

Policy Report

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The Phenomenon of Political Dynasties Among the Muslim Legislators of Uttar Pradesh

Mohd Osama



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
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The Phenomenon of Political Dynasties Among the Muslim Legislators of Uttar Pradesh

Mohd Osama

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(February – May, 2018)



ABSTRACT

This report on the phenomenon of political dynasties among Muslims in Uttar Pradesh is an empirical enquiry into the extent it has impacted the legislature. The report bases its findings in the fieldwork conducted in Uttar Pradesh to determine the dynastic credentials of Muslim legislators over the last two decades, and finds that the more marginalised a community, the larger the number of political dynasties it will have in the Legislature. Muslim political representation in the State legislature is just 6 per cent in the current assembly, while Muslim dynast MLAs account for 60 per cent. Most Muslim political dynasts are relatively young and politically inexperienced, but that hasn't prevented them from being re-nominated. If family connections have helped them to secure party tickets, they have also changed their party allegiances more often than their non-dynast counterparts. In Uttar Pradesh, both dynast and non-dynast Muslim legislators tend not only to be wealthy but also have a large number of serious criminal cases against them. To study this subject, I assembled the profiles of these dynastic candidates including details such as age, education, the process by which they were nominated and re-nominated, whether they switched political parties, and whether they have a criminal background: all this has been recorded in the primary dataset created for this report.

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Last but not the least, I would like to thank my Ph.D. supervisor, Adnan Farooqui, with whom I first shared my intent to research the question of political dynasties. His strong emphasis on the research design which is based on a sound empirical understanding of Indian politics, solved half the task at hand; it is as much his report as mine.

All the errors in the report are mine.

GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

B.J.P.	:	Bhartiya Janata Party
B.S.P.	:	Bahujan Samaj Party
E.C.I.	:	Election Commission of India
I.A.S.	:	Indian Administrative Services
I.N.C.	:	Indian National Congress
M.L.A.	:	Member of the Legislative Assembly
M.P.	:	Member of the Parliament
O.B.C.	:	Other Backward Castes
R.L.D.	:	Rashtriya Lok Dal
S.P.	:	Samajwadi Party
U.P.	:	Uttar Pradesh

I. INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXT OF THE STUDY

The youngest M.L.A. elected to the 17th Legislative Assembly of Uttar Pradesh, who is the son of a well-known Muslim politician from Rampur, disagreed with my line of questioning when I interviewed him about the advantage a candidate has, when he/she is the political heir of an established politician. He said, “When a doctor’s son becomes a doctor, nobody questions that; when an I.A.S. [officer]’s son prepares to become [an] I.A.S. [officer] or becomes an I.A.S. [officer], nobody ponders on it. Then, why should a politician’s son be asked about it?” He further added, “I am elected, not selected...a politician is just exposed to questioning”.

Such responses are not unique to this young dynast, but can be heard among others of his tribe, as I discovered during my research for this report.

In the introduction to her book *Democratic Dynasties*, Kanchan Chandra argues that the primary difference between the erstwhile traditional aristocratic dynasties and modern elected dynasts is that they are elected, and not selected (Chandra 2016). Being voted by the people is one of the greatest normative qualifiers for these political ‘heirs’. Hence, whether it is a notorious Muslim criminal-turned-politician M.L.A. from eastern U.P. or a Muslim representative from western U.P., they both argue in a very similar fashion about what they owe to their family members for ease of entry into the political arena and acceptance by the people.

Broadly, a dynastic M.P. or M.L.A. is an elected candidate, who has a family member related by blood or marriage, preceding him or her in politics (Chandra 2016; Smith 2012; Querubin 2010; Dal Bo, Dal Bo, and Synder 2009). In Parliament, 20 per cent, 30 per cent, and 22 per cent of the M.P.s who were elected in 2004, 2009, and 2014, respectively, were dynasts. If we consider only the Muslim M.P.s, 26 per cent, 36 per cent, and 32 per cent among them were dynasts in the 14th, 15th, and 16th Lok Sabha, respectively (Chandra 2016). The percentage of dynasts increases, when we look at only Muslim M.P.s from U.P. — 55 per cent, 43 per cent, and 100 per cent (only one Muslim M.P. from the State) respectively in the 14th, 15th, and 16th Lok Sabha.¹

¹ On the basis of the fieldwork undertaken as part of this project.

In the U.P. Legislative Assembly, the percentage of dynasts among Muslim M.L.A.s is even larger — 60 per cent, 53 per cent, and 60 per cent for the 15th (2007), 16th (2012), and 17th (2017, current assembly) assemblies, respectively.²

This phenomenon is not unique to India; it has been empirically found so in Nicaragua³, and Colombia⁴, where the elites and dynasties control most political parties, thanks to their weak organisational structures. In Japan, the hereditary system of elite recruitment is very high: in the 1990 general elections in Japan, around 170 *nisei* (second generation dynasts) contested the elections, and around 125 were elected. This was around a quarter of the 512 Diet (lower house) members.⁵ Daniel M. Smith, in his new book, argues that, since the 1996 general elections, more than a quarter of all M.P.s in the Japanese House of Representatives have been members of a democratic dynasty.⁶ In Philippines, around 70 per cent of the 15th Philippine Congress representatives are dynasts⁷, and in the 2010 elections, roughly 50 per cent of the elected Congressmen and Governors had a relative who had previously held office. Moreover, in 35 of the 80 provinces in the Philippines, the Governor and Congressman are related.⁸

The question that comes to mind is: why does the phenomenon of dynasties occur in the first place? Kanchan Chandra argues that in the case of India, the returns, associated with a political career, financial or otherwise, associated with the State, and weak organisational political party structures, ensures that dynasties prosper in the political sphere. These ‘democratic dynasties’ are a result of modern political Indian institutions, not because of any pre-disposed or any other essential characteristics of Indian politics (Chandra 2016).

² **Ibid.**

³ **Vilas, C. M. 1992.** “Family Affairs: Class, Lineage and Politics in Contemporary Nicaragua”, *Journal of Latin American Studies*, May, Vol. 24, No. 2, pp. 309-341.

⁴ **Martz, J. D. 1992.** “Party Elites and Leadership in Colombia and Venezuela”, *Journal of Latin American Studies*, February, Vol. 24, No. 1, pp. 87-121.

⁵ **Fakui, S. N. and Fakui, H. 1992.** “Elite Recruitment and Political Leadership”, *PS: Political Science and Politics*, March, Vol. 25, No. 1, pp. 25-36.

⁶ **Smith, D. M. 2018.** “Dynasties and Democracy: The Inherited Incumbency Advantage in Japan”, July 3, Chapter 1 (<https://www.sup.org/books/extra/?id=24504&i=Chapter%201.html>)

⁷ **Mendoza, R. U. et al. 2012.** “Inequality in democracy: Insights from an empirical analysis of political dynasties in the 15th Philippine Congress”, *Philippine Political Science Journal*, July 12, Vol. 33, No. 2, pp.132-145, DOI: 10.1080/01154451.2012.734094 [https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/40104/1/MPRA_paper_40104.pdf].

⁸ **Querubin, P. 2016.** “Family and Politics: Dynastic Persistence in the Philippines”, *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 11: No. 2, pp. 151-181. [<http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/100.00014182>].

This phenomenon of dynasties is not only responsible for the exclusion of many deserving non-dynastic candidates, but also for the inclusion and increase in representation of many marginalised communities such as Muslims and women. Without this inclusion, their representation would have been lower than what it is at present (Basu 2016, Chandra 2016).

Pradeep Chhibber⁹ argues that, in the context of Indian political parties, the lack of a proper party organisation, the centralised financing of elections, and the absence of independent civil society associations that mobilise support for the party helps to promote the phenomenon of political dynasties.

Before talking about the methodology followed in this project, and its findings, I will try to place the subject of this research in context.

Context of the study

Political Representation among Muslim Legislators

In 1952, Muslim M.P.s accounted for four per cent of the total number; in 2014, in the current Lok Sabha, it is still four per cent. In 1980, the representation of Muslims had shot up and was nearly in proportion to their population (roughly 14 per cent) in India. The absence of Muslims from the legislature or ‘Missing Muslims’¹⁰ from the legislature as per their population is nearly 71 per cent in the present Lok Sabha of 2014 (table a).

However, representation at the candidacy level in Lok Sabha elections has gone up, with the number of Muslim candidates nearly in proportion to their population in the last three Lok Sabha elections. Earlier, very few tickets were given to Muslims (Ansari 2006). In the 2014 Lok Sabha elections, 11 per cent of the candidates were Muslims, who are roughly 14 per cent of the population (table b). In U.P., Muslims were given tickets by parties like the Indian National Congress (INC), the Bahujan Samaj Party (B.S.P.) and the Samajwadi Party (S.P.) in the 2014 Lok Sabha elections (table c), but no Muslim candidates could win. Over the years, parties like the B.S.P. have started giving fewer tickets to Muslims (table c).

⁹ Chhibber, P. 2011. "Dynastic parties: Organization, finance and impact", Party Politics, *SAGE Journals*, May 5, Vo. 19, pp. 277-295

¹⁰ The ‘missing Muslim’ is just a phrase used to reflect on the lack in numbers of Muslims in the legislature.

A similar pattern is visible in the composition of the U.P. assembly: the representation of Muslims was at an all-time high in 2012, when 71 Muslim legislators were elected (includes those who won by-elections). From 71, it went down to 25 in the 2017 assembly elections. At the candidacy level, unlike for the Lok Sabha, the number of candidates shrank in the U.P. assembly elections. In 2007, for the 15th Legislative Assembly elections, only six per cent of the candidates were Muslim; this went up to 12 per cent in 2017, in the 17th assembly elections, still far below their presence in the State's population in U.P. — 19.26 per cent.

The trend of decreasing Muslim representation at the elected as well as at the candidacy level for both general and State elections can be attributed to the rise of the B.J.P. as a party in power (Jaffrelot and Verniers 2018).

Studying the phenomenon of dynasties among Muslim Legislators

The political representation of Muslims is very low in India, as empirically discussed above. In the last two decades, 70 per cent of Muslim M.L.A.s elected in U.P. were *Asbrâfs* (upper caste Muslims), though they are not more than 20 per cent of the Muslim population in the State. They are wealthier, better educated, and political parties favour them in giving tickets (Verniers 2014).

The phenomenon of dynasties has both an inclusion and an exclusion effect: parties tend to give more tickets to those who come from political families, even as they have begun to include members of some marginalised communities who could have never achieved that much representation, such as women, Muslims, O.B.C.s (Other Backward Castes), etc. So, this phenomenon has an inclusive effect as far as their numbers in the legislature is concerned (Basu 2016, Chandra 2016).

Lok Sabha	Percentage of Dynastic Muslim M.P.s (among total Muslim M.P.s) in respective Lok Sabha	Percentage of Muslim M.P.s among total M.P.s
14th Lok Sabha (2004)	26	7
15th Lok Sabha (2009)	35	5
16th Lok Sabha (2014)	32	4

Source: for Muslim Dynastic Parliamentarians, see Kanchan Chandra (2016).

Even if Muslim political representation is low, the number of those who represent political families among them is high in Parliament (Chandra 2016; see the above table). In the 16th Lok Sabha, Muslims M.P.s make up four per cent of the total; of them, 32 per cent are dynasts. Hence, when studying Muslim legislators, it would be useful to analyse whether a family background in politics promises political advantage. It would also help to answer the question: Does this factor help Muslims in their substantive representation?

The phenomenon of political dynasties among Uttar Pradesh's Muslim legislators

U.P. offers an advantage in studying about Muslim politics, with 19 per cent of its population belonging to the community; it is also the most populous State of India, sending the largest number of M.P.s to Parliament. Muslim candidates given tickets by the parties are mostly from U.P. (see the table below). However, in recent years, Muslim M.P.s from U.P. have gone down, so much so that, in the current Lok Sabha, no Muslim was elected from the State (only one elected Muslim M.P., elected in Bye-Election in 2018), even though 126 Muslims got tickets (see figure b).

Table: Muslim Members of Parliament, State-wise from 1952-2004; Most Muslim candidates and winners are from the State of Uttar Pradesh

States	Average Muslim Population (%)	Total number of Muslims nominated	Total number of Muslims who won
Assam	24	159	30
Kerala	19	149	38
U.P.	15	879	118
West Bengal	20	369	76

Source: 1952-2004: Iqbal A. Ansari (2006)

If we consider the Legislative Assemblies, the U.P. Legislative Assembly has had the largest number of Muslim M.L.A.s over the years (see the table below).

Table: Most and Least-Muslim Members of Legislative Assemblies of various States, from 1952-2004 (Legislative Assembly of Uttar Pradesh have the most Muslim Legislators)

States	Average Muslim Population (%)	Most Muslim winners	Least Muslim winners
Assam	25	32 (1980)	16 (1967)
Kerala	20	28 1(982)	11 (1957)
U.P.	16	49 (1977, 1985)	23 (1967, 1969)
West Bengal	21	42 (1991)	18 (1952)

Source: 1952-2004: Iqbal A. Ansari (2006)

Hence, U.P. offers a distinct advantage in the context of studying the phenomenon of political dynasties among Muslim legislators, in terms of the number of M.L.A.s and M.P.s.

Table a
Lok Sabha Muslim Legislators
From 1952 To 2014

Lok Sabha	Muslim M.P.s Elected	Total seats in Lok Sabha	Muslim members in Lok Sabha (%)	Muslim Population (%)	Missing Muslims/ Deprivation in Representation (%)
1st Lok Sabha (1952)	21	489	4	9.9	59.5
2nd Lok Sabha (1957)	24	494	5	9.9	49.4
3rd Lok Sabha (1962)	23	494	5	10.7	53.2
4th Lok Sabha (1967)	29	520	6	10.7	43.9
5th Lok Sabha (1971)	30	518	6	11.2	46.4
*6th Lok Sabha (1977)	34	542	6	11.2	46.4
*7th Lok Sabha (1980)	49	529	9	11.2	19.6
*8th Lok Sabha (1984)	46	542	8	11.4	29.8
9th Lok Sabha (1989)	33	529	6	11.4	47.3
10th Lok Sabha (1991)	28	534	5	12.1	58.6
11th Lok Sabha (1996)	28	543	5	12.1	58.6

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12th Lok Sabha (1998)	29	543	5	12.1	58.6
13th Lok Sabha (1999)	32	543	6	12.1	50.4
14th Lok Sabha (2004)	36	543	7	13.4	47.7
15th Lok Sabha (2009)	29	543	5	13.4	62.6
*16th Lok Sabha (2014)	23	543	4	14.2	71.8

* LS 1977, 1980, 1984, and 2014 includes winners of by-elections; source: From 1952-2002, see Iqbal A. Ansari (2006); 2004-2014: Mohd Osama's dataset on Muslim Legislators'

Chart: Mohd Osama, PhD Candidate, JMI


Table b

'Missing' Muslims

Muslim candidates' under-representation among the total candidates

Lok Sabha	Muslim Population percentage	Muslim candidates (includes Independent candidates) percentage among total candidates	Missing Muslims (%)
14th Lok Sabha 2004	13.43	9 (497/5435)	31
15th Lok Sabha 2009	13.43	10 (802/8070)	23
16th Lok Sabha 2014	14.23	11 (885/8251)	21

Figure a




THE PHENOMENON OF POLITICAL DYNASTIES
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Table c

Lok Sabha	Political parties - U.P.	Muslim candidates (total candidates of the party)	Muslims won (total won by a party)
1998	I.N.C.	12 (76)= 16%	0
	B.J.P.	1 (82)= 1%	1 (57)
	S.P.	13 (81)= 16%	3 (20)
	B.S.P.	14 (85)= 16%	2 (4)
1999	I.N.C.	11 (76)= 14%	2 (10)
	B.J.P.	1 (77)= 1%	0 (29)
	S.P.	13 (84)= 15%	2 (26)
	B.S.P.	17 (85)= 20%	3 (14)
2004	I.N.C.	9 (73)= 12.3%	0 (9)
	B.J.P.	2 (77)= 2.5%	0 (10)
	S.P.	12 (68)= 18%	7 (35)
	B.S.P.	19 (80)= 24%	4 (19)
2009	I.N.C.	9 (69)= 13%	3 (21)
	B.J.P.	4 (71)= 5.6%	0 (10)
	S.P.	10 (75)= 13%	0 (23)
	B.S.P.	14 (80)= 18%	4 (20)
2014	I.N.C.	11 (67)= 16%	0 (2)
	B.J.P.	0 (78)= 0%	0 (71)
	S.P.	12 (78)= 15%	0 (5)
	B.S.P.	19 (80)= 14%	0

Source: Mohd Osama's dataset on Muslim Legislators'

Chart: Mohd Osama, PhD candidate, JMI. **Graph:** Mohd Osama, PhD Candidate, JMI.

Figure b

Source: From 1952-2004: Iqbal A. Ansari (2006); 2009-2014: Mohd Osama's dataset on Muslim Legislators'. 2014: only one elected Muslim M.P., elected in Bye-Election in 2018.

Graph: Mohd Osama, PhD candidate, JMI. (IND: Independent)

Table d

Uttar Pradesh Muslims M.L.A.s 1952-2017

Muslim Representation increased in a linear pattern from 1991 and reached at the highest representation point in 2012. From there, it declined to the low of 6%. Missing Muslims shows the deprivation in Muslim representation over the consecutive assemblies

	Legislative Assembly	Elected Muslim M.L.A.s	Muslim Population Percentage	Muslim Representation Percentage	Missing Muslims Percentage
1	1st Legislative Assembly 1952	41 (430)	14.3	9.5	33.5
2	2nd Legislative Assembly 1957	37 (430)	14.3	8.6	39.8
3	3rd Legislative Assembly 1962	30 (430)	14.6	7.0	52.05

THE PHENOMENON OF POLITICAL DYNASTIES
AMONG THE MUSLIM LEGISLATORS OF UTTAR PRADESH

	Legislative Assembly	Elected Muslim M.L.A.s	Muslim Population Percentage	Muslim Representation Percentage	Missing Muslims Percentage
4	4th Legislative Assembly 1967	23 (425)	14.6	5.4	63.01
5	5th Legislative Assembly 1969	23 (425)	14.6	5.4	63.01
6	6th Legislative Assembly 1974	25 (424)	15.5	5.9	61.9
7	7th Legislative Assembly 1977	49 (425)	15.5	11.5	28.3
8	8th Legislative Assembly 1980	47 (425)	15.5	11.1	28.3
9	9th Legislative Assembly 1985	49 (425)	15.9	11.5	27.6
10	10th Legislative Assembly 1989	38 (425)	15.9	8.9	44.02
11	11th Legislative Assembly 1991	23 (418)	17.3	5.5	68.20
12	12th Legislative Assembly 1993	25 (422)	17.3	5.9	65.8
13	13th Legislative Assembly 1996	33 (424)	17.3	7.8	54.9
14	14th Legislative Assembly 2002	47 (403)	18.0	11.7	35
15	15th Legislative Assembly 2007	55 (403)	18.0	13.6	24.44
16	16th Legislative Assembly 2012	71 (403)	19.3	17.6	8.80
17	17th Legislative Assembly 2017	25 (403)	19.3	6.2	67.8


Source: from 1952 to 2002: Iqbal A. Ansari (2006); 2007 to 2017: Mohd Osama's dataset on Muslim Legislators' sourced from U.P. Legislative Assembly website (http://uplegisassembly.gov.in/ENGLISH/sadasya_parichay.aspx). 2017: includes one bye election winner; 2012: includes four by election winners; 2007: includes one by election winner; 1991- missing in Iqbal Ansari's (2006)

Chart: Mohd Osama, PhD candidate, JMI

Table e and figure c

'Missing Muslims': Muslim candidates' under-representation among the total candidates

Legislative Assembly	Muslim Population Percentage	Muslim candidates (includes Independent Candidates) Percentage among total candidates	Missing Muslims Percentage
15th Legislative Assembly 2007	18.01	6% (388/6086)	66.6
16th Legislative Assembly 2012	19.26	12% (826/6839)	37.6
17th Legislative Assembly 2017	19.26	12% (575/4853)	37.6



Source: Collated from the ECI statistical data

Chart: Mohd Osama, PhD candidate, JMI. **Graph:** Mohd Osama, PhD Candidate, JMI.

II. METHODOLOGY

This research paper theorises about the causes and consequences of dynastic politics among U.P.'s Muslim legislators. As there is no secondary data available on the dynastic component of the State's Muslim legislators, primary research has been undertaken to prepare a quantitative dataset on their various attributes. Around 22 interviews were also conducted to reflect on the dynastic politician's views on the phenomenon of political dynasties, voters, and U.P. politics in general.

Information on well-known Muslim families of the State is available on the internet, but there is no data or information available on many other legislators, who may also belong to political families.¹¹

In the next section, I will define what I mean by a dynastic legislator, and provide a code for the variables used in the dataset. The fieldwork for the quantitative data collection to create an original dataset on the political dynasties of U.P., interviews, and the challenges faced in the data collection will also be taken up.

Defining dynasty

Defining dynasty is a complex task, as there are many kinds of relationships, and many levels of government. For this study, I am using Kanchan Chandra's definition¹² of a dynastic legislator: an M.L.A. or M.P. is dynastic if he or she is preceded by a family member who was active in politics. The term "active in politics" could mean holding office in any elected political body, being nominated by a party as a candidate for election to any office, or holding a formal position in the party organisation (e.g. District President, Youth Chief). An "elected political body" would include the Lok Sabha/ Vidhan Sabha/local level elected bodies, or indirectly elected bodies such as the Rajya Sabha/Legislative Council/indirectly elected post at the local level. The term "active in

¹¹ Lok Sabha website (<http://164.100.47.194/Loksabha/Members/lokprev.aspx>) and U.P. legislative Assembly website (http://uplegisasembly.gov.in/ENGLISH/sadasya_parichay.aspx) have no or very little information on the past political experiences of legislators in the profile section; almost no information is available regarding their experiences at the local government level, as well as any information on whether they come from political families

¹² for the discussion on the definition, see **Chandra, K. 2016.** "*Democratic Dynasties: State, Party and Family in Contemporary Indian Politics*", Cambridge University Press, June, pp. 266-267.

politics”, however, doesn’t include a person who was appointed as a Governor or a District Collector, or is simply a “political activist” or a “social activist”.

Family members have to be related by “blood” or “marriage”. In Daniel Smith’s new work “*Dynasties and Democracies*”, he defines, a “legacy candidate” as a candidate for national office who is related by blood or marriage to a politician who had previously served in national legislative or executive office (presidency or cabinet). If a legacy candidate is elected, he or she becomes a legacy M.P. and creates a ‘democratic dynasty’, which is defined as any family that has supplied two or more members to national-level political office. He contrasts his liberal definition with that of another scholar, Stephen Hess, who defines a dynasty in the American context as “any family that has had at least four members, in the same name, elected to federal office”¹³. Pablo Querubin¹⁴ doesn’t include indirectly elected past family members, while Dal Bo, Dal Bo, and Synder¹⁵ only code dynastic members as those whose relatives were also members of the U.S. Congress and not of any other elected body.

So, the definition of a “dynastic politician” used in this research paper is broader than other definitions discussed above.

Coding procedure for the main variable: Dynastic Relation

The first step was to identify Muslim M.P.s and M.L.A.s from U.P., elected to the 14th, 15th and 16th Lok Sabhas and the 15th, 16th and 17th Legislative Assemblies of the State, respectively. This was easy as U.P. Muslims generally have distinct Muslim names; there were some names, however, which were confusing, and could only be eliminated manually.¹⁶

The next step was to find the names of the parents and spouses of these legislators from the websites, <http://loksabha.nic.in/> (for Muslim M.P.s) and

¹³ Smith, D. M. 2018. “*Dynasties and Democracy: The Inherited Incumbency Advantage in Japan*”, July 3, Chapter 1 (<https://www.sup.org/books/extra/?id=24504&i=Chapter%201.html>)

¹⁴ Querubin, P. 2010. “*Family and Politics: Dynastic Persistence in the Philippines*”, Manuscript.

¹⁵ Dal Bo, E. et al. 2009. “Political Dynasties. Review of Economic Studies”, *The Review of Economic Studies*, Vol. 76, No. 1, pp. 115-42

¹⁶ E.g. Shabbir Ahmad, elected as an M.L.A. on a S.P. ticket in 1993, 1996, 2002, and 2007 from Charda, Bahraich (constituency doesn’t exist after Delimitation, 2008): The name had initially sounded Muslim, but it turned out during a telephonic conversation with him, that he is from the Scheduled Caste category and is not a Muslim. This was corroborated by cross referencing from the ECI report of 1993: Charda was an SC reserved seat (http://eci.nic.in/eci_main/StatisticalReports/SE_1993/StatisticalReport_UP_1993.pdf).

<http://uplegisassembly.gov.in/english/index.html> (for Muslim M.L.A.s), online sources like Election Returns made available by the Election Commission of India (E.C.I.), checking older Muslim legislators' names against the narrowed down constituencies, and searching newspapers such as *The Hindu*, *Indian Express*, *Times of India*, *Dainik Jagran* (in Hindi), *Inquilab* (in Urdu), *Roznama Rashtriya Sahara* (in Urdu) etc.

Coding for additional attributes / variables

In addition to coding for dynastic relationships, the other variables were: gender, constituency (for the three consecutive sessions each for M.L.A.s and M.P.s to reflect on the change in constituency, if any), and past political experience. Other variables included were: criminal background, age, education, assets, and liabilities. This is the candidate's affidavit-related data, available in the form of secondary data.¹⁷

Challenges in collecting primary data and the way out

I faced challenges on two fronts: one was collecting information about Muslim legislators from political families, and the other in recording their past political experiences.

The definition of a dynastic family used in this study includes anyone with a relative active in politics. Reports of the E.C.I. provided information about parents and spouses; cross referencing, in turn, provided details about their political credentials, if any.¹⁸ However, if the relative in question was an elder brother or maternal/paternal uncle or cousin, this methodology was not useful in establishing the dynastic connection.

A similar problem was encountered while seeking to record the political experience of a Muslim M.P. / M.L.A.. A legislator's political history is important to code in the dataset as this could shed light on the political background of Muslim representatives of U.P. in general, and in particular, it could tell us the differences, if any, between the political career of a dynastic candidate whose family member(s) are already in politics and a non-dynastic candidate who has no relative in

¹⁷ Data compiled by ADR (<http://myneta.info/>).

¹⁸ E.g. Nahid Hasan, an M.L.A. elected twice from Shamli, Kairana (U.P.), in 2012 (by-election) and 2017. His mother: Begum Tabassum Hasan was the M.P. from Kairana (15th Lok Sabha) elected in 2009, and is the only Muslim M.P. from U.P. in the 16th Lok Sabha (elected in the by-election of 2018); His father was Munawwar Hasan (deceased): he was the M.P. from Kairana and Muzaffarnagar, elected in 1996 and 2004, respectively.

politics. But, as stated above, the websites have very limited information on the past political experience of legislators, and almost nothing on their local government experience.

Hence, I had to depend on the resourcefulness of a few persons¹⁹ who helped fill the gaps in my research. The contacts (working mobile numbers), and their addresses were arranged. Many telephonic exchanges were undertaken and, in cases where a telephone call was unfruitful, visiting them was an option. Conversations on the telephone and in-person were very useful, and the legislators were very candid in their answers. The fieldwork was also an experience, rare in opportunity. Almost all the legislators interviewed were very forthcoming in providing details about their dynastic backgrounds though they had to be coaxed to share their political experiences at the local government level. This could be the reason for the lack of information on the political experience of legislators in the *Who's Who* section of the Lok Sabha and U.P. assembly websites.

Interviews: Qualitative inquiry

The reason for making a qualitative intervention was to know in some detail the views of Muslim dynasts on the advantage of having a family member in politics, voters, nomination and re-nomination, etc.

I faced the same challenges as I had at the stage of making a quantitative dataset on the phenomenon of dynastic legislators —most legislators were unavailable. The interviews were a mix of structured and unstructured questions. The questions related to their political past, identifying family members in politics; the advantages of having a political relative, how party tickets are given, the nomination and re-nomination process, followed by a general discussion on U.P.'s current politics.

The respondents were dynastic Muslim M.L.A.s from U.P.'s 15th, 16th, and 17th Legislative Assemblies (2007-2017). The interviewees ranged from the six-time sexagenarian S.P. M.L.A., Iqbal Mehmood from Sambhal district, to the 27-year-old M.L.A., Abdullah Azam Khan from Rampur who had no past political experience.

¹⁹ I would like to thank journalists working at The Hindu, covering Uttar Pradesh, for their help. The Youth Vice-President of a national political party was very helpful in arranging working mobile numbers and home addresses.

III. QUANTITATIVE FINDINGS OF THE RESEARCH

The original dataset prepared for this study provides some interesting insights into the phenomenon of Muslim political dynasties in U.P. The dataset revolves around dynasties as its main variable and is the primary subject of this research. It takes into account Muslim legislators from U.P. elected to the Lok Sabha and the Vidhan Sabha.

The 14th, 15th, and 16th Lok Sabhas (2004 to 2014; only M.P.s elected from U.P.) and U.P.'s 15th, 16th, and 17th Vidhan Sabhas (2007 to 2017) were examined for Muslim legislators. In addition to the information on dynastic relationships, other variables for which information is entered are: gender, constituency (for three consecutive sessions each for an M.L.A. and an M.P. to reflect on the change in constituency, if any), and past political experience. Other variables included are: criminal background, age, education, assets, and liabilities. This is the candidate's affidavit-related data, available already in the form of secondary data.²⁰

Overview of the dynasty phenomenon among Muslim legislators in U.P. (2004-2017)

Of the Muslims elected to the 14th Lok Sabha (2004-2009) from U.P., 55 per cent were dynasts; of those in the 15th Lok Sabha, 43 per cent; of those in the current 16th Lok Sabha, 100 per cent²¹(see table 1). These percentages show the extent of the dynastic phenomenon in the context of only Muslim M.P.s elected from U.P. If we compare this with the overall extent of the dynastic phenomenon among Muslim M.P.s in the Lok Sabha, there is a gradual decline in percentages: around 26 per cent in the 14th Lok Sabha, 36 per cent in the 15th Lok Sabha, and 32 per cent in the present 16th Lok Sabha. This means that a larger number of M.P.s elected from U.P. belong to political families, when compared with the rest of the country.

U.P.'s Vidhan Sabha also has a large number of Muslim dynasts among its members. Around 60 per cent of Muslim M.L.A.s elected in 2007 (15th Legislative Assembly) were dynasts, with relatives who had participated in electoral politics. In the next election in 2012, the figure came down to 53 per cent, and rose again to 60 per cent in 2017. If we compare these figures with those of Muslim M.P.s at the national level, approximately 31 per cent in three consecutive Lok Sabhas were

²⁰ Accessed on Association for Democratic Reforms undertaking. <http://myneta.info/>

²¹ 2014: only one elected Muslim M.P. elected in Bye-Election of 2018.

dynasts. This comparison provides interesting insights into the difference between the profiles of M.L.A.s and M.P.s.

Muslim Politicians: Less Representation, more Dynasts

Amrita Basu explained the paradox of low representation of women in Parliament and the high incidence of dynasts among women M.P.s by referring to the working and structure of political parties (Chandra 2016). The percentage of women elected to Parliament is consistently higher than the percentage of women candidates nominated by political parties. For example: 11.4 per cent of M.P.s in the Lok Sabha of 2014 are women, but only 7.4 per cent of the total number of candidates were women. Available literature²² on the subject suggests that while women are nominated in mostly winnable seats, the women nominated by the B.J.P. and the I.N.C. are largely those who are strong candidates and have previous political experience. Now, read this with the data on women M.P.s from political families: around 58 per cent of women M.P.s in 2004, 69 per cent in 2009, and around 43 per cent in 2014 were dynasts (compare this with the data for men: only 17 per cent, 25 per cent, and 19 per cent of male M.P.s in the 2004, 2009, and 2014 Lok Sabhas, respectively, were dynasts). Hence, being a member of a political family makes it easier to win an election. Such connections produced a paradox in representation which, Basu said, worked like an informal affirmative action device that helped to increase representation of women in Parliament. If one uses Basu's framework, the original dataset created for this project tells us that all female Muslim M.P.s of U.P. are dynasts; all Muslim M.P.s who got elected in the three consecutive Lok Sabha elections in U.P. (2004, 2009, 2014) hailed from political families. While, no non-dynast got elected to the Lok Sabha from U.P., one Muslim woman, who did not belong to a political family, was elected to the U.P. Assembly in 2012; in the other two U.P. assembly elections of 2007 and of 2017, no non-dynast woman got elected to the State Assembly. The three women M.L.A.s who were elected to the 2007 Legislative Assembly were all dynasts. No female Muslim M.L.A. got elected in the more recent 2017 Assembly polls (see table 2.1 and 2.2). Therefore, the poor representation of women in politics is being compensated for by those with family connections in politics. Though what this says about the substantive representation of Muslim women is a matter of study.

²² **Jensenius, F. R. 2018.** *India-Contradictory Record*. In Franceschet, S., Krook M. L., and Tan N. (eds.) *Global Handbook of Women's Political Rights*, Palgrave Macmillan UK (available online: http://www.francesca.no/wp-content/2018/04/Jensenius2018_WomenMPs_India.pdf) and **Spary, C. 2014.** "Women candidates and party nomination trends in India – evidence from the 2009 general election", *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, January 17, Vol. 52, No.1, pp. 109-138, DOI: 10.1080/14662043.2013.867691.

Now, if we look at the data on Muslim representation and how many of those are dynasts, a very similar story emerges.

In U.P.'s 15th Legislative Assembly in 2007 (see table 2), while six per cent of the candidates were Muslims, 14 per cent of the legislators belonged to the community. A similar pattern can be seen in the next Legislative Assembly of 2012. This would suggest that political parties largely nominate only winnable Muslim candidates in their strongholds. This makes sense, as voters vote strategically on the basis of merit and, not necessarily, on religious lines.²³ Evidently, a candidate with family connections in politics is seen as more likely to win (Chandra 2016; Ziegfeld 2014). This point emerged in the qualitative inquiry, too. In an interview, a third generation M.L.A. from Bareilly argued that “since 1957, non-Muslim voters are connected to us, and continuously supporting us”. He added that the face matters, not the party, and that “voters remember” the work or service connected to some political families as the family name is like a “brand”²⁴ promising quality service. The “brand name advantage” has been found to be a factor in winning elections in other literature, too.²⁵

As a consequence, Parliament and the State assemblies are full of dynasts. In the data cited above on U.P.'s 15th Legislative Assembly, Muslim representation may be just 14 per cent (55 out of 403 Legislators), but dynastic representation is a whopping 60 per cent.²⁶ The 2012 Assembly elections saw the highest Muslim representation till date, with 71 Muslim M.L.A.s elected to a House of 403, of which 53 per cent²⁷ were dynasts; in the 17th Legislative Assembly of 2017, the figure of dynasts rose to 60 per cent even though only 25 Muslim M.L.A.s were elected, just 6 per cent of the total. This is a paradox of representation, but is responsible for increasing representation of

²³ **Heath, O. et al. 2015.** “Do Muslim voters prefer Muslim candidates? Co-religiosity and voting behavior in India”, *Electoral Studies*, June, Vol. 38, pp. 10-18.

²⁴ **Ziegfeld, A. 2015.** “Who Wins Votes? Candidate Characteristics in Indian Elections”, *Asian Survey*, Vol. 55, No. 5, pp. 1018-1043, p 12. DOI: 10.1525/as.2015.55.5.1018.

²⁵ **Feinstein, B. D. 2010.** “The Dynasty Advantage: Family Ties in Congressional Elections”, *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 35, No. 4, pp. 571-98.

²⁶ Six Muslim M.L.A.s were not included in the analysis to calculate the extent of the dynastic phenomenon as they were unavailable. Source: Osama, M. 2018. Dataset on Political Dynasticism among Muslim Legislators in Uttar Pradesh.

²⁷ Two Muslim M.L.A.s were not included in the analysis to calculate the extent of the dynastic phenomenon due to their unavailability. Source: Osama, M. 2018. Dataset on Political Dynasticism among Muslim Legislators' in Uttar Pradesh.

disadvantaged groups (like Muslims)²⁸. The data for Parliament is similar (see the table 3), showing the same pattern of low representation and a high incidence of dynasts getting elected. In the 14th, 15th, and 16th Lok Sabhas (2004, 2009 and 2014, respectively), it has been empirically found that, Muslim political dynasts accounted for 26 per cent, 35 per cent, and 32 per cent, respectively, whereas Muslim representation was as low as 6 per cent, 5.7 per cent, and 4 per cent, respectively (Chandra 2016).

However, this is not to suggest that upper caste politicians are not benefitted by family connections in politics. By way of comparison (see table 4), in the 14th, 15th, and 16th Lok Sabhas: 23 per cent, 36 per cent, and 27 per cent of forward caste M.P.s, respectively, were dynasts (Chandra 2016). However, it should be kept in mind that around half the legislators are forward caste M.P.s, and that the average Muslim representation in the three Lok Sabhas (2004-2014) was just five per cent, much less than their proportional presence in the country.²⁹

Political Experience and the dynastic phenomenon

Dynastic connections can be a substitute for political experience in Parliament, as argued by Anjali Thomas Bohlken.³⁰ Among the 54 per cent of M.P.s who have experience at the local/State level in the Lok Sabha of 2004, only 15 per cent of them are dynasts, and 85 per cent of those M.P.s are non-dynasts (Chandra 2016). In other literature³¹ that has cited responses from party elites, it was observed that political experience was less important than a family connection for obtaining a party position (Chibber 2011). Hence, it can be argued that a dynastic background helps a politician to enter politics without any political experience at the local level or State level, and even get a ticket for a Lok Sabha election.

²⁸ Chandra, K. 2016. “*Democratic Dynasties: State, Party and Family in Contemporary Indian Politics*”, pp. 50-52, 141, Delhi: Cambridge University Press. Paraphrasing: “It is not surprising then that dynastic representation is especially high among under-privileged social groups such as women, Muslims, and Backward Castes, who do not have reservations to aid them”, and at some other place “In this sense we can think of dynastic politics as an informal substitute for institutional devices such as affirmative action that serve to bring about some form of political equality...Had it not been for dynastic politics, the already low representation of women in parliament may have been even lower.”

²⁹ Muslims population in India: 14.23% of 121 crore individuals, which equals to 17.22 crore individuals; source: Census 2011-Religion data. [<https://www.census2011.co.in/religion.php>].

³⁰ Bohlken, A.T. 2016. Dynasty and “paths to power”. In Kanchan Chandra (ed.). *Democratic Dynasties: State, Party and Family in contemporary Indian Politics*, New Delhi: Cambridge University Press.

³¹ Chhibber, P. 2011. “Dynastic parties: Organization, finance and impact”, *Party Politics*, Vol. 19, pp. 277-295. Pradeep Chibber observed that, 46% of the 538 respondents in a survey who were party elites are of the opinion that political experience is far less important for obtaining a party position.

In the original dataset prepared for this project on Muslim political dynasties, experience is coded as: “No Experience”, “Experience at State level/local level/political party position/student union level”, and “Experience also at the National level”. (See table 5)

In the 15th Legislative Assembly (2007), of the Muslim M.L.A.s who were dynasts, 23 per cent had no political experience whatsoever at the local or State level. By contrast, of the Muslim M.L.A.s who were non-dynasts, five per cent had no experience at all. In the category ‘State level/local level experience or being a member of a political party or student union earlier’ in the same 15th Legislative Assembly of 2007, 85 per cent of non-dynast Muslim M.L.A.s had political experience, while only 70 per cent of Muslim dynasts had experience of some kind. In subsequent U.P. Legislative Assemblies, the pattern was similar: Muslim non-dynasts had more experience at the national/State/local level or had been a member of a political party or of a student union than their dynastic counterparts. A lack of previous political experience is to be found more among dynastic M.L.A.s than among non-dynastic M.L.A.s. The data on Muslim M.P.s from U.P. also reflects the same pattern (See table 6). For example, in the 14th Lok Sabha of 2004, 50 per cent of dynast M.P.s had political experience at the lower levels of governance, while all non-dynast M.P.s had political experience.

The age factor and the dynastic phenomenon

Besides political experience, age is the other variable that helps to understand the political advantage associated with being a dynastic politician. In the 16th Legislative Assembly of U.P. in 2012, the average age of Muslim dynast M.L.A.s was 48, of non-dynastic M.L.A.s 53. In the next Assembly in 2017, the average age of Muslim dynast M.L.A.s was 53, for non-dynast Muslim M.L.A.s 60 (see Table 7). Evidently, Muslim political dynasts find it easier to get a ticket to contest an election at a relatively younger age than their non-dynast counterparts. For U.P.’s Muslim M.P.s, the gap is not significant enough to reflect any discernible pattern (see table 7).

An S.P. party M.L.A. from Rampur who was interviewed for the qualitative data on this project is also the youngest M.L.A. to be elected (at the age of 26) to the 17th Legislative Assembly of 2017, in which only 25 Muslims figured in the list of 403 M.L.A.s. While explaining the political advantage that came with being from a political family, he said, there was nothing wrong in having this advantage as, he stressed, “We are elected, not selected.”

Education

M.P.s and M.L.A.s from political families are more educated than those from non-political backgrounds (Chandra 2006). This is also confirmed by the original dataset prepared to map the phenomenon of political dynasties among U.P.’s lawmakers. The education variable is coded as “percentage of education (Graduates)”.

In 2007, 63 per cent of dynast M.L.A.s and 25 per cent of non-dynast M.L.A.s were college graduates. In 2012, 49 per cent of dynast M.L.A.s and 45 per cent of non-dynast M.L.A.s were graduates. In 2017, when only 25 Muslim M.L.A.s were elected, 60 per cent in both categories were graduates (See table 8 and 8.1).

Crime, money, and the dynastic phenomenon

In Milan Vaishnav’s seminal text³² on the relationship between muscle and money in the context of Indian elections, he analysed why criminals join politics, why political parties give tickets to them, and why voters choose criminal candidates. Through extensive fieldwork, he built a dataset of M.L.A.s and M.P.s against whom there are criminal charges, dividing them into two categories — “any criminal charges/minor charges” and “serious criminal charges”. The first refers to unlawful assembly, campaigning, or speech, as they might be pressed as a political retribution tactic;³³ the rest are serious criminal charges. According to Vaishnav, serious criminal charges are less likely to be pressed out of retribution or political vendetta, as false cases, involving serious charges, are “difficult to engineer”.

Candidates (with criminal charges against them but who have not yet been convicted) enter politics to integrate vertically with the State, cutting out the middlemen, to enhance their prospects. Political parties give them tickets as they are often winnable candidates; also, with elections a costly affair, such candidates, being generally moneyed, can finance their own elections, reducing the burden on the party. Some parties, such as the B.S.P., according to an M.L.A. who was interviewed for this project, “sell tickets” — B.S.P. ticket aspirants are expected to ‘buy’ their nominations by making contributions to the party (Farooqui and Sridharan 2014). With little internal democracy

³² Vaishnav, M. 2017. *When Crime Pays: Money and Muscle in Indian Politics*, Noida: Harper Collins Publishers.

³³ *ibid.*, Appendix A, 319-324.

and rising costs of fighting elections, a wealthy candidate finds it easier to get a party ticket; often, candidates spend a great deal of money, seeing it as an investment for the future, if elected.³⁴

But why do people elect such candidates? Vaishnav explains that people vote for such candidates not out of ignorance, but because they can get their work done *vis-à-vis* the State. Simply being a wealthy candidate is not enough — there is a distinct ‘criminality premium’ (Vaishnav 2017).

In the dataset for the dynastic phenomenon made for this project, the criminal background of candidates as reported in their election affidavits, easily accessible as a secondary source³⁵, has been disaggregated into “minor charges” and “serious charges”, using Vaishnav’s methodology of classification of criminal charges³⁶. Those with assets worth more than one crore rupees have been classified as wealthy to judge the effect of criminality and money on getting elected. This data has been used for both dynastic and non-dynastic politicians, to examine the relationship of crime with money for dynastic candidates.

The table (see Table 9) that shows the relationship between criminal charges, wealth, and the dynastic phenomenon, makes clear that in the three consecutive U.P. Assemblies under study, having “serious charges”, and being wealthy (more than one crore rupees) are generally assets for both dynast and non-dynast M.L.A.s. The table (see Table 10) also demonstrates that belonging or not belonging to a political family (in the context of criminal background) has no significant effect in getting elected. Sometimes, a larger number of wealthy non-dynasts M.P.s with serious charges against them are elected, sometimes, their dynastic counterparts. The only variables which have a uniform effect is that of “serious charges” against a candidate, and of wealth (having more than one crore or ten million rupees) if we ignore the 2007 Assembly when a larger number of relatively poorer but seriously charged criminals were elected.

This conclusion reflects Vaishnav’s argument that candidates who have serious criminal charges against them have a greater chance of winning elections than those with minor criminal charges (Vaishnav 2017). He writes that candidates with no criminal cases, candidates with only minor

³⁴ **Sircar, N. 2018.** Money in Elections: The role of Personal Wealth in Election outcomes. In Kapur, D. and Vaishnav, M. (eds.). *Costs of Democracy: Political Finance in India*, New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

³⁵ Data compiled by ADR [www.myneta.info].

³⁶ **Vaishnav, M. 2017.** “*When Crime Pays: Money and Muscle in Indian Politics*”, Appendix A, pp. 319-324, Noida: Harper Collins Publishers.

cases, and candidates with serious cases in the Lok Sabha elections between 2004 and 2014, have six per cent, 17 per cent, and 18 per cent chances of winning, respectively.³⁷ He also argues that wealthy candidates have a greater chance of winning elections. He then combines the two variables and argues that wealthy candidates with serious criminal charges against them have a better chance of winning elections than wealthy candidates with only minor charges against them.

In this study on the dynastic phenomenon, we got similar results: wealthier candidates with serious criminal charges against them have a greater chance of winning elections, whether they are dynasts or non-dynasts. Dynast Muslim M.L.A.s are wealthier than non-dynast Muslim M.L.A.s and have more criminal charges against them, both minor and serious (as we can see in the figure). But when it comes to serious criminal charges, wealthy Muslim dynast or non-dynast M.L.A.s stand an almost equal chance of getting elected.

Data on U.P.'s Muslim M.P.s was not used in this analysis on crime, wealth, and the dynastic phenomenon as the sample is too small to draw any definite conclusions.

The dynastic card and political parties

Some political parties encourage candidates from established political families more than others. According to Adam Ziegfeld³⁸, dynastic parties have weaker organisations, are run in an autocratic fashion by a single leader, which makes it easy to give tickets to a large number of dynastic candidates. The parties run by dynastic leaders, or are in line to have dynastic succession, favour more dynastic candidates. Pradeep Chibber³⁹, too, argues that dynastic parties are very poorly organised — they do not have an organisation that is independent of the 'elected' wing of the party, and fund raising is centralised in the party leadership.

In this study of the dynastic phenomenon among U.P.'s Muslims in politics, the inferences drawn echo the literature on the subject. In Table 11 that has data on political parties and their share of Muslim M.P.s from U.P., almost half of the B.S.P.'s Muslim M.P.s are from political families. It follows the trend at the Lok Sabha level: though the party, nationally, has not yet shown signs of

³⁷ *ibid.* figure 4.3, 122. The calculations are based on the affidavits submitted to the Election Commission of India by candidates contesting the 2004, 2009, and 2014 parliamentary elections.

³⁸ **Ziegfeld, A. 2016.** Dynasticism across Indian political parties. In Kanchan Chandra (ed.). *Democratic Dynasties: State, Party and Family in contemporary Indian Politics*, New Delhi: Cambridge University Press.

³⁹ **Chibber, P. 2011.** "Dynastic parties: Organization, finance and impact", *Party Politics*, Vol. 19, pp. 277-295.

the possibility of a dynastic succession, more than 20 per cent of its M.P.s are dynasts (Ziegfeld 2016). In absolute numbers, however, the S.P. has more dynast M.P.s from U.P. than the B.S.P. At the State Assembly level, between 2007 and 2017, 67 per cent of Muslim M.L.A.s in the Rashtriya Lok Dal (R.L.D.) and the INC are dynasts, the largest for any party (see figure 1). In the S.P., which has the largest number of Muslim M.L.A.s in the absolute sense in the legislature and the largest number of dynast Muslim M.L.A.s; 58 per cent of them are dynasts while 48 per cent of the B.S.P.'s Muslim M.P.s are dynasts.

These findings are in keeping with the literature on the subject: The I.N.C., the B.S.P. and the S.P. are weak in organisational structure (Farooqui and Sridharan 2014). The S.P. party is run by its founder, Mulayam Singh, who has chosen members of his own family for important party positions. The B.S.P., currently, has one supreme leader, Kumari Mayawati, who succeeded the party's founder, Kanshiram. To secure a party ticket, a candidate has to 'buy' a nomination (Farooqui and Sridharan 2014). This has been found in this project's qualitative inquiry also: a third generation Muslim dynast M.L.A. from Bareilly, when asked why he changes his party every other election, said that the B.S.P. gives tickets to those who pay more.

However, whether a new candidate brings money to the party, or the party's leader is an autocrat who hands out tickets to favourites, merit or winnability of a candidate is important (*ibid.*) — whether an incumbent M.L.A. or M.P. will get re-nominated largely depends on the party's opinion of that candidate, often formed through informal surveys. A new candidate could get a ticket if his or her prospects of winning are perceived to be high.

Nomination, re-nomination and change of parties

The subject of nomination/re-nomination should be discussed as not every legislator gets re-nominated for the succeeding election. For the 2004 and 2009 Lok Sabha elections, the I.N.C. repeated only 33 per cent of its former candidates, the B.J.P. 42 per cent, the Communist Party of India (CPI) 52 per cent, the S.P. 30 per cent, and the B.S.P. 16 per cent (*ibid.*). The reasons range from the party being dominated by a leader, meaning there is no one to question such decisions, to incumbents defecting to other political parties which have a weak organisational structure (*ibid.*). Besides this, many politicians don't get re-nominated because they do not work properly.⁴⁰

⁴⁰ An S.P. politician from Meerut told me in an interview conducted for this research, that if an M.L.A. doesn't work properly or does something unbecoming of a legislator, the party doesn't give ticket to him; even if that politician is from an established political family.

How does the dynastic phenomenon fare amidst these complexities? In Table 12, the data shows that dynastic Muslim M.L.A.s are more likely to be re-nominated for a succeeding assembly election than a non-dynastic Muslim M.L.A. in U.P. In the elections in 2007, the gap between dynastic and non-dynastic M.L.A.s who were re-nominated was 7 per cent; this percentage rose to 13 per cent in the 2012 assembly election, and to 36 per cent in the 2017 assembly elections. In 2012, 39 per cent of dynasts M.L.A.s switched parties, while 19 per cent of non-dynasts followed suit. In the 2017 election, 24 per cent of the dynasts and 5 per cent of non-dynasts changed parties. In short, dynastic M.L.A.s are not only likely to be re-nominated more than their non-dynastic counterparts, they are also more prone to defecting to other parties. Political parties favour dynastic candidates as they have local connections with, and knowledge about, the voters, more so in parties with a weak organisational presence at the local level (Bohlken 2016). A third generation Muslim dynast from Bareilly, whose grandfather was a seven-time M.L.A., and father a two-time M.L.A., said in an interview for this project that voters remember the family name. In fact, almost all M.L.A.s who were interviewed said they had benefitted from the family's political presence in the constituency, and knowledge about the voters and their problems. Their wealth, and consequently the ability to 'buy' tickets, or the perception that parties have about their winnability helps such candidates to be nominated — and re-nominated. However, non-dynastic Muslim M.L.A.s tend to be more attached to their party⁴¹ and defecting to other political parties was seldom an option for them. This is why fewer non-dynastic M.L.A.s join other political parties than dynastic M.L.A.s. However, during the fieldwork for this project, I came to know that many Muslim dynast ex-M.L.A.s (who had been elected in 2007 and in 2012), mostly from the S.P., and who had been denied tickets for the next election, said that they would never dream of leaving the "party" or "netaji" (as Mulayam Singh Yadav is addressed by his followers). In our original dataset, I had come across a Muslim dynast M.L.A.⁴² who had fought three consecutive elections as well as a non-dynast M.L.A.⁴³ who had contested consecutive elections, both on the same party ticket.

⁴¹ **ibid.** Pradeep Chibber observed that, in a survey of 538 respondents in a survey, who were party elites.

⁴² A first generation Muslim political dynast, Haji Irfan Solanki, who has been an S.P. party M.L.A. for three times, from Kanpur is a son of Haji Mushtaq Solanki who was the ex-S.P. party M.L.A. from Kanpur. Irfan Solanki got the ticket in the 2007 assembly election, after his father died in 2006 and vacated the Aryanagar (Kanpur) assembly seat.

⁴³ A non-dynast Muslim M.L.A from the B.S.P., Muhammad Gazi, has always been with the B.S.P. He was M.L.A in 2007 and 2012 from Afzalnagar and Barhapur, respectively, both in Moradabad. He was also an M.L.A candidate for the B.S.P. in 2002 and 2017 from Afzalnagar and Barhapur, respectively.

There were also cases of both dynasts⁴⁴ and non-dynasts⁴⁵, switching parties for every election. Why this happens requires more qualitative study, but as the literature (Chibber 2011) points out, politicians change their political loyalties usually when they get a better position in some other party.

⁴⁴ A dynast Muslim M.L.A, Mukhtar Ansari, a notorious criminal-turned-politician, has been an M.L.A thrice from Mau assembly seat: in 2007 as an Independent candidate; in 2012 as a Qaumi Ekta Dal party candidate; and in 2017, on a B.S.P ticket.

⁴⁵ A non-dynast Muslim M.L.A., Sultan Beg, has been an S.P. M.L.A twice from Kavar, from Meerganj, on a B.S.P ticket, in 2007 and 2012. He also contested in 2002 as an S.P. candidate, and in 2017 as a B.S.P. candidate.

IV. QUALITATIVE FINDINGS: INTERVIEWS OF THE DYNASTS

For this study, I interviewed around 22 Muslim politicians from political families who were elected to the U.P. Legislative Assembly in 2007, 2012 and 2017. The questions posed to them referred to their political past, family members who were in politics, the political advantages resulting from family connections, party tickets, the process of nominations and re-nominations and, finally, the current State of U.P.'s politics.

The reasons for joining politics — as they emerged from these conversations — ranged from it being a matter of choice, a desire to continue a political legacy, a wish to serve the people, to just a passion for politics. An M.L.A. of the 16th Legislative Assembly, who belongs to Ghazipur district in eastern U.P. and is the elder brother of a criminal-turned-politician, said he joined politics as a matter of choice: "...the sense of *khidmat-e-khalq* (social service) motivated us to enter politics, like our father had," he said. Indeed, most dynast politicians regard entering politics as the natural outcome of having grown up in a political family. The youngest M.L.A. in the 17th U.P. Vidhan Sabha, who is from Rampur district in western U.P., said that when politics is done for a good cause, the condition of the poor people improves. He also pointed out that "passion" was an important factor for his entering politics. Wanting to continue the family legacy in politics is also a reason for joining politics: "All my family members were in politics — if I did not join, too, it would be the end of this political *virasat* (legacy)," said a third generation M.L.A. from Bareilly, whose father was an M.L.A. twice, and grandfather a seven-time M.L.A.

A family background in politics usually translates into a political advantage, with those followed by family members creating an advantage for their descendants (Chandra 2016). Research suggests that elite, political families might continue to "dominate the political process simply by virtue of their superior endowments of income, education, and connections. These advantages might arguably give dynastic candidates a head start over non-dynastic candidates in building a political career."⁴⁶ Indeed, almost all my respondents believed that a dynastic connection creates a distinct political advantage. An M.L.A. from Kanpur stressed that, "whether it is Rahul Gandhi, Akhilesh Yadav, or me, we walk in our father's footsteps". However, they added that they also believe that

⁴⁶ Smith, D. M. 2018. "Dynasties and Democracy: The Inherited Incumbency Advantage in Japan", July 3, Chapter 1 [<https://www.sup.org/books/extra/?id=24504&i=Chapter%201.html>].

a dynastic connection does not ensure that a dynastic candidate will always get elected — one has to make a mark on one's own, too. An M.L.A. from Meerut provided an interesting insight: “It (getting elected) is both easy and difficult”, and explained this paradox by building a comparison between two scenarios of inheriting the family name. If members of the first generation work hard, he said, then getting in is easy; if they are unpopular because of their work, then it is very difficult. One M.L.A. from Amroha cited the example of his father who was in the CPI and became the Nagar Palika (City Council) Chairman: he said his father's record of work among the people had helped him to win the M.L.A. election from that same area, because voters there identified him with his father. One S.P. M.L.A. from Rampur questioned the theory that taking advantage of family connections in politics was somehow illegitimate: “When a doctor's son becomes a doctor, nobody questions that”, he said, stressing that all politicians are exposed to public scrutiny and that, “We are elected, not selected.”

The next area of enquiry relates to whether Muslim voters prefer Muslim candidates, and whether Muslim candidates approach Muslim and non-Muslims voters differently? The literature on the subject suggests that Muslim voters vote for Muslim candidates only if there is any chance of their winning the elections (O. Heath et al 2015). So, Muslim candidates, regardless of the political party they represent, cannot depend only on Muslim voters in their respective constituencies. An M.L.A. from Kanpur explains the futility of differentiating between voters by using a metaphor: “A dish is a dish; why notice individual spices?” He also adds that those candidates who approach voters differently tend to fail, as it is important to “take everyone along”. In almost all interviews, respondents stated that they had received the votes of all communities.

There has been no study to pinpoint why voters choose dynast candidates (Chandra 2016) though one can find data to suggest that voters prefer them, with one survey estimating that around 46 per cent of voters prefer those with a family background in politics (Vaishnav, Kapur, and Sircar 2014). A third generation dynast M.L.A. from Bareilly argues that, “since 1957, non-Muslim voters are connected to us, and continuously supporting us”. He adds to this by stating that the face matters, not the party, and that the “voters remember”. But this has no empirical grounding as party affiliation is important: not a single dynast M.P. was elected between 2004 and 2014. The quantitative research⁴⁷ undertaken as a part of this project also points in this direction.

⁴⁷ **Osama, M. 2018.** Dataset on Political Dynasticism among Muslim Legislators' in Uttar Pradesh. It was found that no independent dynast Muslim M.P. was elected from Uttar Pradesh in 2004 to 2014, and only one

Kanchan Chandra argues that political parties prefer dynasts as candidate⁴⁸. In my own quantitative research⁴⁹ on the extent of the dynastic phenomenon among Muslim M.L.A.s in U.P., I discovered that 67 per cent of Muslim dynast M.L.A.s of the 14th Legislative Assembly (2002-2007) were re-nominated as candidates for the 15th Legislative Assembly, for either Legislative Council elections or for Lok Sabha elections held during that time period. However, only 60 per cent of Muslim non-dynast M.L.A.s were re-nominated. For the 15th Legislative Assembly, 93 per cent of Muslim dynast M.L.A.s and 80 per cent of non-dynast M.L.A.s were re-nominated as candidates for the 16th Legislative Assembly, for Legislative Council and Lok Sabha elections. In the U.P. assembly elections of 2017, 92 per cent of the Muslim dynast M.L.A.s of the 16th Legislative Assembly (2012-17) were re-nominated, while only 58 per cent of non-dynasts were re-nominated.

The interviews also shed light on the reasons for being re-nominated or not being re-nominated. An S.P. M.L.A. from Amroha said that a sitting M.L.A.'s work is assessed, stressing that while a dynastic connection matters in the first election or by-election, "development work" matters for subsequent re-nominations. For this, he said, the "party organisation carries out a survey about the particular M.L.A.'s winnability, acceptability, and popularity". An M.L.A. from Meerut echoed this, saying re-nomination can be difficult, if an M.L.A. has not worked properly among the masses.

The literature on the subject validates this view: Farooqui and Sridharan point out that the general criterion is 'merit', which means that a candidate's prospects in a particular election is assessed, before re-nomination. Referring to the nomination process in the B.S.P., they say it is centrally about money, and candidates are expected to "buy" their nominations by making contributions to the party, to be paid personally to the leader, Kumari Mayawati.⁵⁰ This has been found in this project's qualitative inquiry also: a third generation Muslim dynast M.L.A. from Bareilly, on being asked why he kept changing parties⁵¹ said the B.S.P. gives tickets to those who pay more. However, money is not the only criterion for getting a ticket — winnability is also a prime consideration, and the party conducts its own internal surveys to establish that.

independent Muslim dynast M.L.A. was elected from U.P. in the time period, 2007 to 2017 (Imran Masood was elected independently from the seat of Muzaffarabad in 2007)

⁴⁸ This is due to organisational weakness (not rule bound in nominating candidates) in political parties and to avoid defection.

⁴⁹ **Osama, M. 2018.** Dataset on Political Dynasticism among Muslim Legislators' in Uttar Pradesh

⁵⁰ **Farooqui A. and Sridharan E. 2014.** "Incumbency, internal processes and renomination in Indian parties", *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, Vol. 52, No. 1, pp. 78-108, DOI: 10.1080/14662043.2013.867690

⁵¹ In 2002- elected as an independent; in 2007- was elected on B.S.P. ticket; in 2012, elected on I.E.M.C. (Ittehad-e-Millat Council) ticket; in 2017 as an S.P. candidate, but didn't win.

V. SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

Summary of the findings

- The more marginalised a community is, the larger the number of political dynasties it will have in the Legislature: In the Lok Sabha, the phenomenon of political dynasties among Muslim M.P.s from U.P. was 55 per cent, 43 per cent, and 100 per cent in 2004, 2009, and 2014, respectively; in the State assembly, it was, 60 per cent, 53 per cent, and 60 per cent in 2007, 2012, and 2017, respectively. However, while the number of Muslim M.L.A.s (as a percentage of the total number of Muslim M.L.A.s) who come from political families is high, their representation among the total number of M.L.A.s is low —14 per cent, 18 per cent, and six per cent, and also low at the candidate stage itself — six per cent, 12 per cent, and 12 per cent, in 2007, 2012, and 2017, respectively.
- Joining politics is a matter of choice for Muslim dynast M.L.A.s, and they have a distinct political advantage in matters of getting a party ticket, getting elected and being re-nominated.
- Getting re-nominated is easier for Muslim dynast M.L.A.s/M.P.s than for their non-dynast counterparts; however, re-nomination is only possible if the M.L.A. in question has worked sincerely during the five-year term in his or her constituency. Dynastic credentials help on the first occasion; thereafter, it's the work that talks.
- Muslim dynast M.L.A.s and M.P.s are relatively younger than their non-dynast counterparts; hence, they are likely to be less politically experienced.
- Dynastic candidates are, however, better educated; and they receive votes from all communities, not just from Muslims.
- A wealthy Muslim candidate, who has serious criminal charges against him, whether a dynast or a non-dynast, has a greater chance of winning his seat than his poorer counterpart. However, it is noteworthy that in U.P., dynastic candidates among Muslims tend not only to be wealthier, but to have a larger number of serious criminal charges against them, as I found in my research.
- Muslim dynast M.L.A.s tend to get elected on the symbols of the R.L.D., the I.N.C., the B.S.P., and the S.P. in U.P. The S.P. has had the largest number of M.L.A.s in successive State assemblies in absolute numbers, while the I.N.C. and the R.L.D. have the largest as a per cent of the total who have been elected on their respective party tickets.

- Muslim dynast M.L.A.s are re-nominated more by parties and these candidates change political parties more, than their non-dynast counterparts.

Limitations of the study

As this study is limited to U.P., the trends noted here, and the extent of the incidence of the dynastic phenomenon among Muslim legislators may not be reflected in other States. But, perhaps we can conclude that this phenomenon would be high in other states as well because of the marginalisation of Muslims as a whole in the country.

The qualitative insights and views elicited through personal interviews could be very different for a different set of Muslim political leaders, and should not be taken as true for all Muslim politicians. This research project does not seek to make any moral judgment on the dynastic phenomenon; it is only mapping the extent of its incidence and its relation and co-relation with other variables.

VI. TABLES

Table 1

Dynastic M.P.s in Indian Parliament

Percentage of Dynasticism among Muslim Parliamentarians; percentage of Dynasticism among Muslim Parliamentarians from Uttar Pradesh

Lok Sabha	Percentage of Dynastic Muslim M.P.s (among total Muslim M.P.s) in respective Lok Sabha	Percentage of Dynastic Muslim M.P.s from U.P. (among total Muslim M.P.s from U.P.) in respective Lok Sabha
14th Lok Sabha (2004)	25.71 (35)	54.54 (11)
15th Lok Sabha (2009)	35.48 (31)	42.85 (7)
16th Lok Sabha (2014)	31.82 (22)	100 (1)

Source: for Muslim Dynastic Parliamentarians, see Kanchan Chandra (2016); for Muslim Dynastic Parliamentarians from Uttar Pradesh: Mohd Osama's dataset on Muslim Dynasticism in Uttar Pradesh

Chart: Mohd Osama, PhD Candidate, JMI

Table 2

Muslim Political Representation and Dynasticism

U.P. Legislative Assemblies	Muslim population in Uttar Pradesh (%)	Muslim Elected (total M.L.A.s includes Muslim bye-election Muslim winners)	Percentage of representation	Dynastic Representation (%)
15th Legislative Assembly 2007	18.02	55 (403)	13.6	60 (of 50)*
16th Legislative Assembly 2012	19.26	71 (403)	17.6	52.8 (of 70)**
17th Legislative Assembly 2017	19.26	25 (403)	6.2	60 (of 25)

Source: Data on the Muslim representation in U.P. Legislative Assemblies is collated from the U.P. assembly site (http://uplegisassembly.gov.in/ENGLISH/sadasya_parichay.aspx); Dynasticism data: Mohd Osama's dataset on Muslim Dynasticism in Uttar Pradesh. **Note:** Muslims elected in each assembly consists of bye-election Muslim winners *six Muslim M.L.A.s were not included due to their unavailability (2007-55 elected plus one bye elected Muslim winner; so total figure to start the analysis for Dynasticism is 56). **Two M.L.A.s were not included due to their unavailability (2012-68 elected plus 4 bye elected Muslim winners; so total figure to start the analysis for Dynasticism is 72).

Chart: Mohd Osama, PhD Candidate, JMI

Table 2.1

Male-Female Muslim M.P.s from Uttar Pradesh and Dynastic Representation
 Muslim Women M.P.s in the three consecutive parliaments: Dynastic connection indeed helps in getting elected; no Non-Dynastic Muslim female M.P. got elected from U.P.

Year		Total M.P.s	Male M.P.s	Female M.P.s
2004	Total Muslim MPs	11	10	1
	Muslim Dynast M.P.s	6	5	1
	Muslim Non-Dynast M.P.s	5	5	0
2009	Total Muslim MPs	7	5	2
	Muslim Dynast M.P.s	3	1	2
	Muslim Non-Dynast M.P.s	4	4	0
2014	Total Muslim MPs	1	0	1
	Muslim Dynast M.P.s	1	0	1
	Muslim Non-Dynast M.P.s	0	0	0

Source: Mohd Osama's dataset on Muslim Political Dynasticism in U.P.

Chart: Mohd Osama, PhD Candidate, JMI

Table 2.2

Male-Female Muslim M.L.A.s from Uttar Pradesh and Dynastic Representation
Muslim Women M.L.A.s in the three consecutive parliaments: Dynastic connection indeed helps in getting elected; Dynastic Representation among Muslim female M.L.A.s is more than Non-Dynast female M.L.A.s; no Non-Dynastic Muslim female M.L.A.s got elected in two Elections besides 2012.

Year	Uttar Pradesh M.L.A.s	Total M.L.A.s	Male M.L.A.s	Female M.L.A.s
2007	Total Muslim M.L.A.s	56*		
	Muslim Dynast M.L.A.s	30	27	3
	Muslim Non-Dynast M.L.A.s	20	20	0
2012	Total Muslim M.L.A.s	72**		
	Muslim Dynast M.L.A.s	37	35	2
	Muslim Non-Dynast M.L.A.s	33	32	1
2017	Total Muslim M.L.A.s	25		
	Muslim Dynast M.L.A.s	15	15	0
	Muslim Non-Dynast M.L.A.s	10	10	0

Source: Mohd Osama's dataset on Muslim Dynasticism in Uttar Pradesh. **Note:** Muslims elected in each assembly consists of bye-election Muslim winners *six Muslim M.L.A.s were not included due to their unavailability (2007-55 elected plus one bye elected Muslim winner; so total figure to start the analysis for Dynasticism is 56). **Two M.L.A.s were not included due to their unavailability (2012-68 elected plus 4 bye elected Muslim winners; so total figure to start the analysis for Dynasticism is 72)

Chart: Mohd Osama, PhD Candidate, JMI

Table 3
Comparative Muslim Dynasticism in Political Representation

Lok Sabha	Percentage of Dynastic MUSLIM M.P.s (all India) among (total Muslim M.P.s)	Percentage of Representation (%)	U.P. Legislative Assembly	Percentage of Dynastic U.P. MUSLIM M.L.A.s among (total Muslim M.L.A.s from U.P.) (%)	Percentage of Representation (%)
14th Lok Sabha (2004)	25.71 (35)	6.44 (35/543)	15th Vidhan Sabha (2007)	60 (50)*	14 (56/403)
15th Lok Sabha (2009)	35.48 (31)	5.70 (31/543)	16th Vidhan Sabha (2012)	52.8 (70)**	18 (72/403)
16th Lok Sabha (2014)	31.82 (22)	4.05 (22/543)	17th Vidhan Sabha (2017)	60 (25)	6 (25/403)

Source: for Muslim Dynastic Parliamentarians, see Kanchan Chandra (2016); for Muslim Dynastic Parliamentarians from Uttar Pradesh: Mohd Osama's dataset on Muslim Dynasticism in Uttar Pradesh. **NOTE:** Muslims elected in each assembly consists of by-election Muslim winners *six Muslim M.L.A.s were not included due to their unavailability (2007-55 elected plus one bye elected Muslim winner; so total figure to start the analysis for Dynasticism is 56). **two M.L.A.s were not included due to their unavailability (2012-68 elected plus 4 bye elected Muslim winners; so total figure to start the analysis for Dynasticism is 72)

Chart: Mohd Osama, PhD Candidate, JMI

Table 4

Comparative Dynastic Representation of Forward Caste M.P.s, Muslim M.P.s, and female M.P.s "Paradox of low Representation and High Dynasticism": Under-Representation of Muslims and females in the internal organization of Political Parties. Due to Dynastic advantage, their Representation has increased (Chandra 2016).

Lok Sabha	Percentage of Dynastic M.P.s (among total number of M.P.s)	Percentage of Forward Caste Dynast M.P.s (among total Forward Caste M.P.s)	Percentage of Muslim Dynast M.P.s (among total Muslim M.P.s)	Percentage of female Dynast M.P.s (among total female M.P.s)
14th Lok Sabha (2004)	20.07 (543)	22.85 (210)	25.71 (35)	57.88 (45)
15th Lok Sabha (2009)	30.02 (543)	35.60 (236)	35.48 (31)	68.96 (58)
16th Lok Sabha (2014)	21.92 (543)	27.23 (235)	31.82 (22)	42.86 (63)

Source: Adapted from Kanchan Chandra (2016)

Chart: Mohd Osama, PhD Candidate, JMI

Table 5

Uttar Pradesh Muslim M.L.A.s

Experience and Dynasticism: Dynastic Candidates have Political Advantage; relatively more dynastic M.L.A.s get elected than their non-dynastic counterparts, despite having less political experience

Legislative Assembly / Vidhan Sabha	Dynasts/Non-Dynasts	No Experience (%)	Experience Also At National Level (%)	Experience at State/Local/ Party Position/ Student Union Level (%)
15th Legislative Assembly (2007)	Dynasts	23.3 (7/30)	6.66 (2/37)	70 (21/30)
	Non- Dynasts	5 (1/20)	10 (2/20)	85 (17/20)
16th Legislative Assembly (2012)	Dynasts	16.2 (6/37)	5.4 (2/37)	78.3 (29/37)
	Non- Dynasts	6 (2/33)	3 (1/33)	90.9 (30/33)
17th Legislative Assembly (2017)	Dynasts	6.6 (1/15)	6.6 (1/15)	86.6 (13/15)
	Non- Dynasts	0	10% (1/10)	90 (9/10)

Source: Mohd Osama's dataset on Muslim Dynasticism in Uttar Pradesh

Chart: Mohd Osama, PhD Candidate, JMI

Table 6

Uttar Pradesh Muslim M.P.s

Experience and Dynasticism: Dynastic Candidates have Political Advantage: relatively more
 Dynastic M.P.s got elected, despite having less political experience

Lok Sabha	Dynast / Non-Dynast	No Experience (%)	Experience also at National Level (%)	Experience at State/Local/ Party Position/Student Union Level (%)
14th Lok Sabha (2004)	Dynast	16.6 (1/6)	33.3 (2/6)	50 (3/6)
	Non- Dynast	0	0	100 (6/6)
15th Lok Sabha (2009)	Dynast	33.3 (1/3)	33.3 (1/3)	33.3 (1/3)
	Non- Dynast	25 (1/4)	0	75 (3/4)
16th Lok Sabha (2014)	Dynast	0	0	100 (1/1)
	Non- Dynast	0	0	100 (1/1)

Source: Mohd Osama's dataset on Muslim Dynasticism in Uttar Pradesh

Chart: Mohd Osama, PhD Candidate, JMI

Table 7

Comparative average age of Dynastic and Non-Dynastic Muslim M.P.s and M.L.A.s from U.P.

Lok Sabha	Average Age of Muslim Dynastic M.P.s	Average Age of Muslim Non-Dynastic M.P.s	U.P. Legislative Assembly	Average Age of Muslim Dynastic M.L.A.s	Average Age of Muslim Non-Dynastic M.L.A.s
14th Lok Sabha (2004)	49	47	15th Legislative Assembly 2007	45	46
15th Lok Sabha (2009)	43	56	16th Legislative Assembly 2012	48	53
16th Lok Sabha (2014)	49*	NULL	17th Legislative Assembly 2017	54	60

Source: Mohd Osama's dataset on Muslim Dynasticism in Uttar Pradesh. *only one Muslim M.P. from U.P. (elected in the bye-election, 2018).

Chart: Mohd Osama, PhD Candidate, JMI.

Table 8
Lok Sabha Muslim Dynasts information Wealth and Education

Lok Sabha	Percentage of Muslim Dynastic M.P.s among Muslim M.P.s*	Percentage of Muslim Dynastic M.P.s among U.P. Muslim M.P.s	Percentage of wealthy (in Rs. crores) Dynasts	Percentage of wealthy (in Rs. crores) Non-Dynasts	Percentage of Education (Graduate) Dynasts	Percentage of Education (Graduate) Non-Dynasts
14th Lok Sabha (2004)	26	54.54 (6/11)	66.66 (4/6)	40 (2/5)	66.66 (4/6)	40 (2/5)
15th Lok Sabha (2009)	35	42.85 (3/7)	66.66 (2/3)	50 (2/4)	33.33 (1/3)	75 (3/4)
16th Lok Sabha (2014)	32	100 (1/1)	100 (1/1)	0	0	0

Source: Mohd Osama's dataset on Muslim Dynasticism in Uttar Pradesh. *see Kanchan Chandra (2016)

Chart: Mohd Osama, PhD Candidate, JMI

Table 8.1
U.P. Vidhan Sabha Muslim Dynasts information on Education and Wealth

Legislative Assembly	Percentage of Muslim Dynastic M.L.A.s among U.P. Muslim M.L.A.s	Percentage of wealthy (in Rs. crores) Dynasts	Percentage of wealthy (in Rs. crores) Non-Dynasts	Percentage of Education (Graduate) Dynasts	Percentage of Education (Graduate) Non-Dynasts
15th Legislative Assembly 2007	60 (30/50)*	56.6 (17/30)	40 (8/20)	63.33 (19/30)	25 (5/20)
16th Legislative Assembly 2012	52.8 (37/70)**	75.6 (28/37)	51.5 (17/33)	48.6 (18/37)	45.4 (15/33)
17th Legislative Assembly 2017	60 (15/25)	80 (12/15)	70 (7/10)	60 (9/15)	60 (6/10)

Source: Mohd Osama's dataset on Muslim Dynasticism in Uttar Pradesh.

Note: Muslims elected in each assembly consists of bye-election Muslim winners *six Muslim M.L.A.s were not included due to their unavailability (2007-55 elected plus one bye elected Muslim winner; so total figure to start the analysis for Dynasticism is 56). **Two M.L.A.s were not included due to their unavailability (2012-68 elected plus 4 bye elected Muslim winners; so total figure to start the analysis for Dynasticism is 72).

Chart: Mohd Osama, PhD Candidate

Table 9
Crime, Wealth and Dynasticism

Having “serious charges”, and being wealthy (more than one crore rupees) are generally assets for both dynast and non-dynast M.L.A.s

Legislative Assembly	Severity of Charges	Dynastic / Non-Dynastic	Wealthy (Assets more than Rs. One Crore)	Non-wealthy (Assets less than Rs. One Crore)
Uttar Pradesh M.L.A.s 2007	Non-Serious/ Minor Charges	Dynast M.L.A.s	5.88% (1/17)	7.6% (1/13)
		Non-Dynast M.L.A.s	0	8.33% (1/12)
	Serious Charges	Dynast M.L.A.s	23.5% (4/17)	38.4% (5/13)
		Non-Dynast M.L.A.s	12.5% (1/8)	33.3% (4/12)
Uttar Pradesh M.L.A.s 2012	Non-Serious/ Minor Charges	Dynast M.L.A.s	14.2% (4/28)	11.1% (1/9)
		Non-Dynast M.L.A.s	23.5% (4/17)	6.25% (1/16)
	Serious Charges	Dynast M.L.A.s	32.14% (9/28)	22.2% (2/9)
		Non-Dynast M.L.A.s	64.7% (11/17)	6.25% (1/16)
Uttar Pradesh M.L.A.s 2017	Non-Serious/ Minor Charges	Dynast M.L.A.s	8% (1/12)	
		Non-Dynast M.L.A.s	29% (2/7)	
	Serious Charges	Dynast M.L.A.s	42% (5/12)	33% (1/3)
		Non-Dynast M.L.A.s	29% (2/7)	

Source: Mohd Osama's dataset on Muslim Dynasticism in Uttar Pradesh.

Chart: Mohd Osama, PhD Candidate

Table 10
Crime, Wealth and Dynasticism

Sometimes, a larger number of wealthy non-dynasts M.P.s with serious charges against them are elected, sometimes, their dynastic counterparts. The only variables which have a uniform effect is that of "serious charges" against a candidate, and of wealth (having more than one crore or ten million rupees)

Parliament	Severity of Charges	Dynastic / Non-Dynastic	Wealthy (Assets more than One Crores Indian Rupees)	Non-Wealthy (Assets less than One Crores Indian Rupees)
Uttar Pradesh M.P.s 2004	Non-Serious/ Minor Charges	Dynast M.L.A.s	0	0
		Non-Dynast M.L.A.s	0	0
	Serious Charges	Dynast M.L.A.s	25% (1/4)	100% (2/2)
		Non-Dynast M.L.A.s	50% (1/2)	67% (2/3)
Uttar Pradesh M.P.s 2009	Non-Serious/ Minor Charges	Dynast M.L.A.s	0	0
		Non-Dynast M.L.A.s	0	0
	Serious Charges	Dynast M.L.A.s	0	0
		Non-Dynast M.L.A.s	50% (1/2)	0
Uttar Pradesh M.P.s 2014	Non-Serious/ Minor Charges	Dynast M.L.A.s	0	
		Non-Dynast M.L.A.s	0	
	Serious Charges	Dynast M.L.A.s	0	0
		Non-Dynast M.L.A.s	0	

Source: Mohd Osama's dataset on Muslim Dynasticism in Uttar Pradesh.

Chart: Mohd Osama, PhD Candidate

Table 11

Muslim M.P.s from the Uttar Pradesh, 2004 to 2014

From the table, B.S.P. seems to be the most favourable to the Dynastic candidates: having almost 50 percent of its elected M.P.s as Dynastic

Lok Sabha Muslim M.P.s From Uttar Pradesh	Dynast/ Non-Dynast	Total	S.P.	B.S.P.	I.N.C.	R.L.D
2004	Dynast	6	4	2	0	0
	Non- Dynast	5	3	2	0	0
2009	Dynast	3	0	2	1	0
	Non- Dynast	4	0	2	2	0
2014	Dynast	1	0	0	0	1
	Non- Dynast	0	0	0	0	0

Source: Mohd Osama's dataset on Muslim Political Dynasticism; In 2014, S.P. and R.L.D. were in alliance: Tabassum Hasan, wife of an ex-M.P. and mother of an M.L.A. is the only Muslim M.P. from U.P., elected in the bye-election, held in 2018.

Chart: Mohd Osama, PhD candidate, JMI

Table 12

U.P. Legislative Assembly Muslim M.L.A.s

Nominations, Re-nominations, and their change of Political Party

Legislative Assembly: Nomination and Re-nomination	Percentage among Dynasts Muslim M.L.A.s	Percentage among Non-Dynasts Muslim M.L.A.s	How many switched the Political Party, among Dynasts?	How many switched the Political Party, among Non-Dynasts?
Dynastic Muslim M.L.A.s in 2007-who were Candidate/Winner in 2002*	66.6 (20/30)	60 (12/20)	35 (7/20)	50 (6/12)
Dynastic Muslim M.L.A.s in 2007-who were Re-nominated in 2012*	93.3 (28/30)	80 (16/20)	39.2 (11/28)	18.7 (3/16)
Dynastic Muslim M.L.A.s in 2012-who were Re-nominated in 2017*	91.8 (34/37)	57.5 (19/33)	23.5 (8/34)	5.2 (1/19)

Source: Mohd Osama's dataset on Muslim Dynasticism in Uttar Pradesh. *in each of these time periods: Nomination, Re-Nomination and change of a political party is considered for M.L.A., M.L.C. and M.P. post.


Chart: Mohd Osama, PhD Candidate, JMI.

Table 13
Lok Sabha Muslim M.P.s
Nominations, Re-nominations, and their change of Political Party

Lok Sabha: Nomination and Re- nomination	Percentage among Dynasts Muslim M.L.A.s	Percentage among Non- Dynasts Muslim M.L.A.s	How many switched the Political Party, among Dynasts?	How many switched the Political Party, among Non- Dynasts?
Dynastic Muslim M.P.s in 2004-who were Candidate/Wi nner in 1999*	16.6 (1/6)	20 (1/5)	0	100 (1/1)
Dynastic Muslim M.P.s in 2004-who were Re- nominated in 2009*	83.3 (5/6)	60 (3/5)	40 (2/5)	33.3 (1/3)
Dynastic Muslim M.P.s in 2009-who were Re- nominated in 2014*	100 (3/3)	100 (4/4)	0	25 (1/4)

Source: Mohd Osama's dataset on Muslim Dynasticism in Uttar Pradesh. *in each of these time periods: nomination, re-nomination and change of a political party is considered for M.L.A., M.L.C. AND M.P. post.

Chart: Mohd Osama, PhD Candidate, JMI. **Graph:** Mohd Osama, PhD Candidate, JMI.

Figure 1

Source: Mohd Osama's dataset on Muslim Dynasticism in Uttar Pradesh.

Chart: Mohd Osama, PhD candidate, JMI. **Graph:** Mohd Osama, PhD Candidate, JMI.

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He has presented papers at national conferences and written online articles. Lately, he has developed an interest in research puzzles related to segregation and urban geography.

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