act of 1955, is included as part of the Hindu Code Bills. The main purpose of this enactment was to amend and codify the laws relating to marriage among Hindus and others; others meaning in this context, the Buddhists, Jains and Sikhs. Besides the amendment and codification of Sastrik Law, it introduced separation and divorce which was earlier non-existent in Sastrik Law. This enactment brought uniformity of law for all sections of Hindus. Section 2 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 says:“This Act applies - a. to any person who is a Hindu by religion in any of its forms or developments, including a Virashaiva, a Lingayat or a follower of the Brahmo, Prarthana or Arya Samaj; b. to any person who is a Buddhist, Jaina or Sikh by religion; and c. to any other person domiciled in the territories to which this Act extends who is not a Muslim, Christian, Parsi or Jew by religion, unless it is proved that any such person would not have been governed by the Hindu law or by any custom or usage as part of that law in respect of any of the matters dealt with herein if this Act had not been passed. Explanation . The following persons are Hindus, Buddhists, Jainas or Sikhs by religion, as the case may be: a. any child, legitimate or illegitimate, both of whose parents are Hindus, Buddhists, Jainas or Sikhs by religion; b. any child, legitimate or illegitimate, one of whose parents is a Hindu, Buddhist, Jaina or Sikh by religion and who is brought up as a member of the tribe, community, group or family to which such parent belongs or belonged; and c. any person who is a convert or re-convert to the Hindu, Buddhist, Jaina or Sikh religion. 2. Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), nothing contained in this Act shall apply to the members of any Scheduled tribe within the meaning of clause (25) of article 366 of the Constitution unless the Central Government, by notification in the Official Gazette, otherwise directs. 3. The expression “Hindu” in any portion of this Act shall be construed as if it included a person who, though not a Hindu by religion, is, nevertheless, a person to whom this Act applies by virtue of the provisions contained in this section.” 19 The Act provided for conditions under which a Hindu marriage was to be solemnised, registration of such marriages, the restitution of conjugal rights as well as judicial separation, the provision for divorces, punishment for divorces etc.The application of the Act to all Hindus by religion in all of the religion’s derivatives, while also clubbing together other religions, namely Jains, Buddhists and Sikhs, was initially a point of concern and debate, though with the passage of time, it seems to have been accepted by all the people. It needs to be pointed out here that with the passage of the amended Anand Marriage Act, Sikhs now also have their own personal law related to marriage. The Indian Parliament cleared the Anand Marriage Amendment Bill in 2012, which paved the way for the validation of Sikh traditional marriages, amending the Anand Marriage Act of 1909, thus providing for compulsory registration of “Anand Karaj” marriages. With the new legislation, couples whose marriages have been registered under this Act will not be required to get their marriage registered under the Registration of Births, Marriages and Deaths Act, 1969, or any other law for the time being in force. However, the UK does not recognise such marriages and Sikh British citizens still require a legal English marriage as per law. In passing it may be mentioned that the Hindu Marriage Act still shows its provisions as being applicable to Hindus as well as Sikhs. B: The Hindu Succession Act, 1956 , is the second of the Acts of the Parliament, under the umbrella of what was envisaged as the Hindu Code, enacted to amend and codify the law relating to intestate or unwilled succession, among Hindus, Buddhists, Jains, and Sikhs. Hailed for its consolidation of Hindu laws on succession into one, this Act lays down a uniform and comprehensive system of inheritance and applies to persons governed by all schools of religious thought such as the Mitākṣarā and Dāyabhāga schools. 20 “One of the important differences between the two schools is that under the Dayabhaga, the father is regarded as the absolute owner of his property whether it is self-acquired or inherited from his ancestors. Mitakshara law draws a distinction between ancestral property (referred to as joint family property or coparcenary property) and separate (e.g. property inherited from mother) and self-acquired properties. In the case of ancestral properties, a son has a right to that property equal to that of his father by the very fact of his birth. The term son includes paternal grandsons and paternal great-grandsons who are referred to as coparceners. An important category of ancestral property is property inherited from one’s father, paternal grandfather and paternal great-grand father.” 21 The Hindu woman’s limited estate was abolished by the Act. Any property possessed by a Hindu female is to be held by her as her absolute property and she is given full power to deal with it and dispose it of according to her will. Parts of this Act were amended in 2005 by the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, which revised rules on coparcenary property, giving daughters of the deceased equal rights with sons, and subjecting them to the same liabilities and disabilities. The amendment essentially furthers equal rights between males and females in the legal system.The applicability of this Act is similar to Section 2 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, quoted above. The anomaly mentioned with regard to the Hindu Marriage Act whereby persons of certain other religions were clubbed with the Hindus though they may not be Hindus by religion continues to be an issue. C: The Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, was the third of the statutes introduced as part of the Hindu Code. The Act was meant to enhance the Guardians and Wards Act of 1890, not serve as its replacement. This Act specifically served to define guardianship relationships between adults and minors, as well as between people of all ages and their respective property. A minor and a guardian were defined in this Act as follows: 4. “Definitions.—In this Act,— a. “minor” means a person who has not completed the age of eighteen years; b. “guardian” means a person having the care of the person of a minor or of his property or ofboth his person and property, and includes—a natural guardian,a guardian appointed by the will of the minor’s father or mother,a guardian appointed or declared by a court, anda person empowered to act as such by or under any enactment relating to any Court of wards. c. “natural guardian” means any of the guardians mentioned in section 6.”Section 6 says:“6. Natural guardians of a Hindu minor.—The natural guardians of a Hindu minor; in respect of the minor’s person as well as in respect of the minor’s property (excluding his or her undivided interest in joint family property), are— a. in the case of a boy or an unmarried girl—the father, and after him, the mother: provided that the custody of a minor who has not completed the age of five years shall ordinarily be with the mother; b. in the case of an illegitimate boy or an illegitimate unmarried girl—the mother, and after her, the father; c. in the case of a married girl—the husband:Provided that no person shall be entitled to act as the natural guardian of a minor under the provisions of this section— a. if he has ceased to be a Hindu, or b. if he has completely and finally renounced the world by becoming a hermit (vanaprastha) or an ascetic (yati or sanyasi). Explanation.—In this section, the expressions “father” and “mother” do not include a step-father and a step-mother.” 22 As with the other Acts of the Hindu Code, this Act also applies to all Hindus, including those who practise the religions of Buddhism, Sikhism, and Jainism. Both legitimate and illegitimate minors with at least one parent, fall under the jurisdiction of this Act. The father is the primary guardian for a legitimate boy and unmarried girl and their property, while the mother is the secondary guardian. However, the mother is the primary guardian for all children under the age of five. For illegitimate children, the mother is the primary guardian, while the father is the secondary guardian. A married girl’s husband becomes her guardian. For an adoptive son, the adoptive father is the primary guardian, then the adoptive mother. Should a parent cease being a Hindu or become a renouncer, hermit, or ascetic, that parent will lose his or her guardian rights. D: The last of the statutes of the Hindu Code enacted by Parliament in 1956 was the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act . This Act dealt specifically with the legal process of adopting children by a Hindu adult, as well as the legal obligations of a Hindu to provide “maintenance” to various family members including, but not limited to, his wife or wives, parents, and in-laws. In Hindu Vedas, begetting a son is one of the three debts that a Hindu was required to discharge in this world. Yet, illegitimate sons also have their rights, acknowledged from the Vedic age to this date. Some of the illegitimate sons were also fitted into the system of sonship and those who were left out were never denied maintenance. It was believed that the one who was responsible, either directly or indirectly, for the birth of a child, had to provide for its maintenance. These ideas are reflected in the provisions of the Act. This Act too, like the other three Acts mentioned above, has been made applicable to Hindus and all those considered under the umbrella term of Hindus, including Buddhists, Jains and Sikhs. Illegitimate children also shall get the benefit of maintenance under the provisions of the Act. Persons who are Muslims, Christians, Parsis or Jews are excluded from this definition. Moreover, if the wife is not a Hindu, then the husband is not bound to provide maintenance for her under this Act under modern Hindu Law.The fact remains that the separate Acts under what would have been a Hindu Code, while bringing some form of uniformity in social and religious customs, failed to control the prevalent gender discrimination. As the Acts applied only to Hindus, and religions under the umbrella term ‘Hindu’, women from the other religions remained victims of male chauvinism and other forms of prejudices. Especially so, the Muslim women who did not get the benefit of inheritance of agricultural land. Nehru accepted that the Bill was incomplete, but was reluctant to make too many drastic changes which could stir the anger of other communities. But he took pride in the fact that it was an “outstanding achievement” of his time. 23 His principle of women’s equality as an ideal to be pursued in Indian politics was eventually accepted by the previous critics of the Bill. A UCC, for him, was essential for the country, but he hesitated in forcing it down upon any community, especially if that community was not ready for such a reform. Indeed, his vision of uniformity was not forcibly enforced, but was added as a desirable objective under the Directive Principles of the Constitution. Return to Contents V. A SECULAR MARRIAGE ACT AND SHAH BANO An Act which predated the above statutes, namely the Special Marriage Act, 1954, also deserves a place in this analysis. This Act provides for civil marriage for any citizen irrespective of religion, thus permitting any Indian to have their marriage outside the boundaries of any religious personal law. The law applied to all of India, except Jammu and Kashmir, though it would apply there too, when amendments to Article 370 come into operation.Though the Act is almost identical to the Hindu Marriage Act of 1955, it gives some idea as to how secularised the law regarding marriages had become. The Special Marriage Act allowed Muslims to marry under its provisions and thereby retain their protections, generally beneficial to Muslim women, which could not be found in their personal law. Under this Act polygamy was illegal, and inheritance and succession would be governed by the Indian Succession Act, rather than the respective Muslim personal law. Divorce also would be governed by the secular law, and maintenance of a divorced wife would be along the lines set down in the civil law. While distinct from the Hindu personal law, the Act provided the safeguards that had been considered in the statutes of the Hindu Code to the Muslim beneficiaries of the Act. The Shah Bano case We need to take some time to consider a possible historic opportunity that had presented itself to the Rajiv Gandhi government to make substantial changes to the position and status of Muslim women. This pertains to what is now known as the Shah Bano case of 1985.Bano was a 73-year-old woman who bravely, and with much courage, sought maintenance allowance from her husband, Muhammad Ahmad Khan, who divorced her after 40 years of marriage by the triple talaaq system as permitted under the Muslim personal law. He refused her claim for maintenance and the matter went into protracted legal proceedings. Though Bano was initially granted maintenance by the verdict of a local court in 1980, the matter was taken up to the Supreme Court, which finally ruled in her favour under the provisions of Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, (Cr.P.C) 1973, which applied to all citizens irrespective of religion. It further recommended that the long pending UCC be set be finally enacted.The Shah Bano judgment observed thus: “It is also a matter of regret that Article 44 of our Constitution has remained a dead letter. It provides that “The State shall endeavour to secure for the citizens a uniform civil code throughout the territory of India”. There is no evidence of any official activity for framing a common civil code for the country. A belief seems to have gained ground that it is for the Muslim community to take a lead in the matter of reforms of their personal law. A common Civil Code will help the cause of national integration by removing disparate loyalties to laws which have conflicting ideologies. No community is likely to bell the cat by making gratuitous concessions on this issue. It is the State which is charged with the duty of securing a uniform civil code for the citizens of the country and, unquestionably, it has the legislative competence to do so. A counsel in the case whispered, somewhat audibly, that legislative competence is one thing, the political courage to use that competence is quite another. We understand the difficulties involved in bringing persons of different faiths and persuasions on a common platform. But, a beginning has to be made if the Constitution is to have any meaning. Inevitably, the role of the reformer has to be assumed by the courts because, it is beyond the endurance of sensitive minds to allow injustice to be suffered when it is so palpable. But piecemeal attempts of courts to bridge the gap between personal Laws cannot take the place of a common Civil Code. Justice to all is a far more satisfactory way of dispensing justice than justice from case to case.” 24 Before Shah Bano , two other Muslim women had previously received maintenance under the Criminal code in 1979 and 1980. The relevant section of the Cr. P.C. reads as follows:“125. Order for maintenance of wives, children and parents. If any person having sufficient means neglects or refuses to maintain…his wife, unable to maintain herself… a Magistrate of the first class may, upon proof of such neglect or refusal, order such person to make a monthly allowance for the maintenance of his wife… at such monthly rate not exceeding five hundred rupees in the whole, as such Magistrate thinks fit, and to pay the same to such person as the Magistrate may from time to time direct.” 25 It is relevant to observe that the maximum amount payable under this provision is only Rs 500 a month. However, the Shah Bano case soon became a hotly debated political issue. It is interesting to note that after the 1984 anti-Sikh riots, most of the minorities in India, with Muslims being the largest, feared attacks on their identity and felt the need to safeguard their culture. 26 Muslim conservatives accused the government of encouraging Hindu dominance over every Indian citizen at the expense of the minorities. The Criminal Procedure Code was seen as a threat to the Muslim personal law, which they considered their cultural identity. According to them, the judiciary recommending a UCC was evidence that Hindu values would be imposed over every Indian. The possible reason for this was the animosity between hardline fundamentalist sections in the two religions: The Hindu Code being well established in the country by now, the fear amongst the minorities was that its provisions would become the template for superimposition on the minorities. This was an unexpressed fear that could not be reasonably satisfied through logic and discussions. The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights in Divorce) Act, 1986 The worst effect of this case can be seen in the succumbing of the Rajiv Gandhi Government, when it passed a law nullifying the Supreme Court judgment through the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights in Divorce) Act, 1986. This made Sec. 125 non-operable for Muslim women. According to this, maintenance was payable to the divorced wife only during the iddat period (the mandatory waiting period when the divorce matters are being settled), and not thereafter. The fate of the divorced woman after the iddat period remained dark and uncertain. This act of the government was viewed by large sections of citizens, including Muslim women, with contempt and fury and may have resulted in the loss of confidence of the people in the party. 27 The Muslim orthodoxy felt threatened by the judiciary-directed modification of the Muslim personal law. Rajiv Gandhi’s Congress government, which previously had their support, lost elections in December 1989 perhaps because of its initial endorsement of the Supreme Court’s decision and its later turnaround by passing the Muslim (Protection of Rights in Divorce) Women Act, 1986. The members of the Muslim Personal Law board started a campaign for complete autonomy in their personal laws and this became a national issue as can be seen from the news coverage of the time.An independent Muslim Member of Parliament proposed a Bill in the Lok Sabha to protect the community’s personal law. Sensing the political error that it had committed and its impact on the Muslim vote-bank, the Congress Party reversed its previous position and supported this Bill. The Hindu right, the Left, Muslim liberals and women’s organisations strongly condemned it. The debate now centred on the divinity of the Muslim personal law and the claim that a judicial court had no role to play in such matters. It also led to a situation of defining a woman’s right according to her specific community, with Congress political leader Jaffar Sharief saying, “today, in the Shah Bano’s case, I am finding that many people are more sympathetic towards Muslim women than their own women. This is very strange.” 28 It would not be out of place to say that the legal reversal of introducing the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights in Divorce) Act of 1986 29 , significantly also dampened the national women’s movement of all religions and civic groups in the 1980s. An opportunity squandered? It may well be argued that the Rajiv Gandhi government squandered a historic opportunity to bring about a significant reformation of the rights of Muslim women. Given the specific intent of the Supreme Court, the Government could have taken the great leap forward. In fact, the Supreme Court had quoted Dr Tahrir Mahmood from his book Muslim Personal Law (1977 edition pp. 200-202) as he exhorted the Muslim Community: “instead of wasting their energies in exerting theological and political pressure to secure an ‘immunity’ for their traditional personal law from the state’s legislative jurisdiction, the Muslim will do well to begin by exploring and demonstrating how the true Islamic laws, purged of their time-worn and anachronistic interpretations, can enrich the common civil code.” This was signal enough for the government to have initiated reforms which would have had a salutary and far-reaching impact on the community and the country as a whole. Return to Contents VI. THE GOA FAMILY LAW Surprisingly, Goa is the only State in India which has a form of UCC. The Goa Family Law, originating from the Portuguese Civil Code, continued to be implemented even after Goa’s annexation in 1961 30 . A word about the mother law may not be out of place: The Portuguese Civil Code of 1867 - which was extended to Portugal’s overseas provinces including Goa in November, 1869 - is a remarkable piece of legislation promulgated by King Luiz Augusto Rebello da Silva. Comprising 2538 articles, it underwent various legislative amendments from time to time by inclusion of other related laws such as law of marriage, protection of children, divorce, civil registration, civil procedure etc. Interestingly it defines important concepts of civil law, including its scope, the sources of rights and obligations etc. The function of civil law has been defined thus: “Civil Law recognizes and specifies such rights and corresponding duties; ensures and protects the enjoyment of rights and the performance of duties; lays down the circumstances in which a citizen may be disabled from exercising rights and the manner in which such disability may be overcome.” It is significant to note that within the scope of Article 9, and through a separate decree of 16 December 1880, “it ordered safeguarding in favour of the gentile Hindus of Goa, without distinction of Old and New Conquests, their special and peculiar usages and customs reviewed and codified by this decree.” 31 There is a lesson for us in there somewhere; a Christian Catholic Government situated in Lisbon, ordering the protection of the customs and practices of its Hindu subjects, residing in faraway Goa on the Indian sub-continent. And this happened about 140 years ago. The Goa Family Law was in the news not long ago: The Supreme Court drew attention to this as recently as September 2019, when it observed in Jose Paulo Coutinho vs Maria Luiza Valentina Pereira : “21. However, Goa is a shining example of an Indian State which has a uniform civil code applicable to all, regardless of religion except while protecting certain limited rights. It would also not 5 (1985) 2 SCC 556 6 (1995) 3 SCC 635 be out of place to mention that with effect from 22.12.2016 certain portions of the Portuguese Civil Code have been repealed and replaced by the Goa Succession, Special Notaries and Inventory Proceedings Act, 2012 which, by and large, is in line with the Portuguese Civil Code. The salient features with regard to family properties are that a married couple jointly holds the ownership of all the assets owned before marriage or acquired after marriage by each spouse. Therefore, in case of divorce, each spouse is entitled to half share of the assets. The law, however, permits pre­nuptial agreements which may have a different system of division of assets. Another important aspect, as pointed out earlier, is that at least half of the property has to pass to the legal heirs as legitime. This, in some ways, is akin to the concept of ‘coparcenary’ in Hindu law. However, as far as Goa is concerned, this legitime will also apply to the self­acquired properties. Muslim men whose marriages are registered in Goa cannot practice polygamy. Further, even for followers of Islam there is no provision for verbal divorce.” 32 However, Ramakant D. Khalap, who was the Chairman of the Goa Law Commission (April 2009-March 2012), raises two fundamental questions:The first is whether the family laws in Goa truly “uniform”? “That the Family Laws of Goa are uniform in all respects is a misconception which we have tried to expose through our Report No.21 aptly titled as the “Protection of Institution of Marriage Bill 2012”. This Bill and the accompanying Report and Statement of Objects and Reasons highlight how the “Concordata” i.e. the Treaty signed between the King of Portugal and the Holy See (The Pope) in 1940 permits the Catholics to get married in Church but simultaneously takes away the Jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in matters of separation of spouses, annulment of Marriage and Divorce and further proceeds to make our constitutionally created High Court of Judicature a mere post office performing the onerous task of conveying the decrees of the Canonical Courts to the Civil Registrars for recording the dissolution of marriage in the marriage Register maintained by the Civil Registrar. The law vests no power in the High Court to examine the Decrees of Canonical Courts on the touchstone of Constitutional validity or Public Policy. The very fact that such an anachronism on the legal system of the Country could continue for well over 50 Years after liberation emphasizes the [”raison d’etre”] of a validly constituted Law Reforms Commission.” 33 He continues by pondering over the issue of a civil code and Article 44: “Should Goa or for that matter India have a Civil Code of its own? This is a million dollar question. We toyed with this idea for a considerable time. It is a gigantic work and requires perhaps a specially constituted Law Commission for the sole purpose of drafting a Civil Code for the State of Goa and or the Country as a whole. We leave this issue to the powers that be and hope that one day the dream enshrined in Article 44 of the Constitution of India will be realized.” 34 We must, of course, keep in mind that there are some discordant views about the Goan law itself. The tolerance of bigamy amongst Hindus, the essentiality of church marriages and prohibition of divorce for Catholics, etc are oddly anachronistic in the modern world. Further, Albertina Almeida, a prominent Goan lawyer had this to say: “The ‘Goans’ (meaning the dominant class/caste Goans) on the one hand have been wanting to distinguish themselves from the Portuguese, and from the mestiços (mixed race of Portuguese and Goan parents), and on the other hand also want to distinguish themselves from the rest of India, while maintaining all the distinctions that they have already made between themselves. It suited the Goan to distinguish himself from the non-Goan (the rich ‘Indian’) and the migrant by whom he felt overwhelmed either because of larger power potential or numbers. Be it in the field of law, music, song and dance, cuisine, games, language, art, architecture…..the story is the same. In and through all these fields of life, there is a desire to consolidate the existing power equations. This has been further strengthened by the economic driver of tourism, which has taken the form of neo-colonialism, and where it was essential to stereotype the image of an exotic Goan with a different image of a hybrid between Indian and Iberian culture.” 35 Evidently, the Goan personal law, often touted as a model that could be followed by the minority community, has its own fault lines. Return to Contents VII. THE HINDU CODE: DEBATES, DILUTIONS, AND THE CALL FOR A UNIFORM CIVIL CODE As we harken back to those tumultuous days of intense debates in the parliament, in the final analysis it may be said it stands to the credit of Nehru that the Hindu Code was at all passed, though in an abridged fashion. The UCC as originally envisaged was never realized. It remained a pious hope, caught among the linguistic trappings of Article 44 of the Directive Principles of the Constitution. Muslim law remained untouched: it was several decades later that instant triple talaq was outlawed by a strong pro-Hindu government; and though clerics opposed it, the modern Indian, and the world in general, largely welcomed the measure. There are those who would argue later that the objections raised in the Parliament during the debate on the Hindu Code, could have been talked through, if persistence and determination could have steadied the legislative intent. Nehru was conscious of the criticism that the amendments that were finally approved diminished the Bill. But he was always to hold the view that one had to make a beginning somewhere and that the essential principles underlying the changes were not given up. Even those Parliamentarians who did not see eye to eye with him did concede that without him, the legislation would not have been passed at all. Amrit Kaur said it succinctly when she commented that the social reforms that are now on the Statute Book would have been talked out if it had not been for Jawaharlal’s powerful advocacy and insistence on them. 36 The debate surrounding the UCC, with its far-reaching implications for all religions and communities, combined with undeniable impact on issues pertaining to the secular nature of this country, is one of the most controversial subject of current Indian politics. The plural and multi-religious nature of the country and its religious laws, with differentiation not only in caste and religion, but even in region and sects, further complicates the issue. Women’s rights groups have argued that this is not so: the only issue is the protection of their rights and security, irrespective of religion and the possibility of its misuse by political groups. 37 “Neither necessary nor desirable”: 21 st Law Commission In the midst of all this clamour, it was a little unexpected, though perhaps cautionary, that the 21 st Law Commission struck a wary note. In the initial paragraphs of its report dated August 31, 2018, it wrote: “While diversity of Indian culture can and should be celebrated, specific groups or weaker sections of the society must not be dis-privileged in the process. Resolution of this conflict does not mean abolition of difference. This Commission has, therefore, dealt with laws that are discriminatory rather than providing a uniform civil code which is neither necessary nor desirable at this stage [emphasis by author]. Most countries are now moving towards recognition of difference, and the mere existence of difference does not imply discrimination, but is indicative of a robust democracy.” (Para 1.15) 38 That said, one must also factor in the Hindu nationalists view this issue in the light of the concept of their laws enshrined in the four Acts collectively called the Hindu Code, which they say, is secular and equal to both sexes. The BJP was the first party in the country to promise the implementation of UCC if it were to be elected into power. Now that it holds the reins of power, it may be but a matter of days before the subject holds centre stage in the never-ending debates of our complex and fascinating country.From another perspective, the UCC’s importance for gender equality cannot be denied and in a country like India, where women’s rights are daily contested and often denied, this is of special significance. And most significantly, the imperative for reforming the archaic personal laws of Muslims which allow unilateral divorce and polygamy cannot be ignored. The recent law that makes the triple talaaq a crime has found approval among most sections of our society, except the conservative Islamic segments. On a more practical level, the Supreme Court of India has also been asserting the need for a UCC. It had also made certain pronouncements recently in two cases that make it amply clear that it is in favour of a UCC. In ABC 39 vs The State (NCT of Delhi) decided on July 6. 2015, the court dealt with the issue of guardianship of a Christian unwed mother without the consent of the child’s father. While ruling in the woman’s favour, it said: “It would be apposite for us to underscore that our Directive Principles envision the existence of a uniform civil code, but this remains an unaddressed constitutional expectation.” 40 Again, very recently, in Civil Appeal 7378 of 2010 delivered on September 13, 2019, (Jose Paul Coutinho vs Maria Luiza), the Supreme Court stated “Whereas the founders of the Constitution in Article 44 in Part IV dealing with the Directive Principles of State Policy had hoped and expected that the State shall endeavour to secure for the citizens a Uniform Civil Code throughout the territories of India, till date no action has been taken in this regard.” 41 Return to Contents VIII. COMMON CIVIL CODES: SOME INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCES It is also pertinent to note that many of the countries of the world do have their own codified civil law applicable on all its citizens uniformly, without fear or favour, affection or malice. Perhaps we have not yet comprehended this fact consciously as a nation. The logic and imperative of having a civil code homogeneously applied on its citizens, irrespective of religion, sex or any other consideration, cannot be overemphasised. A quick survey of some of these civil laws or codes as extant in some other parts of the world will give us a broader view of the requirement of a common code in India. Justinian and the Roman origin We all do know that Civil law refers to a body of rules that attempts to define and make justiciable the private rights of citizens: ideally it offers legal remedies that may be sought in a dispute. It covers all the related areas of law such as contracts, torts, property and family law. The concept of civil law can be traced back to the Romans – although other examples, such as the code of Ur-Nammu of Mesopotamia may be a comparable example – and is a good starting point to trace the evolution of civil law. The Romans used doctrines to develop a code, specific to the Roman people, that determined how legal issues would be decided. They called it Jus Civile, the legal historical term which embraces all the rules and principles of law derived from the customs and legislations of Rome, as opposed to those derived from the customs of all nations known as jus gentium or from fundamental ideas of right and wrong implicit in the human mind, known as jus naturale. 42 Emperor Justinian’s personal vision, after he took over the throne in 527 CE, was responsible for this Code: he set about constituting a team of law commissioners to codify all laws and statutes, decrees and writings of jurists etc. At the peak of its development, it covered personal law, family law, contractual law, the law of corporate and mercantile bodies as well as the law of property and possession and succession as well as court procedures. In fact, Roman law remained in use in Europe – and more particularly in Germany – informing the laws of many other countries, well into the 15 century, although it had been interpreted, developed, and adapted to later conditions by generations of jurists and had received additions from non-Roman sources. 43 France and Napoleon’s civil code After the fall of the Roman Empire, the earliest European states that took up this difficult task were the then governments of Austria, Prussia, Bavaria, and Saxony. However, the country that codified the civil laws in a methodical and consultative manner was France. In fact, one of the most well-known and debated civil codes in the world in the modern sense, is that of France. Napoleon’s civil code introduced in France as early as 1804 – though the movement for the unification of existing civil law had begun more than a decade earlier – replaced over 300 hundred local codes of civil law. It superimposed itself on both customary law and existing legal statutes and covered the vast area of property, goods, usufruct, servitudes, succession, wills, gifts, contracts and quasi-contracts. The French code struck a balance between privilege and equality, custom and legal requirements. Napoleon’s personal contribution was significant: he personally attended meetings, while ensuring that the foundations of family life were not disturbed. The general consensus is that it remains great achievement: “a single Code for the whole of France, substantially based upon the broad historical instincts of the race, while preserving the most valuable social conquests of the revolution.” 44 “It supplied a model for other countries to emulate. Later, even when the Code suffered frequent amendments and annulments, changes and deletions, it still symbolized and expressed the legal and moral unity of a great nation. Indeed, the gains made by the sword of the Revolution were washed away when Louis VIII returned in 1815, but she retained what she had conquered by ideas.” 45 Plurality in British law On the other hand, the law of UK is not a single code: it has three legal systems, namely, the English law, the Scots law and the law of Northern Ireland. Since 2007, there also exists a purely Welsh law. There is a substantial overlap between these legal systems: each legal system defaults to each area and court systems of each jurisdiction further the relevant system of law through their judgments and the process of jurisprudence. Overarching these separate systems is the law of the United Kingdom, also known as United Kingdom law. British law arises where laws apply to the United Kingdom and/or its citizens as a whole, most obviously constitutional law, as also, for instance, tax law. The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom is the highest court in the land for all civil cases and is also the final court (in the normal sense of the term) for interpreting United Kingdom law. Note, however, that unlike in other systems (for example the U.S.), the Supreme Court cannot strike down statutes, and its own cases can be expressly overridden by Parliament by virtue of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. Germany, China, Russia, and the U.S. Mention of a few other countries as examples would suffice: In Germany , Burgerliches Gesetzbuch is the civil law and became effective in January 1900. In the People’s Republic of China , the General Principles of Civil Law came into force in January 1987. In Russia , the Civil Code was passed in 1923. Consisting of 435 sections it is marked by the absence of certain topics which hold a prominent place in other codes, such as family relations, contracts of employment, real property etc. The contentious and chilling clause of Section 21 continues: “Land is the property of the State and cannot be the object of private contract. Tenure of the land shall be permitted only under the title of use. Private property in land having been abolished, the division of property into real and personal is hereby repealed.” Yet, the Code safeguards civil rights without discrimination in Russia. 46 In the United States , where the question of diversity may approximate more to Indian circumstances, there are multiple layers of laws, separately applicable to the nation, the State and the county, or agencies and cities. States are independent legal entities with their own Supreme Courts that follow their own practices and legal conventions. Yet there are common principles that govern these civil laws in the States in a manner that is applicable for all people across that vast country. Only matters of a federal nature or those affecting the country as a whole such as security, taxation, broad legal issues, etc., are taken up at the Federal Supreme Court. Civil Codes in Islamic countries What about Islamic countries? Most countries following the Islamic faith traditionally adopted Sharia law, derived from religious teachings, practices and traditions, often interpreted by qualified jurists of the faith. In the modern era, however, such laws have been modified or replaced by statutes inspired by European models.Judicial procedures and legal education were likewise brought in line with European practice. On the other hand, many of the matters dealing specifically with family law continue to be governed by traditional Sharia laws. This has been a constant source of contestation not only within the countries which observe them, but also from other countries who see certain aspects of the sharia law as being contradictory to human rights and personal freedom. Indeed, there is a continuous movement in progressive Islamic countries to modernize the laws without abandoning the foundations of traditional jurisprudence. In certain other countries with a resurgent Islamic revival, there is a demand to re-instate legal systems based entirely on Sharia law. Thus, the Islamic countries of the world usually have a combination of civil laws based on classical sharia laws (as may be observed in Saudi Arabia), secular systems (Turkey is an example, through there is currently pressure on its secularism) as well as mixed systems (such as are seen in Pakistan, Egypt, Malaysia, Nigeria etc. 47 The Indian context An international survey would reveal that, in fact, there are few countries where common civil laws do not exist, dispensing justice in a fair and neutral manner. As we have seen, in India, the nature of the structured and layered social formations, the chaturvarna hierarchies approved and mandated by religion and tradition which have existed for several millennia, complicates the social fabric in more ways than can be decipherer. It may be argued that the immense diversity of social customs, the plurality of social mores and traditions, the staggering variety of rituals and practices and the presence of hundreds of castes and sub-castes, all make our country so complex that to even think of a universal law that will encompass these variations, without trampling on individual freedom and the right to practice one’s chosen religion. In India, the complex mosaic of these overlapping personal, social, local and community traditions and practices make the task of implementing a UCC truly difficult. Yet, if we are to move on to a truly unified country with treats all its citizens with dignity, respect and equity, without sacrificing their basic human rights, while at the time, protecting those individual variations and cultural practices of each community, which do not militate against basic principles of our vast and magnificent Constitution, then we would have achieved a near impossible task. This balance between general principles of civil law and specific traditions of individual religions: that is the desiderata we must aim for. Return to Contents IX. THE PATH AHEAD At present, as we approach the end of the year 2019, the possibility of the Parliament promulgating a UCC looms large on the nation’s polity; perhaps there is a better chance of its getting through now, with the majoritarian government, backed by a massive recent mandate, firmly in the saddle. Efforts in the recent past have not borne fruit. In the Muslim community, the All India Muslim Personal Law Board (AIMPLB) is clear that it shall oppose any attempts to adopt a UCC. It is the AIMPLB that had organised pressure on the Rajiv Gandhi government in 1986, in the aftermath of the favourable decision in Shah Bano , to adopt The Muslim Women’s (Protection of Rights and Divorce Act), Article 5 of which allows a paltry amount to be paid to the divorced wife for a period of a mere three months. Then, it was a major step backward for the country, though an activist judiciary had upheld significant principles of law that should have been accepted. Yet, the recent Act of Parliament renders all declaration of talaq to be void 48 , especially in the context of the talaq-i-biddat (where pronouncement of talaaq thrice in one sitting by a Muslim man to his wife results in instant and irrevocable divorce), found approval in most places, including Muslim women, though clerics of the community still protest. Meanwhile, other Muslim Personal Law Boards were also created, two led by women. Some Muslim women have been vocal against these personal communalist laws and even seek the UCC. There is, however, some scepticism even amongst the majority community and these views come through when, as we have seen, the 21 st Law Commission itself, the tenure of which has expired in August last year, said in its consultation paper of August 31, 2018, that it is not time yet for the adoption of the Code. As Herrenschimidt summarises it: “It is necessary to further add that there was yet another powerful reason for this refusal, loudly voiced for a few years, including amongst intellectuals considered as progressive: this Code is the harbinger of a western secularism, deeply atheist, which does not suit a profoundly religious India whose ‘secularism’ means respect and protection for all religions.” 49 The Government of India would soon constitute the new Law Commission, the 22 nd , and, it can be conjectured, would urge it to think more innovatively and courageously than its predecessor. Despite the cautious warning of the earlier Law Commission, it appears that an irreversible movement towards securing a UCC for our country has begun. The repeated exhortations of the Supreme Court, the call of the Directive Principles as enunciated in the Constitution of India in Article 44, the political determination of the ruling political dispensation steadfastly manifest now, all make it apparent that there will soon be a push towards obtaining a wide consensus in the Parliament for a UCC for “We, the people of India”. Return to Contents X. AMBEDKAR’S COUNSEL Indeed, when all is said and done, it cannot be denied that there are compelling arguments in UCC’s favour, not the least of them being that it finds mention in the list of Directive Principles of State Policy in the Constitution. A diversity of laws with their varying entitlements for different communities, not to mention the many inherent contradictions between them, can also pose challenges to the unity and integrity of a country that is strongly democratic and secular in nature.To think that the writer of our Constitution and the conscience-keeper of our nation, Ambedkar, resigned from the Government of India on the issue of the Civil Code, is a sobering thought for all of us. In his resignation speech he touched on the disappointment that he felt when the original intent and thrust of the Code was gradually diluted. He had special grievances against the Prime Minister Nehru, who had committed his government to the goal, but still had to make compromises in the end. In his impassioned speech he said: “To leave inequality between class and class, between sex and sex, which is the soul of Hindu Society untouched and to go on passing legislation relating to economic problems, is to make a farce of our Constitution and to build a palace on a dung heap. This is the significance I attached to the Hindu Code. It is for its sake that I stayed on notwithstanding my differences.” 50 Be that as it may, contemporary developments are moving fast. We live in another age, in another time. The world is a different place altogether: now identity and state clash, freedom and nationalism oppose each other.In the days ahead, there will be much speculation. The Modi government, in many aspects of identity and perspective, seems to have touched a chord in the hearts of the people, especially the vast Hindu majority, who unwittingly, perhaps even unthinkingly, now support the majoritarian nationalistic juggernaut that is driving this country forward single-mindedly. A UCC will not have much impact on them, as they have already been absorbed into the embrace of the Hindu code. With the Hindu Code already in existence for almost 60 years now, any major changes in that Code for the Hindus may not be feasible or called for now.In an age when citizens’ rights are of paramount significance, and the admitted position is to move towards a society which respects human rights irrespective of caste, religion, region and gender, the imperative to legislate on a UCC cannot be denied. The moot question, however, is the manner in which the country would now take steps to introduce a UCC that will also cover the Non-Hindus who are outside the Hindu Code. There are several significant questions that will have to be simultaneously addressed in this regard. Whether it is at all desirable, and if so, what form it should adopt, is the first of such questions. The assimilation of the Hindu Code, which has stood the test of time over the last six decades, into the UCC, is another. Will the four statutes forming the Code be absorbed as such into the new UCC or will they be subject to modification? To what extent will the principles behind the Hindu Code be applied, or sought to be applied, on the non-Hindus, even as preserving the cultural and religious identities of each of the other religions will necessarily have to be kept in mind? If the Hindu Code and the proposed code for the non-Hindus are kept distinct in the new UCC, could it possibly be a uniform code for everyone, or just a compendium of laws placed into the same folder?The real impact of the UCC will surely fall on those of the other religions and communities - yes, we may as well state it bluntly- the minorities, who have been guarding their respective traditions and idiosyncrasies within the diktats of their own holy books, religious practices and common law, formulated through practices, rituals and precedents. Their genuine fear is that the very special identities they have struggled to maintain in the last several centuries, will now be swept away into a uniform mould, to which everyone must adhere. If the Code clashes with certain special distinguishing features that a community or a society has treasured and cherished, will they be forced to give it up? And become of one hue and colour as all the rest?Indeed, the pitfalls are many, the most important of them being the perceived need to preserve the religious and social identity of the many peoples and communities who together constitute this pluralistic and multi religious country. But this also severely tests our claim that we are a secular country that guarantees basic and common fundamental rights to all its citizens, seems to flounder in the face of the plethora of laws and practices that proliferate in this country, insofar as our many religions, sects and denominations are concerned. It will take all the skills of accomplished political and social leadership, duly supported by the religious communities and with the benevolent touch of a crusading judiciary, for this dream to come true. But until then will it continue to be a utopian dream that will remain unrealised for years to come?Harington’s words quoted at the beginning of this monograph, though in a different context, are still relevant. Can a uniform law be suitable to the genius of the people of this country who pride themselves on their variety and diversity and who may not brook any interference in what are essentially their personal and religious matters? On the other hand, when can we hope to achieve the ideal of a country where ‘we, the people’ live with equity and freedom, shorn of prejudices and religious diktats that discriminate between man and man and man and woman? Ambedkar’s counsel for a “voluntary” code The essence of their doubts can be summarised as follows: at the practical level, will the UCC oust customs and practices of marriage and divorce, succession and adoption? On a more profound level, will it destroy the diversity of our nation and violate Article 25 of the Constitution that guarantees the right to practise one’s own religion. In fact, the sceptics hold that the UCC pushed through by the state, will militate against the basic tenets of democracy itself. “The secular state is, after all, an enabler of rights rather than an inhibitor in sensitive matters of religion and personal laws”. 51 Yet again, other voices may advise reflection and cautious restraint. They will argue that the Code is to cover only civil matters and surely, the collective wisdom of the people will not allow the spirit of intangible and undefinable things -- those traditions that are sanctified under personal law by usage and practice, which some hold to be the very essence of life itself -- to be brushed away in contempt.Ambedkar himself had tried to soothe agitated minds when he had argued in the debates in the Constituent Assembly. “I quite realise their feelings in the matter, but I think they have read rather too much into Article 35, which merely proposes that the State shall endeavour to secure a civil code for the citizens of the country. It does not say that after the Code is framed the State shall enforce it upon all citizens merely because they are citizens. It is perfectly possible that the future parliament may make a provision by way of making a beginning that the Code shall apply only to those who make a declaration that they are prepared to be bound by it, so that in the initial stage the application of the Code may be purely voluntary. Parliament may feel the ground by some such method.” 52 [Emphasis by author] (Article 35 mentioned in theabove quote is the draft number of the article as listed during the time of the Constituent Assembly discussions, which in the final version of the Constitution was renumbered as Article 44) Should the current political leadership, demonstrating reason and maturity, wish to take a few gentle steps forward in this direction, rather than forcing the new law down unwilling throats, here then is a possible way forward: by making a beginning that the UCC shall apply only to those that are willing to adopt it; so that the application of the Code may be purely voluntary. We may finally be able to find in the voice of Ambedkar the middle ground that we can all live by. Return to Contents [ Dr. C.K.Mathew , a retired Indian Administrative Service (IAS) officer of the 1977 batch of the Rajasthan cadre was former Chief Secretary of the State. He has held several important assignments such as District Collector, Secretary / Principal Secretary to the Departments of IT, Irrigation, Mines, Power, Disaster Management and Education, apart from being Principal Secretary to the Chief Minister for five years. He has also held several posts in the Finance Department, including Additional Chief Secretary, Finance. Post-retirement, he was Senior Fellow in the Public Affairs Centre, Bangalore, for four years, and was the principal investigator for a series of 3 annual reports (2016-18) on the measurement of governance in the states of India, known as the Public Affairs Index. He was also Special Rapporteur for the Southern States under the National Human Rights Commission. He is the author of two novels and was awarded Ph.D for his thesis on symbolism in the poems of Emily Dickinson. He writes regularly for his blog, accessible at https://mathewspeak.wordpress.com . He is currently Visiting Professor at the Azim Premji University, Bangalore in the school of Public Policy and Governance. He can be reached at [email protected] ]. Endnote: 1. A shorter version of this article ‘ Uniform civil code: Why and why not ‘ was published on July 10, 2017, at Governance Now . [https://www.governancenow.com/views/columns/uniform-civil-code-why-and-why-not]. Return To text. 2. Timesnownews.com. 2019. Uniform Civil Code by 2020? Modi govt likely to table UCC Bill in Parliament in December 2019 , October 9. [https://www.timesnownews.com/india/article/uniform-civil-code-by-2020-modi-govt-likely-to-table-ucc-bill-in-parliament-in-dec/501855]. Return to Text. 3. Bharatiya Janata Party. 2019. Sankalp Patra Lok Sabha 2019 [ Manifesto of the Bharatiya Janata Party, 2019 ]. p. 37. [https://www.thehinducentre.com/resources/article26769375.ece/binary/BJP-Election-2019-english.pdf]. Return to Text. 4. Nair, P. 2019 . It’s Time For Uniform Civil Code. This Will Help Muslims Break Taboos: Seshadri Chari , Outlook, August 29. [https://www.outlookindia.com/magazine/story/india-news-its-time-for-uniform-civil-code-this-will-help-muslims-break-taboos-seshadri-chari/302081]. Return to Text. 5. Law Commission of India. 1958 . Fourteenth Report (Reform of Judicial Administration), Ministry of Law, Government of India, September 26, Vol. 1. [http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/1-50/Report14Vol1.pdf] Return to Text. 6. Banerjee, A. C. 1984 . English Law in India , Abhinav Publications, pp. 133. [ https://books.google.co.in/books?id=7MXExXXb9usC&pg=PA134&hl=en#v=onepage&q&f=false ]. Return to Text. 7. Wolff, J. 1997. Religion in Victorian Britain: Culture and Empire , Manchester University Press, pp. 123. [The full text of the Proclamation by the Queen in Council to the Princes, Chiefs and people of India (published by the Governor-General at Allahabad, November 1st 1858). [https://www.bl.uk/collection-items/proclamation-by-the-queen-in-council-to-the-princes-chiefs-and-people-of-india]. Return to Text. 8. Rajagopaul, G.R. 1975. The Story of the Hindu Code, Journal of the Indian Law Institute , Vol 17, No. 14 October-December, pp. 537-558. Return to Text. 9. Chavan, N. and Kidwai, Q. J. 2006. Personal Law Reforms and Gender Empowerment: A Debate on Uniform Civil Code . Hope India Publications. Return to Text. 10. Rajagopaul, G.R . 1975. The Story of the Hindu Code, Journal of the Indian Law Institute, Vol 17, No 4, October-December, pp. 537-558. Return to Text. 11. Ibid. Return to Text. 12. Som, R. 1994. Jawaharlal Nehru and the Hindu Code: A Victory of Symbol over Substance? Modern Asian Studies, Cambridge University Press, February, Vol. 28, No. 1, pp. 165-194. Return to Text. 13. Ibid. Return to Text. 14. Ibid. Return to Text. 15. Ibid. Return to Text. 16. Samaddar, R. (Ed) 2005. The Politics of Autonomy: Indian Experiences , SAGE Publications, pp. 56-59. Return to Text. 17. Rajagopaul, G.R. Op. Cit. Return to Text. 18. Levy, H.W. 1969. Lawyer-Scholars, Lawyer-Politicians and the Hindu Code Bill, 1921-1956. Law & Society Review , Vol 3. No. 2, Special Issue Devoted to Lawyers in Developing Societies with Particular Reference to India (November 1968 – February 1969. pp. 303-316. Return to Text. 19. The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 . [https://indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/1560/3/a1955-25.pdf]. Return to Text. 20. By way of explanation, it could be said that in the Mitakshara School, largely practised in Bengal and Assam, the allocation of inherited property was based on the law of possession right from the time of birth. Self-acquired property could be passed on through the instrument of a will. Joint family property went to the group known as coparceners, i.e. those who belonged to next three generations. Therefore in Mitakshara School, sons had an exclusive right by birth in joint family property. However, in the Dayabhaga School, the doctrine of son’s birth right and the devolution of property by survivorship had limited space. The property is inherited after the death of the person who was in possession of it. It is established that in the Mitakshara School neither the father nor any other coparcener could normally disaffect the joint family property. Under the Dayabhaga School there is no such constraint and each coparcener has complete right of separation of his exclusive share in the joint family property. To put it simply, Mitakshara was based on the ‘principle of ownership by birth’, and Dayabagha on principle of ‘ownership by death’. Return to Text. 21. Sivaramayya. n.d . Schools of Hindu Religion: Discrimination in Inheritance Law[s] , India Together . [http://www.indiatogether.org/manushi/issue100/sivarama.htm]. Return to Text. 22. The Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 , May 19, 1986. [https://indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/1649/3/A1956-32.pdf]. Return to Text. 23. Sarkar, S. and Sarkar, T. 2008 . Women and Social Reform in Modern India: A Reader . Indiana University Press. pp. 490-491. Return to Text. 24. Supreme Court of India. 1985. Mohd. Ahmed Khan vs Shah Bano Begum And Ors, April 23. [https://indiankanoon.org/doc/823221/]. Return to Text. 25. Criminal Procedure Code 1973, Section 125. [https://indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/6571/1/crpc.pdf]. Return to Text. 26. Lawrence, B. B and Karim, A. 2007. On Violence: A Reader . Duke University Press. pp. 265-267. Return to Text. 27. Mody, Z. 2013. Summary of “10 Judgements that changed India”, Shobha De Books. Return to Text. 28. Samaddar, R. 2005. The Politics of Autonomy: Indian Experiences . SAGE Publications. pp. 60-63. Return to Text. 29. The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 , May 19. [ http ://legislative.gov.in/sites/default/files/A1986-25_1.pdf]. Return to Text. 30. Government of Goa, 2018. Portuguese Civil Code, 1867 , Panaji. [https://indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/8312/1/ocrportuguesecivilcode.pdf]. Return to Text. 31. Ibid. Return to Text. 32. Supreme Court of India. 2019 . Jose Paulo Coutinho vs Maria Luiza Valentina Pereira , September 13. [https://indiankanoon.org/doc/190351781/]. Return to Text. 33. Law Commission, Goa. 2012 . Reports of Law Commission, March 05. [http://goalawcommission.gov.in/CHAIRMAN’S%20MONOLOGUE.pdf]. Return to Text. 34. Ibid. Return to Text. 35. Almeida, A. 2016. Goa’s Civil Code Shows That Uniformity Does Not Always Mean Equality , The Wire , August 08. [https://thewire.in/law/goas-uniform-civil-code-is-not-the-greatest-model-to-follow]. Return to Text. 36. Som, R. Op Cit. pp. 165-194. Return to Text. 37. Chavan, N. and Kidwai, Q. J. 2006 . Personal Law Reforms and Gender Empowerment: A Debate on Uniform Civil Code . Hope India Publications. pp. 13-20. Return to Text. 38. Law Commission of India. 2018 . Consultation Paper on Reform of Family Law, Government of India, August 31. [http://www.lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/reports/CPonReformFamilyLaw.pdf]. Return to Text. 39. The name ABC is used to protect the identity of the party in sensitive personal cases. Supreme Court of India. 2015. Abc vs State (Nct Of Delhi), Indiankanoon.org, July 06. [https://indiankanoon.org/doc/162566950/]. Return to Text. 40. Ibid. Return to Text. 41. Supreme Court of India. 2019. Jose Paulo Coutinho vs Maria Luiza Valentina Pereira, September 13. [https://indiankanoon.org/doc/190351781/]. Return to Text. 42. dictionary.com . jus-civile. [https://www.dictionary.com/browse/jus-civile]. Return to Text. 43. Kiralfy, A.R., Herbert Felix Jolowicz, H.F., et al. n.d . Roman law , Encyclopædia Britannica. [https://www.britannica.com/topic/Roman-law on 19.10.2019]. Return to Text. 44. Ward, A.W. Et al. 1906 . The Cambridge Modern History Volume IX Napoleon . Cambridge University Press, p. 162. Return to Text. 45. Ilbert, C. 1905 . The Centenary of the French Civil Code, Journal of the Society of Comparative Legislation, Cambridge University Press, Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 218-231. Return to Text. 46. Kantarovich, J. 1923 . The Civil Code of Russia. Yale Law Journal ; June, Vol 32, No. 8, pp. 779-789. Return to Text. 47. Otto, J.M. 2009. Sharia Incorporated: A Comparative Overview of the legal systems of twelve Muslim countries in past and present, Leiden University Press. pp. 615–16. [https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/handle/1887/21170]. Return to Text. 48. PRS Legislative Research. n.d. The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights in Marriage) Bill, 2019 . Ministry of Law and Justice. [https://www.prsindia.org/billtrack/muslim-women-protection-rights-marriage-bill-2019]. Return to Text. 49. Olivier, H. 2009. The Indians’ Impossible Civil Code, Published online by Cambridge University Press , Vol.50, Issue No. 2, pp. 309-347. [https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/european-journal-of-sociology-archives-europeennes-de-sociologie/article/indians-impossible-civil-code/63B0AF97B897D9A065FA43CA8B73E80F]. Return to Text. 50. Moon, V. 1995 . Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar : Writings and Speeches, Dr. Ambedkar Foundation , December 06. [https://www.mea.gov.in/Images/attach/amb/Volume_14_01.pdf]. Return to Text. 51. Rajagopal, K. 2018 . What is the debate on uniform civil code all about? , The Hindu , September 08. [https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/what-is-debate-on-uniform-civil-code-all-about/article24903560.ece]. Return to Text. 52. Lok Sabha Secretariat. 2009. Constituent Assembly of India Debates (Official Report) (Fifth Reprint) Volume VII, p. 551. November 23, 1948. New Delhi. [http://164.100.47.194/Loksabha/Debates/Result_Nw_15.aspx?dbsl=182]. Return to Text.

Bogaram, a village in present day Telangana, which is studied in this Policy Watch for the socio-economic impact of liberalisation on a rural community, was initially the subject of the author’s research in 1996 1 . This Policy Watch is based on a revisit made to the same village in Ramannapet Mandal, Nalgonda district, Telangana State after two decades 2 . This Policy Watch documents the structural changes that have taken place in the village in past 21 years. The major empirical observation that emerged from the study is that the dominant caste of the village, i.e. the Padmashalis (or the traditional weavers), which was emerging as socially, economically, and politically dominant in 1996, has declined in terms of economic and social power over the past 21 years, despite the fact that they are still numerically significant caste and hold the reins of political power. The socio-economic decline of the dominant caste of weavers has happened along with the decline of their weaving occupation as a result of the decline of export markets, lack of local markets for finished cloth, and increasing prices for the raw material, and changes in weaving technology. The study concludes that this decline of the Padmashali dominant caste is in consonance with the decline and pauperisation of the entire village economy in the contemporary context of globalisation and liberalisation. CONTENTS I. VILLAGE STUDIES IN THE ERA OF LIBERALISATION II. VILLAGES AND STATE PRESENCE III. BOGARAM: THE DESCENT OF THE PADMASHALIS IV. DALITS AND THE ABSENCE OF SOCIAL REFORMS V. CONCLUSION VI. WHAT CAN BE DONE: SOME POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING WEAVING   I. VILLAGE STUDIES IN THE ERA OF LIBERALISATION ‘If the direction and outcome of the comprehensive process of societal transformation that is in progress are to become more understandable and tangible from a local angle, high priority should indeed be given to repeat fieldwork in villages that have earlier been the subject of social research’. Jan Breman 3 This Policy Watch aims to explain the social consequences of liberalisation, particularly ina rural society, by studying a village in southern India. It argues that a. the impact of liberalisation on different geographical regions has been uneven; b. this has implications for village studies; and c. an increased pauperisation of the rural society is the overall impact of liberalisation. Village studies, or study of a single village, as representative of Indian villages is a well-known social anthropological/ sociological method of studying rural society. In sociological canon, indeed, the Indian village is supposed to represent the very microcosm of Indian society. The assumption underscoring this is that a village, any village in India, reflects the same social hierarchy and complexity associated with it, in a miniature form. Though urban sociology differs substantially from this, Sociologists would hold that the same ‘social’ hierarchies that characterise the village society, to some, perhaps diluted extent, still reflect in the urban context too. Thus, the study of villages is said to have two fold significance a) as a foundational study of Indian society, b) as a study of a basic unit of rural society to understand the latter.                           Are village studies relevant, particularly in the context of liberalisation? Before we get into the other related aspects discussed, it is necessary to consider this question. The answer, undoubtedly, is in the affirmative. Villages, as demographic and sociological units within certain geographic boundaries, have not disappeared from the Indian cartography. It is only that, as this paper contends, their political economy has become more pronounced overtime than their sociological, demographic and morphological, the latter in the sense that Indian villages are organised physically in terms of caste-demarcated lanes and so on, with social hierarchy reflecting in physical organisation of a village. In that sense any village is representative of an Indian village. This is the premise on which village studies are done. However, we would like to hold that this representative character of villages is changing fast owing to uneven development of the country.    This raises another question: if the political economy of the rural society has become more pronounced overtime, should we adopt a qualitative, anthropological method or should we adopt a single or a set of quantitative methods to examine the changing nature of its political economy in the contemporary context? This author believes that even if the political economy of the rural society has become more pronounced, adopting a qualitative anthropological method, as used by the founding fathers of village studies such as M.N. Srinivas, is very important. Let us ponder on the first question: why does the political economy of the rural society tend to overshadow the other sociological aspects such as ritual status, purity and pollution, commensality, and endogamy? This has its roots in the paradigmatic policy change introduced in the early 1990s, i.e., economic liberalisation. Liberalisation hastened the capitalist mode of development of the economy, integrated the village economy more and more to international markets thereby bringing in the adverse consequences to bear upon the entire rural society. Economic liberalisation is also is said to have loosened caste ties (Panini: 1996). Whether or not economic liberalisation has come to loosen caste ties, the question of incorporation of village into the global markets and associated social consequences appears important. Then the question is, have all these changes, post-liberalisation, been uniform across the country? The answer to this question is in the negative. The impact of liberalisation on the States and villages within them has been disparate. Similarly, the economic growth,  post-liberalisation, shows variations, not only across States, but also village economies. Indian villages: Regional disparities and historical trajectories One clear impact of liberalisation observed has been the widening regional disparities across the country. Not all States have grown equally, with the erstwhile regional disparities increasing further. This increasing regional disparity in the country is a direct consequence of liberalisation and the accompanying politico-economic processes. A look at the table given below makes it clear. Table 1: Trend in Gini Coefficient Measuring Inter-State Inequality Year Gini Coefficient 1990-91 0.171 1991-92 0.175 1992-93 0.199 1993-94 0.207 1994-95 0.214 1995-96 0.225 1996-97 0.228 1997-98 0.225 Source: Ahluwalia, M.S. (2000,2011) (* Gini-coefficient is essentially a measure of economic inequality between large aggregations of populations, for example between income groups, across social classes and so on. Here it is here employed to measure the inequalities between large groups of populations that reside in separate State boundaries. ) The above table clearly explains the trends in the increasing inter-State economic inequality across the country over the years. In fact regional inequality has increased and, therewith, the regional disparity and regional diversity. The increasing disparity and diversity, post-liberalisation, has certainly affected the villages differently in different regions. Increasing regional diversity in the country has only made the classic issue of village studies, i.e. the generalisability and representativeness of villages, even more difficult. In that, a village study or set of village studies done in respect of Andhra Pradesh is no longer generalisable, say, for Uttar Pradesh, nor village studies done with respect to UP or Bihar are generalisable for, say, Karnataka or Maharashtra. This raises both the methodological and substantive questions with respect to village studies. The question then is should we give up village studies altogether? The answer to this question is not in giving up village studies; rather, it is in conducting more village studies with respect to different regions and sub-regions of the country as a way of compensating for the regional diversity as well as differential historical evolution of villages and capturing the contextual nature of their sociological and politico-economic existence. Another important feature of liberalisation and globalisation relates to the rendering of earlier theories of two-class-two-sector models (Mitra: 1977) and ‘peasant class differentiation’ (Patnaik: 1987) models questionable. Either the economic differentiation in the village context has become more levelled or the sectoral and regional imbalances have become too prominent. Further, two arguments are in order: a) it is true that the village social system on the lines of ‘ jajmani system’ has declined (Karanth: 1996); b) social differences have become relatively less important to villagers themselves. Although castes and caste-based occupations persist, they are either getting dissolved or declining in the context of a globalisation-led overall capitalist mode of development. Concomitant with this change have been changes in the growth of nearby urban centres, casualisation of work, monetisation of all work, migration and pauperisation of villages. In this process of social and economic change, the countryside-city contradiction emerges more strongly than the internal contradictions of the village society or village communities themselves. The Indian Village Today: Unity and Diversity Amidst all the diversity, are there some common sociological characteristics for a village to be called a sociological unit? The varna-jati system continues to be the basis of the village as a social organisation. However, as Karanth (1996) has pointed out earlier, today, castes exist independently, not as part of the village ‘social system’. The systemic character of the village has nearly disappeared universally. What we find instead is the existence of castes and caste-based occupations separated in different degrees from one another and, at the same time, incorporated into the modern market economy. The modern market economy only cares for skills of the workers, not the sociological background of their skills. Also the same castes in different parts of the country exist in different degrees of conflict, accommodation and coexistence. Pai (2012) notes at least three types of regions where different degrees of challenge, conflict or accommodation have come to take place in India: the Dravidian South, the Ambedkarite West and the Gandhian North, she notes, have witnessed challenge, conflict and accommodation within the castes in various degrees. However, there are also further divergences apart from these three patterns; there are areas that do not fit into the framework developed by Pai (Pai:2012); for example,  contemporary Telangana. Return to Contents II. VILLAGES AND STATE PRESENCE Contemporary Telangana historically evolved out of the Nizam rule and later, post-Independence and liberation from Nizam’s rule, supported by different national and regional parties. Often in the context of Telangana the major axis of political mobilisation of lower castes has been class rather than caste. Therefore, at the village level, mobilisation along caste lines has been at various degrees of inertia. Historically, none of the three major movements that shaped socio-political discourses in different regions of India - Ambedkarite, Dravidian, or even Gandhian - had a strong base in the region. The communist movement which had evolved in the region was able to mobilise the subaltern castes more in the language of class rather than caste. Thus, here we clearly see the absence of an explicit caste-consciousness. What is pertinent to be noted here is that the presence of the state in the local arena has been rather insignificant. The development works, land reforms and the populist programmes of different parties and governments put together have not laid a basis for a strong presence of the state at the local level. In other words, what we find in respect of Telangana villages is a fair level of indifference on the part of the state towards a change for the better. The impact of all the programmes and schemes put together does not amount to much as far as the presence of the state is concerned for the local communities. Thus, the proximate face of the state mechanism, be it by way of panchayats, or by way of revenue administration, does not amount to much. What we see instead is the indifference on the part of the state towards the local communities unless something extraordinary takes place. This is particularly true after the formation of the Telangana State. During the study, there was no evidence of any significant changes brought about by the new Telangana government in the lives of the local communities. The village under consideration continues to be neglected, as also most of the villages in Telangana. Rather, the new Telangana government has been high on promises, much like many other previous governments with no likelihood of at least some of the promises being fulfilled in the near future. Therefore, we do not see a significant presence of the state at the local level. This is certainly true so far as the local welfare provision is concerned. An account of a brief revisit made to a village called Bogaram in Telangana presented in the next chapter reveals traces the evolution of the dominant caste, the condition of the Dalits today, and explains these changes. Return to Contents III. BOGARAM: THE DESCENT OF THE PADMASHALIS Before coming to the village study presented below, we need to take a look at the macro context at the state-level within which the village is situated. Presently, the village Bogaram falls in the Telangana State. However, prior to the formation of the State on June 2, 2014, after a protracted struggle, the village was part of the united Andhra Pradesh. What is of specific importance to note is that the (united) State of Andhra Pradesh has been at the forefront of economic reform and neo-liberal governance reforms since their introduction at the national level. These were first introduced by the Telugu Desam Party (TDP) government led by Chandrababu Naidu and have since continued. The TDP government that introduced these reforms was defeated in the elections to the State Legislative Assembly in 2004. The main reason for this lies in a complete neglect of the agricultural sector and the economy of the countryside since 1997. The reforms led to an agrarian distress with reports by suicides by farmers and weavers.  The TDP government which initiated reform has also been criticised for these reforms and the successive governments in Andhra Pradesh, and Telangana (after the division of the State), have been following the same policies of economic reforms to attract private capital. The main issue is that these reforms have been largely urban-centric or, to be more specific, ‘Hyderabad-centric’ and have failed to improve the condition of farmers or of people practising their caste-based occupations: one such example is that of weaving. Thus, this village study needs to be contextualised within a pervasive rural crisis in Andhra Pradesh/Telangana. This rural crisis, which is basically an economic crisis, has resulted in the pauperisation of agriculture, 4 (Suri: 2006) with the rural people moving away from traditional caste-based occupations into casual labour. This also has resulted in indebtedness of the farmers and those engaged in other rural occupations. This crisis has affected the weaving sector too and, therefore, the village Bogaram that we discuss below falls in the context of the rural crisis—which is broader than agrarian crisis—affecting all the social groups of the village, including those who are not engaged in agriculture. Bogaram village comes under Ramannapet Mandal of Nalgonda district in Telangana. This village was studied by the author in 1996 as part of his field work for his Ph D thesis. Part of the study was subsequently published in the Economic and Political Weekly 5 . The main observations of that study were:  The dominant caste in Bogaram were the Padmashali weavers. To be called a ‘dominant caste’, in M.N. Srinivas’ terms, it fulfilled two criteria: one, it was a numerically preponderant caste; two, at the time of the study, the Padmashali caste was also politically ascendant in local elections, besides acquiring land. M.N. Srinivas defined the dominant caste in the following terms: ‘A caste may said to be “dominant” when it preponderates numerically over the other castes, and when it also wields preponderant economic and political power. A large and powerful caste group can more easily be dominant if its position in the local caste hierarchy is not too low’.  (Srinivas, 1996:54-55) The Padmashali caste of Bogaram was not, however, the dominant land owning caste. In fact, it only started acquiring land in 1996; despite this it fulfilled the remaining two criteria of being a dominant caste. The Padmashalis are a backward caste according to official records. The main argument at the time of our research in 1996 was that the erstwhile dominant caste, the Reddy Patels, who were dominant in the local power relations, land ownership and caste status, had declined owing to the ‘emergence of backward castes’. Now, however, we would argue that the then-emergent dominant caste, the Padmashali weavers, have not actually consolidated their gains, and although they remain numerically preponderant, constituting nearly 50 per cent of the village population and holding control over the local panchayat, they have, however, declined in respect of economic  power. The argument is that their ascendance earlier was owing to their growing economic power in the village. This has received a blow with the decline in export of woven cloth and emergence of mechanisation as a new process, following the introduction of power-looms. We argue that the investment in power looms could only be done by a few from among the weavers who, at the time of the re-study, were found owning one or two power-looms per house, because they could afford to buy them. A majority of the weavers have become wage labourers in view of the increasing presence of the power-looms or have left the village. From a village of 300 families of weavers, the numerical strength has come down to 100 families. Also, when it comes to wages, we find that agricultural wages far exceed the wages for weaving workers. Thus, in this paper, we argue that a second tectonic change has taken place so far as the village social structure is concerned. Now even the weaving caste finds itself on a decline with no winner being around this time. The case we are trying to make here is that post-liberalisation, there is a pauperisation of the entire village in stark contrast to the growth taking place in nearby towns and cities. The 1996 study pointed out that the weaving occupation had become lucrative around the 1980s with premium quality cotton cloth produced in the village being exported to even overseas markets in Eurasia, Japan and other countries. This internationalisation of the weaving occupation (as noted in the 1996-study) had resulted in a certain social stratification among the Padmashalis. While the master-weavers continued to dominate the village, the two lower rungs of weavers were those engaged in weaving of cloth and those engaged in wage labour in the weaving occupation. Master-weavers were only supplying the raw materials and marketing the finished cloth produced by the two lower rungs of weavers. Caste-wise, master-weavers and handloom weavers were all Padmashalis. However, the wage-worker-weavers were, sometimes, from the other castes of the village as well. The introduction of liberalisation in the early 1990s, however, as mentioned in the study, started working against the above process. As early as 1996, the strains being exerted  on the weaving occupation had become obvious with increases in prices of yarn, colours and dye etc (being used as raw materials), and declines in the market for the finished cloth. I have noted this phenomenon earlier as below:           ‘For weaving, things have changed since roughly about 1990. Prices of yarn, chemicals and other raw materials have doubled, while the price of the finished cloth exported has remained unchanged. The burden is transferred by the master weavers to the two lower rungs of weavers. This is done by cutting down the wage rates and/or piece rates. Thus, it is the wage workers who bear the burden of internationalisation.’ (Vaddiraju, 2012:186-187). In the following section, I intend to present the apparent changes that have taken place since 1996.  The total population of Bogaram stands at about 1,800, while the total number of voters comes to 1,475. Of this population, 50 per cent are Padmashalis or weavers and the rest of the population belongs to the other castes. The other castes include Reddys, Gollas or Yadavas (shepherds), Gouds or toddy tappers, Dalits, and a marginal presence of the washermen and barber castes. There was one Brahmin family in the village in 1996, but it left the village thereafter. There are about 100 weaver families. Bogaram from being a village of handlooms with every weaver household owning one or two handlooms has transformed itself into a village of a few power-looms and many wage working weavers over a period of two decades between 1996 and 2016. Only those who could invest in power-looms have purchased the same with a single power-loom costing about Rs. 50,000 to Rs. 60,000; the double power-loom cost about Rs. 1,00,000 to Rs. 1,50,000. Not all the weavers have been able to shift from handlooms ( chenetamoggalu in Telugu) to power-looms. In a village of about 300 hand-looms, the present power-looms amount to about 60 to 70. About 50 weaving families who own these 60 to 70 power-looms (some families have more than one power-loom) employ the remaining weaver families as wage labourers in the weaving process. Presently, there are two types of wage labour work in weaving: one, warping work for which the wage, on an average for a two-person family amounts to about Rs. 200 per day; second, colouring work for which a weaving family of two earns about Rs. 300 per day. Weaving is often a caste and family occupation wherein all the members of the family work: men and women together. These two processes—warping and colouring—require separate skills and are done separately. This process of transition is a major change observed in this village. In the place of prosperous employment-generating handlooms, we witness mechanisation and, more importantly, proletarianisation of the weaving community. Increasing number of weavers work as labourers for wages lower than the prevailing local agricultural wages. 6 One major disturbing development that can be brought to the attention of the reader is that between 1996 and 2017, 200 weaver families have left the occupation and even migrated out of the village. There were now barely 100 families living in dilapidated houses. Some have built pucca houses, but still do wage work. In 1996, two-to-three truckloads of finished handloom cloth was exported from the village. Now, one small auto-truck carries the entire village produce per week. The exact reasons and policies underlying this transformation and pauperisation appear complex. According to some weavers, up to 1998 the handloom-weaving activity flourished well. There was a steady decline thereafter and now, the entire weaving activity is caught up in deep crisis. The crisis has gone to such levels that during 2010 to 2014, at least six weavers from this village committed suicide; the victims included a woman as well. This is only a reflection of the crisis prevailing in handloom sector. Those weavers who have left their handlooms behind and migrated to Hyderabad mostly to work in the informal sector are occupied in myriad kind of jobs; they have set up petty shops, tea stalls, work as security guards, as salesmen in medical shops and the likes. Most of them do not have education enough to be absorbed into the formal urban economy. The average education of the weavers is 12 standard. In rare cases some have a graduate degree, but that is often of no avail in securing jobs in the formal economy. Those weavers who migrated did so with their immediate families. They left behind their older parents who still somehow make a living out of handlooms/wage-based work. The monthly wages of these migrant weavers range between Rs.10,000 and Rs. 12,000 a month in the city, whereas they find it enormously difficult to earn even that amount in the village engaged in their traditional handloom weaving profession. Hence, the migration. One reason reported for this change is that chenetamoggalu (handlooms) require physical strength to operate. Since Bogaram village falls under a fluoride-affected region with the drinking water containing hazardous levels of fluoride, the health of many handloom weavers got affected forcing them either to adopt power-looms or to leave the profession. Here, it is interesting to note that the entire Ramannapet region is affected by fluoride in drinking water. This affects health and causes orthopaedic disorders. However, this is only a partial explanation for the transformation that has taken place. The major reasons for the crisis in the handloom sector lie in the changing macro policies and the political economy of the weaving sector. Another possible reason for this is that most of the educated youth among the weaving community do not intend to take up rural caste-based occupation; instead, they prefer urban-based work and, therefore, migrate to cities for whatever work they can find.   Table 2: Transition from hand looms to power looms 1996 300 handlooms (owned by 200 families) 2017 60 to 70 power looms (50 families of weavers own these. Remaining 50 families work as wage working weavers) Source: Based on data derived from author’s fieldwork   Image-1jpg  1: A weaver standing beside a power loom. Photo: Anil Kumar Vaddiraju   Image-2jpg  2: A newly installed power loom. Photo: Anil Kumar Vaddiraju The social hierarchy or the emergent stratification among the weavers, as we had explained earlier, is described in the following Diagram-1. Here, in 1996, the master-weavers supplied the yarn, colours and other requisite raw material to what were then only handlooms, besides marketing the finished cloth. They gave near wage prices to the handloom weavers skimming off the surplus from weaving. However, we argued that given the magnitude of the handloom activity then, every section of the weavers benefited monetarily from the process. This process, we argued, benefitted the master-weavers more than the other weaving sections and, in the process, enriched the master- weavers unevenly. 7 However, by 2017, the entire class of master-weavers had disappeared with no one to supply the raw materials and to market the finished cloth. The master-weavers also worked as exporters and with export markets going down, there was none to care for the marketing of the cloth produced. Now handloom and power-loom workers directly take the cloth to a place called Pochampally for selling their product at the wholesale market. The earlier class structure within the weavers that we had described in 1996 is as below: Diagramjpg   Agri Wages Higher Than Weaving There is no major change in the physical conditions of agricultural production. Agriculture is still carried on with bullocks and plough. There is no significant mechanisation of the agricultural activities observed, with tractor-ownership in the entire village not exceeding two.  There has been no major change in the agrarian structure ever since we first visited the village in 1996. The Reddy caste households still happen to be the major land owners though with a proviso. That is to say, the size holdings of these families have dwindled with the division of families and consequently land holdings. As we have already noted earlier, by 1996, practices such as vetti (bonded labour) had completely disappeared as also the jeeta (annual attached farm servant) system. Now, no landowner prefers to have a jeeta or an attached farm-servant as the wages for the same are very high, according to them. The prevailing agricultural wages are higher than wages in the weaving occupation. Agricultural wage per male worker per day is around Rs. 350 to Rs. 400 while for female wage workers, it is about Rs. 200 to Rs. 250. There are 20 Reddy families who are agriculturists. Each family owns about 10 to 11 acres. There are 75 Yadava families who are mainly sheep grazers and small farmers. There are about 30 families of toddy tappers or Gouds and 20 families of washermen. Endogamy, that is marriages within the caste, is still the norm in the village. Return to Contents IV. DALITS AND THE ABSENCE OF SOCIAL REFORMS Before we proceed to discuss the condition of Dalits, it is important to note that Telangana State has never witnessed the same kind of Dalit mobilisation and consciousness as in Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra, or Uttar Pradesh (UP). Therefore, all three frameworks of understanding Dalit consciousness i.e. Dravidian, Ambedkarite and Gandhian (Pai: 2012), fail to explain the condition of Dalits in Telangana in general, and in this village in particular. We have not observed the kind of Dalit mobilisation in this village as described by Pai (2012). We do not even see such a level of consciousness among Dalits and consequent antagonism and confrontation with upper castes. The situation is largely inert if at all one were to go by the macro level descriptions provided by Pai (2012). Besides, Telangana, historically, had also not witnessed social reform or caste reform movements on the lines of those of Jyotiba Phule and Ambedkar in Maharashtra, or Ramaswamy Naicker in Tamil Nadu, nor did it have a strong Gandhian movement. In fact the historical legacy of social reform can be of great importance and relevance to all sections of society, including Dalits. This absence of a history of social reforms and any historical memory of the same is glaringly obvious in Telangana. Instead, Telangana has the historical memory of the peasant armed struggle against the Nizam led by the Left movement in the late 40s and 50s. However, the influence of the Left has since drastically declined owing to various reasons. Currently, the Communist Party of India (Marxist) [CPI (M)] has a small presence in the village mobilising some votes in the elections but it is no longer a formidable force. A small pucca cement road near the bus stop within the village leads to the Dalit families. There are about 50 families of Dalits, of which 48 families belong to the Madiga sub-caste and two families to Mala sub-caste. These constitute 200-250 voters. There are about 50 male educated Dalit youths in the village who have completed graduation but they have not succeeded in finding jobs in the formal sector. On being asked as to why they did not find work in the formal sector with education up to graduation and the support of affirmative action, the youth replied that wherever they looked for jobs, they were being asked for skill training. Both private and public sector jobs demanded, apart from general graduate degrees, a specific training in skills, the youth are generally not equipped with it. Since they have not undergone skill training, they are being denied jobs and hence, they work as skilled labourers, e.g. masons. The village also boasts of an Ambedkar youth association which was established and registered in 2002. At an interaction during the revisit, the secretary of the Ambedkar Youth Association said that there was no practice of untouchability observed in the village. Among the 50 Dalit families, none followed its caste occupation of leather work or any such practices. Only one Dalit person from the entire community is still engaged in the leather work. There are six Dalit families of marginal farmers with each owning about two to four acres. The remaining 44 families are agricultural labourers. In the entire village, there were only two jeetas , or attached farm labourers, the system almost having disappeared in the rest of the village. There is complete casualisation of labour. A majority of the labourers are engaged in daily wage work (what is called roju coolie in Telugu). This is liberating in the sense that the wage labourers do not have any obligation or bondage or extra-economic coercion at work place. There is only one visible improvement observed as much for Dalits as in the rest of the village. The agricultural wages have improved from 1996 to 2017. Depending upon the season, the male wage-rate is from Rs 350 to Rs. 500, whereas, the female wage-rate is about half of that (Rs. 200 to Rs. 300) per day. How much of this is translated into the improvement of real wages is for economists to tell. This is also a reason why the erstwhile handloom weavers now prefer agricultural wage work to weaving with handlooms. Both, however, do not enjoy the same social status and, more importantly, this is an obvious case of proletarianisation of half of the village households that come from weaving background and other castes. No major caste-conflicts are reported in the village. I enquired particularly about conflicts between the upper castes and Dalits and between backward castes and Dalits. However, according to the Dalits interviewed, no such incidents have taken place so far. As a Dalit woman observed in a discussion, “The upper castes now come a step down to treat us well. And we treat them well too.” When asked about the activities of the Ambedkar Youth Association, the secretary of the association explained that it periodically conducted sports and cultural activities for the youth of the village. On being asked whether they felt there is a difference between the youth of the association and the rest of the village, he explained, “The association youth do not see any difference. And, moreover, the rest of the youth too cooperate in these cultural and sports activities and the relations between the youth of different castes are harmonious.” Obviously this is a very different situation from the one elaborated by Pai (2012) in respect of Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu and UP. When asked as for which political party the Dalits voted, they said that they all voted for the TRS (Telangana Rashtra Samiti) despite the presence of many other political parties in the village. The Village Panchayat When I first visited this village in 1996, the elections to the Gram Panchayat had just got over with clear majority for backward castes in the entire Mandal of Ramannapet. This was after the introduction of the affirmative action in Panchayats. The same trend has continued since then. The current Sarpanch of the village is a woman from the Padmashali caste. However, when asked about the village panchayat, Shivaranjani, refused to speak and said that we should contact her husband instead, Balram. For every question that we have tried to ask, her standard answer was, “Ask Balram sir. He will tell you.” It appeared clearly a case of proxy presidentship in the Panchayat. Although women among Padmashalis take the full load of their occupation and share as much burden of weaving as the male members do, when it comes to holding a public office perhaps they are still somewhat hesitant. Interestingly, the Sarpanch and her husband belong to Telugu Desam Party (TDP). Return to Contents V. CONCLUSION The village discussed here, Bogaram, is essentially weaver-caste dominated village. The crisis in sector has crippled the village inhabitants and have forced them to migrate, mostly to Hyderabad. Weaving, as it comes out from our in-depth interviews, is affected by increasing prices of yarn and colours and the lack of markets for finished cloth. The government of Telangana was supposed to have announced 45 per cent subsidy on yarn prices. However, this promise remained only at the announcement stage. The subsidy has never reached the weavers. The crisis in weaving sector has long been brewing. Initially from the late 1980s to 1996, there were export markets for handloom cloth. Later, however, the exports declined. While we do not know the exact macro policy reasons for this, the weavers themselves tell us that the exports of handloom cloth have been subsequently banned by the government at the Centre. Simultaneously, the domestic markets declined because of the high price of the handloom cloth when compared to the mill produced cloth. Increase in the prices of raw materials has pushed up the price of the finished handloom cloth which is uncompetitive when compared to the cloth produced in cotton mills.  Most of the weavers sell their finished cloth to the wholesalers in the famous town of Pochampally (known for handloom cottons and silks).    A quick visit to Pochampally and interviews with the weaver’s cooperative there tells us that there is now a glut of handlooms unsold in the market. This is because while the exports have not been revived, the domestic markets are dominated by the mill produced cotton cloth. All these have resulted in outward migration from Bogaram and, at a few extreme circumstances, suicides of the weavers. It is interesting to note that the State has done very little other than providing some ex gratia to the victims of suicides. There were practically no steps to prevent the crisis in livelihoods and the resultant migration. Not even the fluoride problem is solved. The Hindustan Petroleum Company started a drinking water purification plant in the village out of its Corporate Social Responsibility funds in 2014. The company sells purified water at the rate of Rs.3 per 20 litres and the villagers are left with barely any alternative. The much awaited water from Mission Bhageeratha (a centralised drinking water provision scheme for entire Telangana) has not materialised so far. Another reason why the weavers and farmers cannot cope with the post-liberalisation scenario is the lack of education. Most weavers are educated only up to Matriculation or intermediate and they cannot find formal sector jobs with this education. The government has not even provided a High School for this village. There is only one secondary or what is called Upper Primary School (UPS) in Bogaram and the education it imparts hardly enables them to go beyond. The village does not have a hospital or a PHC (Public Health Centre). The villagers are forced to commute to Ramannapet PHC which is three km away or private hospitals in the same city, for medical care. There is, of course, a private medical practitioner in the village who provides initial care, but this is grossly inadequate for a population of 1,800. These are the reasons why, as stated above, the presence of the State does not amount to much for the villagers, especially in the context of their well-being. They have no hospital, no drinking water, no high school and no attempts by the State to curb migration by enhancing livelihood opportunities. The indifference of the state machinery is rather stark as reflected by the villagers during the field visits. This paper has argued that studying villages of India post-liberalisation is fraught with difficulties. Besides the question of generalisability of village studies, there is also the question of increasing regional disparities in the country that makes the generalisation of single village studies even more difficult. We have also argued that what has happened since liberalisation is largely the pauperisation of major sections of the village, including the backward castes and their occupations. On the one hand, the jajmani system—a system of reciprocal support between different castes in kind and services to each other and to land owners—has disappeared; traditional caste occupations are on the decline—whether or not they have been replaced by any other. On the other hand, what is taking place is increasing pauperisation, proletarianisation and migration of major sections of the village populations. In this context, following Ambedkar’s argument, we should actually be celebrating the decline of this ‘sink of localism… and communalism’. That indeed is the paradox that Marx had noted of proletarianisation. That is, those who become proletarians in the new places are liberated from erstwhile bondages, in our case the loosening of caste occupations and ties, but on the other side, they become slaves of new circumstances. The debate between Mahatma Gandhi and Ambedkar about the Indian village is well known. In the current scenario, however, it is Marx and the political economy that is enormously behind the decline of villages. We have tried to demonstrate, based on the Bogaram study, that the trend is towards a gradual decline of the village both as a social unit and an economic unit. Those who take the Gandhian approach to studying villages may regret this, while those who take an Ambedkarite approach may find comfort in this truth. Return to Contents VI. WHAT CAN BE DONE: SOME POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING WEAVING In the light of the revisit study of we may suggest the following policy measures: The most urgent need is that of the reduction of the prices of the raw materials that go into weaving. The prices of the yarn, chemical and colours have to be decreased. A 45 per cent subsidy on yarn, as announced by the Telangana and Union governments, should be implemented. There have to be channels by the Telangana government and its weavers’ body, TESCO (Telangana State Weavers’ Cooperative Society), to purchase the finished fabric from weavers and market the same elsewhere. This has to be done immediately and effectively. The five per cent GST imposed on the handloom cloth should be removed. The GST only adds to the price of the final cloth in the market and makes sale of the same uncompetitive. There have to be policies towards health insurance for weavers and general insurance for weaving families at subsidised rates. These did exist earlier during the United Progressive Alliance regime at the Centre which have to be revived. Policies towards the weaving sector suffer from tokenism. Traditionally, the Budget speeches of both the Union and the State governments make a mention of the sector and the allocations for the corresponding fiscal year, but nothing happens thereafter. This ‘policy-tokenism’ should be done away with and proper implementation of the promises made in the budgets, allocations and schemes should be done. Flourine in drinking water is a public health hazard and calls for a speedy, effective and leak proof implementation of drinking water policies in the villages. Finally, in the wake of liberalisation and the havoc it has caused to the livelihoods of the village caste-occupations and handloom weavers, we not only need an economic policy but a robust social policy (in terms of public health and education) for villages in general and the weaving sector in particular.   ( Acknowledgements : I thank all the village people of Bogaram and Pochampally for sparing their time to answer my questions patiently and trying to explain their condition;   Dr. Sobin George for providing time in the seminar for presenting the paper. The paper was also discussed in the Department of Political Science, University of Delhi and I thank all who participated in the discussion on that occasion). Return to Contents [ Anil Kumar Vaddiraju, PhD,  is Associate Professor in Political Science at the Centre for Political Institutions, Governance and Development, Institute for Social and Economic Change, Bengaluru. He works on public policy, policy processes, agrarian change, rural and urban governance and political theory. He has an enduring interest in studying rural change over long periods of time. He can be contacted at  [email protected] ; [email protected] ]. Endnote: 1. Telangana State was created on June 2, 2014, as India’s 29th State as a result of the bifurcation of the erstwhile State of Andhra Pradesh. Return To text. 2. The author first studied this village as part of his Doctoral thesis, Capitalist Development and Agrarian Politics in Andhra Pradesh, 1960-90, submitted to the University of Delhi. A paper based on that thesis, Emergence of Backward Castes in South Telangana: Agrarian Change and Grass Roots Politics, was published in the Economic and Political Weekly in 1999. Return to Text. 3. Breman, J. 1997 . "The Village in Focus" in Jan Breman, Peter Kloos and Ashwani Saith (Eds) The Village in Asia Revisited, Delhi: Oxford University Press, pp. 15-75. Return to Text. 4. Suri, K. C. 2006 . "Political Economy of Agrarian Distress", Economic and Political Weekly , April 22, Vol. 41, Issue. 16. Return to Text. 5. "Emergence of Backward Castes in South Telangana: Agrarian Change and Grass Roots Politics", Special Article, Economic and Political Weekly , 34 (7), February 13-19, 1999 pp. 425-430. ISSN: 0012- 9976. Subsequently an abridged version was published in a volume edited by Professor Surinder Singh Jodhka (Jodhka, 2012: 181-192). Return to Text. 6. This is quite reminiscent of Marx’s words about the origins of manufacture and proletarianisation. Marx at one point in Das Kapital says ‘Manufacture (at) first establishes itself not in the cities but in the countryside in villages etc. The rural subsidiary occupations contain the broad basis of manufacture’ (cited in Vaddiraju, 2013:12-13). Return to Text. 7. M.N. Srinivas at one point says about caste-class relationship, ‘Not only will class divisions exist within castes, but each class itself will be composed by diverse castes some castes being more strongly represented in a class than others’ (Srinivas, 1996: xiv-xv). Return to Text. References: Ahluwalia, M., S. 2011 . ‘Economic Performance of States in Post-Reforms Period’ in Pulapre Balakrishnan (ed) Economic Reforms and Growth in India: Essays from Economic and Political Weekly , Hyderabad: Orient Blackswan, pp. 349-376. Jodhka, S. S (ed) 2012 . Village Society: Essays from Economic and Political Weekly , Hyderabad: Orient Blackswan. Karanth, G.K. 1996 . ‘Caste in Contemporary Rural India’ in M.N. Srinivas (ed) Caste: Its Twentieth Century Avatar , New Delhi: Viking, pp. 87-109. Mitra, A. 1977 . Terms of Trade and Class Relations: An Essay in Political Economy , Calcutta: Rupa. Pai, S. 2012 . Dalit Assertion , New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Patnaik, U. 1987 . Peasant Class Differentiation: A Study in Method With Reference to Haryana , New Delhi: Oxford University Press . Panini, M.N. 1996 . ‘The Political Economy of Caste’ in M.N. Srinivas (ed) Caste: Its Twentieth Century Avatar , New Delhi: Viking, pp. 28-68. Srinivas, M.N. 1996 . (ed) Caste: Its Twentieth Century Avatar , New Delhi: Viking. Srinivas, M.N. 1996 . Village, Caste, Gender and Method: Essays in Indian Social Anthropology , New Delhi: Oxford University Press . Vaddiraju, A.K. 2013 . Peasantry, Capitalism and State: Political Economy of Agrarian Societies , New Castle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. Vaddiraju, A.K. 2008 . Land, Labour and Caste: Agrarian Change and Grassroots Politics in Andhra Pradesh , Saarbrucken: VDM Verlag. Vaddiraju, A.K. 1999 . ‘Emergence of Backward Castes in South Telangana: Agrarian Change and Grass Roots Politics’, Special Article, Economic and Political Weekly , 34(7), February 13-19, pp. 425-430. Special Article, Economic and Political Weekly , 34(7), February 13-19, pp. 425-430.

The Jamaat-e-Islami, Jammu and Kashmir, was recently banned by the Union Home Ministry for the third time in its chequered history. Oddly enough, mai

The Global Environment Outlook-6: Healthy Planet, Healthy People (GEO-6), released on March 13, 2019, covers all environmental issues and their link t