

# INDIA NATION OF NATIONS

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Madhavan K. Palat

The Indian Union is a nation because its state declares it to be one, its citizens imagine it is one, and others accept it as one; but the one nation is a composite nation of many nations, several types of nation, of regions that may or may not be nations, and of many possible nations; and all of them, both the one and the many, harbour two concepts of nation, the civic and the ethnic, or the secular and the communal. The civic or the secular implies that all inhabitants of the territory of the nation belong to the nation and vice versa; and the ethnic or the communal suggests that the nation is constituted by only one community. While the Indian nation is accepted, the regional nations seem to be only grudgingly acknowledged if at all. The relation between the nation and its parts is usually examined under the rubrics of 1) federalism, or the constitutional relations between the centre and the states, 2) democracy, or the electoral politics of the national parties, the regional parties, and their myriad coalitions at all levels, and 3) economic development, of regional growth and disparities. It is seldom studied as a relation between a nation and its constituent nations, an issue that goes far beyond federalism, democracy, and regional development, but embraces all of them. The Indian nation is often seen as composed of discrete communities of caste, language, tribe, and religion, but not of the decisive political communities of the regional nations; and Indian pluralism is celebrated or deplored through the clichés “unity in diversity” and “fissiparous tendencies” for these types of non-national communities constituting or threatening respectively the unity of the nation. But if India is regarded a nation of nations, over and above the supposedly primordial relations of caste, language, tribe, and religion, the modern and novel territorial relation of the Indian nation to the regional nation would appear to structure all other.

Three questions arise: 1) are the constituents of India nations; 2) if they are, how do they both retain their distinctiveness and fuse into a single nation above themselves; and 3) how can the Indian nation afford to cultivate potentially divisive nations within itself. The answers to these questions cannot be easily separated for they are part of a single story, of national regional identity, of integration to the Indian Union, and of the reproduction of the national Union through national States.

We face at once the problem of nomenclature. In Indian political usage, the nation is India, and her constituents are regions or States, but not nations. It is often assumed that nations have to be sovereign, although there are innumerable examples of nations that are not sovereign. This arises from the prolonged joust with colonial rule in which the term nationalism was appropriated by the movements that sought to unite against the British: movements that were exclusive were denigrated as communal, and those that were territorially limited were demoted to regional status. Hence the virtual illusion that there is only one nation and one nationalism, not the many that make up the one nation, India, or the others that choose not to belong but are told by many in India that they ought to belong to this one nation, India. Pakistan of course is the foremost example of that choice, followed at different times with varying levels of intensity and conviction by national movements for independence, the Kashmiri, the Khalistani, the Naga, the Mizo, and the Dravidian, to cite the most obvious.

On the other hand in the Soviet Union, the constituents were theoretically declared to be nations, and constitutionally were Republics, the equivalent of Indian States. The Soviet Union itself was the seat of “internationalism” as opposed to the divisive and regional phenomenon of nationalism; and it was always described a “multinational state.” These usages continued to the bitter end even as the Soviet Union acquired the attributes of a nation and was officially described in 1972 to have become a “new historical community.” Having disintegrated, it is now dismissed as never having been a nation and not even a successful union. But as we penetrate the polemic of the Cold War and its aftermath, the parallels with India would be more visible.

The European Union is a further example of the same, with yet another series of ideological inhibitions of its own. It denies that it is a nation, given the enormity of the destruction wrought by nationalism in Europe in the course of the twentieth century. The purpose of uniting after that experience is not to revisit that tragedy. But Europe is the home and the model of nations for the world; it seems inconceivable to Europeans that a nation could possibly rise above such sovereign nations as France or Germany. Hence, the superior entity is known as just Europe or European Union, the equivalent of the Indian and Soviet Unions, and its constituents are called nations, the equivalent of the Indian States and regions and of the Soviet nations and Republics. Ironically in this respect, European usage is closer to the Soviet: the Union above and the nations below.

Nearly every State of the Indian Union is a nation and is nationalist within itself to a surprising degree, and their nationalisms date from the late nineteenth century, coeval with the pan-Indian nationalisms, civic and ethnic. Each one is possessed of a territory that is clearly demarcated; an origin myth; a history peopled with heroes who furthered the cause of this nation and villains who endangered it; a language in most cases but with important exceptions; deriving from that history and language, a culture that is claimed to be unique; the political and cultural institutions of state and nation; a political and cultural leadership firmly in the saddle; and a dissemination of a national culture around these coordinates from the late nineteenth century followed by a political mobilization from the 1920s.

The linguistic states are by far the most numerous: by virtue of this alone they approximate to the linguistic nations of Europe and the Soviet Union. These are Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Gujarat, Orissa, Bengal, and Assam, each with its own language, territory, and a corresponding history. The Hindi-speaking states are a separate category which may be regarded as either regions or as nations. They are Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Haryana, and Himachal Pradesh. Since all of them have a language in common, in spite of the variants of Hindi that are spoken in each of these, they may appear to be regions rather than nations. But they are

so distinctive in their own way that they are more like nations sharing a common language, in the manner of the English speaking nations of the world, of Germany and Austria, the Arab nations, and the Spanish-speaking South American nations. Another group is states distinguished by their tribal rather than linguistic culture and they have been formed after the linguistic states. These are Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, Nagaland, Mizoram, Meghalaya, Arunachal Pradesh, and Tripura. One state is defined by its caste rather than language or tribe, and this is Uttarakhand.<sup>1</sup> Punjab is officially a linguistic state but more a communal state dominated by Sikhs. Finally a group of states are defined more by their very specific histories than anything else; these are Goa and Puducherry as legatees of Portuguese and French colonial rule respectively, Sikkim as a historical entity that entered or was annexed to the Union late, and most famously Jammu and Kashmir, the pure product of a tortured history all its own, and itself composed of at least the two nations of Ladakh and Kashmir, with Jammu a possible third if it is not included as a region in a neighbouring state.

The Indian Union has been energetic about creating States of the Union and promoting their nationalisms; and it began with the Congress Party structuring itself as linguistic units from 1920 leading to political mobilization on the bases of those linguistic territories. In this it is akin to the Soviet Union which reconstructed the Union through such Republics, each with a titular language. The Soviet Union also encouraged a certain kind of nationalism in each of these which was oriented to a Soviet future; but it blocked glorifications of the past that could undermine such a future. The Indian Union on the other hand has been more permissive about such nationalist effusions, tolerating separatist publications and movements, hate campaigns, and exclusionist politics, but permitting electoral office only through constitutional means. The European Union, unlike the other two Unions, is oriented to softening the nationalisms of its member states which have inflicted such tragedy on the continent, not in promoting them. Yet it has functioned like the Indian and Soviet Unions in two respects. Its very existence has given hope to the

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<sup>1</sup> Christophe Jaffrelot, *Religion Caste and Politics in India* (Delhi: Primus, 2010), p. 29.



nationalisms of the non-sovereign nations like Scotland and Catalonia which seem to be on their way to independence, albeit within the European Union; and without the reassuring presence of the European Union (formed as such only in 1993), it is doubtful whether Czechoslovakia would have broken into two sovereign states in 1992. It has encouraged the creation of several independent nations out of Yugoslavia and acted to dismember that country. Thus, like the Indian and Soviet Unions, it has encouraged one type of nationalism and nation-making and discouraged another type. Unions, it would appear, promoted constituent nationalisms expecting them to look to the Union for sovereign guarantees.

How valid would it be to claim that the States of the Union are nations? There are now so many of them that it would be an excess to go through all of them. Instead a few representative ones could be examined.

The modern Tamil nation began to be mobilized with all its ambiguities and contradictions from about the 1880s; and Sumathi Ramaswamy has described so well for us the riotous energy of those movements and their uninhibited exploration of every possibility.<sup>2</sup> They resolved themselves into a series of polarities, of Dravidian versus Aryan, of non-brahman versus brahman, of Tamil versus Sanskrit, all to sediment in Tamil and (not versus) Indian. In the two oppositions of Dravidian / Aryan and non-brahman / brahman, the Sanskritic brahman was anathematized; but in the other two dichotomies, the Tamil / Sanskrit and the Tamil / Indian, the brahman could not be excluded even if no longer permitted the hegemony that is associated with that status.

In the first of these, of Dravidian versus Aryan, the Dravidian religion and culture was declared original to India, antecedent to the Aryan, with Shiva as its deity, Tamil as its language, and casteless egalitarianism as its principal social attribute. This collectively expunged the orientalist and neo-Hindu nationalist

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<sup>2</sup> Sumathi Ramaswamy, *Passions of the Tongue. Language Devotion in Tamil India, 1891-1970* (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1997), especially chapter 2.

construction of a Dravidian aboriginal, animist, sensual religion and culture opposed to the nobility of the Aryan and the exquisite beauty of the Sanskrit. Ironically, one of the exponents of this neo-Hindu culture was the Theosophical Society, with its centre in Adyar in Madras, in the heart of Tamil country.

Sweeping cultural arguments having been made, the Dravidian and non-brahman political mobilization against Aryan and brahman began to assume political form from the second decade of the twentieth century. During the War, the Dravidian Association appeared, led in effect by T. M. Nair, followed in quick succession by the South Indian Peoples' Association and then the South Indian Liberal Federation or the Justice Party. From the interpretation of history to the Brahmin monopoly of jobs, they denounced the brahmans, demanded special treatment for non-brahmans from the British, including quotas in jobs and Councils, and opposed the Congress strategy of overcoming all caste distinctions in a mass mobilization. Eventually the Justice Party lost to the Congress in the elections of 1937 and faded from history. But the movement developed like a fugue. Its most striking leader, E. V. Ramasamy Naicker, first formed the Self-Respect Movement in 1925, and followed it up with the Dravida Nadu Conference in 1939 to campaign for a separate state of Dravidasthan of Tamil, Telegu, Kannada and Malayalam speakers of the peninsula, free of Aryan brahman domination. This became the Dravida Kazhagam in 1944, egalitarian, casteless, anti-imperialist, rationalist, exulting in the achievements of Tamil culture and empires, and violently contemptuous of the icons of brahmanical Hinduism. This was Tamil nationalism in full flood, exclusive, provocative, and clamant, yet profoundly aporetic, for its anti-brahmanism excised a major slice of Tamil culture cultivated by brahmans.<sup>3</sup> As a caste or anti-caste movement it was sustainable; as a national movement of the Tamils it was not.

The tension between the anti-brahman movement on the one hand and the Tamil civilizational and national one on the other were evident from the beginning. Tamil was "discovered", as so often in the histories of nationalism the world over, now as a

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<sup>3</sup> Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr., *The Dravidian Movement* (Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1965), chapters 1-4.

“classical” language. Its origins were lost in antiquity and its flowering was placed in the Caṅkam (Sangam) age of the early common era; with the excavation of the Indus culture in the 1920s, the *Census of 1931* cautiously suggested that it might be Dravidian, which Marimlai Adigal enthusiastically elevated to undisputed fact in 1941; and, as a crushing argument against orientalists and Sanskritic nationalists, not only was it accorded parity with Sanskrit, but it was also exalted as a living classical language against the dead Sanskrit. These cosmopolitan claims left the field wide open. Brahmans like V. G. Suryanarayana Sastri, T. R. Sesha Iyengar, and U. V. Swaminatha Aiyar pitched in; Christians like D. Savariroyan and G. Devaneyan entered the lists; and those from Sri Lanka like Damodaram Pillai and V. Kanakasabhai enthusiastically contributed. Tamil nationalism had to include, not only the brahmans, but also Christians.

The pragmatic, indeed almost Hegelian, resolution of the contradiction between Dravidianism and Tamil nationalism was found in the stable dualism of Tamil and Indian from the 1950s. Its herald was C. Subramania Bharati (1882-1921). His short life was marked by frustration and penury;<sup>4</sup> but he is now nationally celebrated for that perfect fusion, a brahman glorying in Tamil culture, the Sanskrit universe, the Hindu religion, the Hindi language, and the Indian nation,<sup>5</sup> and has earned a statue, a housing estate, and a major road in his name in New Delhi.<sup>6</sup> What the poet glimpsed, the Tamil nationalist parties have enacted from the fifties. Dravidian exclusiveness gave way to cultivating a high degree of Tamil nationalism, never forsaking Sanskrit, holding Hindi at arm’s length, and participating fully in Indian politics from the secure base of the linguistic State of Tamil Nadu. Tamil nationalism erupted in the decades before the First World War as in most parts of the world, it tested the limits of possibility, and it was eventually articulated with Indian nationalism in a manner that recalls Nehru’s self-doubt in 1929 at the Lahore Congress as he moved the resolution for Purna

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<sup>4</sup> A. R. Venkatachalapathy, *The Province of the Book. Scholars, Scribes, and Scribblers in Colonial Tamilnadu* (Ranikhet: Permanent Black, 2012), pp. 51-63.

<sup>5</sup> Ramaswamy, *Passions of the Tongue*, pp. 46-51, 52-53, 200-204.

<sup>6</sup> Subramania Bharti Marg, Bharti Nagar, and the statue outside Bharti Nagar but, for want of a better location, on Maharishi Ramana Marg (Maharshi Raman Marg).

Swaraj: “Independence is not a happy word in the world today; for it means exclusiveness and isolation...”

Andhra Pradesh is defined as the Telugu-speaking country and it famously wrested the linguistic province out of Madras Presidency in the 1950s. This territorial outline emerged during the Kakatiya empire of 1175-1324, still regarded as the founding phase of glorious memory to Andhra nationalism. It assembled three distinct types of country into one political entity. The first was the coastal belt of the Krishna-Godavari and its extensions northward and southward, with its intensive rice cultivation and caste hierarchy dominated by brahmans. The core of this was the Vengi-Andhra country where the Telugu language had been first cultivated from the sixth century and had entrenched itself. The second was Telengana of mixed agricultural and pastoral communities and more fluid caste structure, the region that provided the military backbone to the dynasty, and with Warangal as the centre of empire. The third was the more arid districts of Rayalaseema, of Chittoor, Anantapur, Cuddapah and Kurnool, also composed of such mixed communities. The consolidation of Kakatiya power in the twelfth century saw the extension of Telugu, as seen from the epigraphic evidence, outward from coastal Andhra into Telengana and Rayalaseema, replacing the Kannada of the Kalyani Chalukyas. By the fourteenth century this cultural geography had been established, and while fluctuations occurred in subsequent centuries, modern Andhra Pradesh as a linguistic entity had become clear. The Kakatiya phase supplied the founding legend, the heroic moment, the fusion of military prowess, temple construction and the Telugu language. It also combined a vigorous local Telugu linguistic culture with a cosmopolitan Sanskritic one of brahman provenance.<sup>7</sup> Thereafter it was inserted into the Islamic cosmopolitan world also, but the coherence and integrity of the Telugu linguistic space was not disturbed. It coexisted with both forms of cosmopolitanism.

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<sup>7</sup> See Cynthia Talbot, *Precolonial India in Practice. Society, Region, and Identity in Medieval Andhra* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), especially pp. 4-5, 34-47, 126, and chapter 5.

The confluence of regional specificity and transregional belonging is of some moment. As a Telugu linguistic domain was cleared more or less to the limits of modern Andhra Pradesh, it was also subordinated to the transregional power first of the Delhi sultans and then of the Vijayanagara kings. Prataparudra (r. 1289-1323), the last of the Kakatiya kings, had submitted to the suzerainty of Alauddin Khalji in 1309 by paying a tribute and accepting the symbols of subjection; when he reneged on his commitment, another sultan Ghiyasuddin Tughlak sent his son Ulugh Khan, the future Muhammad bin Tughlak, to enforce submission. Prataparudra once again accepted it in 1319; but when he renounced his allegiance yet again, a fresh Tughlak army overthrew him, razed his citadel at Warangal, and despatched him to Delhi as a prisoner. He died on the way, on the banks of the Narmada, in all probability by his own hand. After two decades, the new Vijayanagara empire established itself over the Kakatiya centre. Thus much of the Andhra world was first enclosed within the Delhi sultanate and then within the Vijayanagara empire, without however merging with either.

The afterlife of the heroic but tragic Prataparudra suggests the manner in which an Andhra political culture was inscribed within an Islamic universe and the Delhi and Bahmani sultanates. For a century inscriptional memorials portrayed Prataparudra holding off the Turks in the starkest contrast of good and evil; but thereafter Islam and the Deccani sultans were already an ineradicable part of the landscape. By the early sixteenth century the king's hagiography, the *Prataparudra Caritramu*, depicted him as having travelled to Delhi after his defeat, there so impressed the sultan's mother that he was released to return to Warangal and establish seventy-seven loyal servitors or *padmanayakas* to govern as independent kings. Mission accomplished, he died. They then secured themselves in the Vijayanagara state, the worthy successor of the Kakatiya one. According to this account, legitimation flowed downward from the Delhi sultan through the transformed Rudrapratapa to the *padmanayakas* and eventually to the Vijayanagara empire. Other accounts, dating from the seventeenth century, speak of his actual conversion to Islam and remaining in Warangal as a

subordinate king.<sup>8</sup> The creation of a linguistic Telegu and political Andhra entity was never eroded; but the diverse components of the Kakatiya state could be variably used. A heroic shudra dynasty, a virtual exception in India; its contribution to the founding of Vijayanagara, the iridescent Hindu empire of nationalist myth; and the Islamic transfiguration of Rudrapratapa to meld with the syncretism of Deccani cultures; all these were available for a usable past in modern times.

These elements were assembled and mobilized into a modern nationalism from the late nineteenth century to fructify in the twentieth in the form we know it, a nation within a nation. During these decades an Andhra national history defined this territory, noted its first consolidation in the Kakatiya kingdom, and appropriated the founding Sangama dynasty of the peninsular Vijayanagara empire (14<sup>th</sup>-17<sup>th</sup> century) as Telugu rather than Kannada speakers. N. Venkataramanayya traced the origin of the Vijayanagara empire to the five Sangama brothers' service under Prataparudra, their capture by the Tughlak armies, service under the sultan to rule the Kampili kingdom, and reconversion to Hinduism through the good offices of none less than Madhavacharya, eventuating in the founding of the Vijayanagara empire by one of the brothers, Bukka I.<sup>9</sup> With the Kakatiya kingdom and the early Vijayanagara empire in the bag, Andhra nationalist memorializing could not have done better.

Gujarat, it would not be surprising to learn, is the country of the Gujarati language.<sup>10</sup> Yet that is a recent phenomenon, as is usual with so many nationalisms, including even Italian in Italy and French in France. It began its career of hegemony in the region only in the middle of the nineteenth century, thanks to the

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<sup>8</sup> Richard M. Eaton, *The New Cambridge History of India*, I. 8, *A Social History of the Deccan, 1300-1761. Eight Indian Lives* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), chapter 1.

<sup>9</sup> Burton Stein, *The New Cambridge History of India*, I. 2, *Vijayanagara* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 5-7, 19, 141.

<sup>10</sup> This paragraph is derived mainly from Aparna Kapadia, "Alexander Forbes and the Making of a Regional History," in Edward Simpson and Aparna Kapadia, eds, *The Idea of Gujarat. History, Ethnography and Text* (New Delhi: Orient Black Swan, 2010), pp. 50-65, and Edward Simpson, "Introduction. The Parable of the Jakhs," in Simpson and Kapadia, eds, *The Idea of Gujarat*, pp. 1-22.

literary and cultural activity of James Kinloch Forbes (1821-1865), the colonial officer, and Dalpatram Dahyabhai, the poet and Forbes's close collaborator. Together they ran the Gujarati Vernacular Society for the promotion of Gujarati, which edged out other possible contenders like Kathiawari, Kutchi, and even Braj bhasha, Dalpatram's first language for a literary career. They also collaborated in the production of that unwieldy but defining text, the *Ras Mala*, which appeared in print in 1856. An uneven collation of myth, legend, history, poetry, and much more, it constructed a region and its nation, Gujarat, as nothing else. It identified the physical boundaries as the ocean and the Rann; Marwar, Mewar, and Malwa, and the Aravalis for the north; the Vindhya for the east, and the Gulf of Cambay for the southern extremity. It defined Gujarat by all that could not be Gujarati; it was an external definition; and the colonial vision shaped it, just as James Tod was to do for Rajputana. It cast its history and sociology as the land of Rajput warrior chieftains while the Sultans, Mughals, and Marathas, overlords in the course of several centuries, all sank to the bottom of the pile. It conceptually unified a highly fragmented assemblage of principalities into a single political entity called Gujarat, free of aliens who had ruled there for so long. Indeed, so politically formless and leaderless was the region in the eighteenth century until the British ascendancy, that Ghulam Nadri has inverted the customary power relationship of ruler to merchant by contrasting impotence to enterprise.<sup>11</sup> The *Ras Mala* is an English text and little known even in Gujarat itself;<sup>12</sup> but its influence has been pervasive, and the physical geography and the language have determined much subsequent nationalist history. But the ruling Rajputs have been surrendered, almost perfidiously, to the monopoly of Rajasthan. Not Gujarat, but Rajasthan, flourishes in the nationalist imagination as the land of Rajput chivalry.

Of the Hindi speaking states, Rajasthan stands out as a distinct region; but is it a nation? It shares a language with most of north India and it is mostly Hindu by religion. Political claims from this

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<sup>11</sup> Ghulam A. Nadri, *Eighteenth Century Gujarat. The Dynamics of its Political Economy, 1750-1800* (Leiden: Brill, 2009), p. 22.

<sup>12</sup> Sarvar V. Sherry Chand and Rita Kothari, "Undisciplined History. The Case of *Ras Mala*," *Rethinking History*, vol. 7, no. 1, 2003, pp. 69-87, here p. 73.

region have not been as strident as in Kashmir, Tamil Nadu, Punjab, or even Andhra Pradesh; it does not enjoy the ideological leadership role that Bengal or rather Calcutta on behalf of Bengal exercised for so long; nor have there been nationalist insurgencies as in Nagaland and Mizoram. It is a region with a limited regional consciousness, yet its formation as a state of the Indian Union was uncontested unlike the obvious ones of Andhra Pradesh or Maharashtra, Gujarat and Punjab, or of Nagaland and Mizoram.

Yet its regional distinctiveness is nearly millennial. It is imagined as the land of the Rajputs, and it sported evocative names like Rajputana, Rajwara, and Raethana in earlier days. But Rajputs as warrior clans have spread over all of north India, from Sind to the lower Ganges and from the Himalayan foothills to the Narmada. According to the caste census of 1931, there were more Rajputs absolutely and relatively in several regions of north India than there were in Rajputana. If it is a land of Rajputs, it is not by virtue of numbers. The answer lies somewhere else. It is the land that was not entirely subdued by empire builders from Delhi, the Turks, Afghans, and Mughals, all Muslim, as they spread out from the thirteenth to the eighteenth centuries. All other Rajput kingdoms succumbed and their lineages subsided into minor aristocracy. The Rajputs of Rajputana alone retained their independence, or what seemed like independence as they collaborated so fruitfully with the Mughals; and their heroism in struggle against the Mughals, as by Rana Pratap, and in the service of the Mughals, as by Man Singh, have been celebrated and elevated as defining the identity of the region. Hemmed in by the desert to the west, and by Punjab, the Ganga-Yamuna Doab, Gujarat, and Sind in all other directions, this became another space, but defined by outsiders. Thus Akbar created the suba of Ajmer for this region in 1594; the colonial regime reproduced it as the Rajputana Agency in the nineteenth century; and the Indian Union reproduced it yet again as the State of Rajasthan. "Rajasthan's cultural distinctiveness stems in large part from having effectively remained outside the sphere of dominance of any of the political and cultural cores."<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> Deryck O. Lodrick, "Rajasthan as a Region: Myth or Reality," in Karine Schomer, Joan L. Erdman, Deryck O. Lodrick, Lloyd I. Rudolph, eds, *The Idea of Rajasthan. Explorations in Regional Identity*, vol. 1, Constuctions (New Delhi: Manohar, 1994), pp. 1-44, here p. 22.



As early as 1829-1832, James Tod sang its glories in the manner of a minstrel of medieval chivalry;<sup>14</sup> and his work has remained a “classic” down to this day. But Tod rendered the following services for the erection of a new political and cultural entity called Rajputana: 1) he defined its boundaries, ensured contiguity, and eliminated overlapping jurisdictions and rights; 2) he worked strenuously to produce a single community that was internally coherent by expelling the Marathas and Pindaris especially through treaties with Rajput princes in 1817-1818; 3) he drew a sharp line between Rajputs and Marathas such that the Marathas became aliens whose presence in Rajputana was illegitimate and undermined Rajput identity; 4) yet he identified the Marathas as a nation whose proper territory was in the Deccan where they could fulfil their destiny rather than pervert it through predation in Rajputana; 5) he specified its national essence as feudal, which could evolve into a nation as in Europe and resist the foreigners: here he cast the Rajputs as the Spaniards and the Marathas as the French of the Revolutionary wars, with the British rescuing the Spaniard-Rajput. These constructions of the heroic Rajput nation were freely exploited in Indian nationalist discourse subsequently to claim that a local nationalism had flowered into a pan-Indian one.<sup>15</sup> From the late nineteenth century, colonial gazetteers further defined the region. Most importantly in 1908, George A. Grierson’s volume on Rajasthan in his *Linguistic Survey of India* (1903-1922) identified a Rajasthani language by grouping five major dialects into a single language in its own right. With a distinct language and region, a heroic self-image, and an identity that outsiders fully endorse, many of the ingredients for a nationalism are in place; but the consciousness is weak as the identity is so “residual” and the external contribution greater than in the internal one. But it remains an important variant of the Indian patchwork quilt.

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<sup>14</sup> James Tod, *Annals and Antiquities of Rajast’han or, The Central and Western Rajpoot States of India*, 2 vols (reprint, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957, 1<sup>st</sup> edn 1929-1932).

<sup>15</sup> On Tod, see Norbert Peabody, “Tod’s Rajast’han and the Boundaries of Imperial Rule in Nineteenth Century India,” *Modern Asian Studies*, vol. 30, no. 1, Feb. 1996, pp. 185-220.

Punjab presents as complex a problem of nationalism as may be conceived; and its significance to the politics of nationalism of both species and as a sub-state nation cannot be overstated. Its extraordinary salience is due to the Sikhs in Punjab and also that the Sikhs are not the totality of Punjab. The territory, and with it the idea, of Punjab, has fluctuated over the centuries. Today it would be understood to comprise the Mughal suba of Lahore, the western portion of the Delhi suba and the northern part of the Multan suba. The colonial province in 1858 extended from Delhi to Peshawar. It was divided between the two sovereign nations of India and Pakistan in 1947; and the Indian State of Punjab was then trifurcated in 1966 into Punjab, Haryana, and Himachal Pradesh.<sup>16</sup>

The Sikhs occupy an unusual position in this region. According to the 1868 census they were a minority of 6.5 percent, with Muslims being a majority of 55 percent, and the Hindus only 22 percent.<sup>17</sup> They remained a minority in Indian Punjab, but finally achieved their majority of 54 percent in the new State of Punjab in 1966.<sup>18</sup> However, it is a linguistic Punjabi State, *not* a Sikh State, a communal or ethnic nationalist demand that was firmly repudiated by Nehru and a legitimation not endorsed by his successors when they carved out the linguistic State. But the religious nationalism of the Akali Dal does not waver; its control of Sikh places of worship through the Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee confers upon it both enormous ideological legitimacy and financial resources; together they make for a highly charged religious nationalist politics in the State. The Akali Dal's religious nationalism is confined within India in spite of its toying with the idea of a Sikh sovereign state in the 1940s when Pakistan was being formed; but its Khalistani offshoot yearns for such independence. The Khalistan movement reached its apogee in the nineteen eighties, amounting in effect

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<sup>16</sup> Anshu Malhotra and Farina Mir, "Punjab in History and Historiography," in Anshu Malhotra and Farina Mir eds, *Punjab Reconsidered. History, Culture, and Practice* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. xv-lviii, here pp. xix-xxvi.

<sup>17</sup> Harjot Oberoi, *The Construction of Religious Boundaries. Culture, Identity and Diversity in the Sikh Tradition* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 42; for the usual uncertainties of classification and further estimates, *ibid.* pp. 209-213.

<sup>18</sup> Harnik Deol, *Religion and Nationalism in India. The Case of the Punjab* (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 96.

to civil war. But not all Sikhs are Sikh nationalists in this sense; they are divided between the Khalistani reach for national independence, the Akali Dal's Sikh sub-state nationalism within India, and a Punjab civic nationalist politics that includes non-Sikhs and functions through the Congress, the BJP, and the Communists. Thus Punjab is home to four types of nationalism: the three sub-state nationalisms of civic Punjabi, Hindutva Punjabi, and Sikh ethnic; to these is added the fourth, the secessionist Sikh ethnic Khalistani.

The Sikhs possess and unfailingly propagate the full repertoire of nationalist mythology. Their origin myth lies in the life of Guru Nanak (1469-1539) whose teachings were transmitted by the ten gurus until the early eighteenth century when the collation of texts known as *Adi Granth* assumed the sanctity of Scripture, and when Gobind Singh instituted the Khalsa as a community with its own normative rules to distinguish it from all other followers of Guru Nanak. It is possessed of its own martyrology deriving from the prolonged contest with the Mughal Empire in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the high points being the executions of Guru Teg Bahadur and of Banda Bahadur (1670-1716). Its heroic phase is the empire of Ranjit Singh in the first half of the nineteenth century, an empire that extended from Kashmir to Sind and up to Peshawar and included vast territories that were neither Punjabi nor Sikh; and its years of despondency followed the British conquest in 1849. Thereafter, coinciding almost exactly with the worldwide elaborations of xenophobic and ethnic nationalisms, a Sikh "renaissance" flowered as certain groups of Sikhs defined themselves in exclusive terms through the ideology of the Tat Khalsa, organized themselves from 1873 in associations known as Singh Sabhas all over Punjab, and dismissed as hinduized degeneration all other Sikh traditions which did not adopt the Tat Khalsa. The state contributed generously through orientalist scholarship which described religions as homogeneous entities, defined a Sikh religion in terms of the Khalsa, and even hired a German orientalist from Tübingen, Ernest Trumpp, to identify and translate the textual foundations. M. A. Macauliffe followed on in 1909 with his *Sikh Religion*, which pleased the ideologues far more; and the army

diligently furthered the cause by observing and enforcing a strict Khalsa code among its myriad contingents of Sikhs.<sup>19</sup> The simultaneous proliferation of exclusivist nationalisms in Europe and India from the 1870s was not fortuitous.

The Kashmiri nation dates its usable nationalist past above all from that luminous text composed in the middle of the twelfth century, the *Rājatarāṅgiṇī* of Kalhaṇa. It defined the natural geography and painted the exquisite beauty of Kashmir with its valleys, mountains, rivers, and snows; it outlined its sacred geography by listing the shrines and pilgrimage centres that enclosed the nation; and it portrayed the moral worth of this country by chronicling the virtuous acts of its kings and queens, whose piety had soaked into the geological sediment of that land, such that even the superlatively evil and genocidal Mihirakula could be tempted into goodness. The haunting power of the *Rājatarāṅgiṇī* seems to have been millennial. Persian scribes and poets in later centuries emulated it in substance and style; colonial historiography in the person of Aurel Stein exalted it as a work of history, the consciousness of which the gods had otherwise denied to Indians; and nationalist historiography faithfully followed the colonial lead by acclaiming it as history marred by mythology. A region was emphatically identified with all the unique features that nationalists would so lovingly embrace from the late nineteenth century; and its uniqueness was reinforced, not eroded, for its having been presented overwhelmingly in the cosmopolitan languages of Sanskrit and Persian even as the regional language Kashmiri firmly held its ground. This fusion of the regional and the cosmopolitan seamlessly located Kashmir in larger universes, be they Shaiva, Vaishnava, Bauddha, or Islamic;<sup>20</sup> to these were added the Indian

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<sup>19</sup> On the Singh Sabhas, the Tat Khalsa, and state, see Oberoi, *The Construction of Religious Boundaries*, chapters 4-6; J. S. Grewal, *The New Cambridge History of India*, II.3, *The Sikhs of the Punjab* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 144-150; and Baldev Raj Nayar, *Minority Politics in the Punjab* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 63-66.

<sup>20</sup> Summarized from Shonaleeka Kaul, “Of Saffron, Snow and Spirituality. Glimpses of Cultural Geography in the *Rājatarāṅgiṇī*,” in Himanshu Prabha Ray ed., *Negotiating Cultural Identity. Landscapes in Early Medieval South Asian History* (New Delhi: Routledge, 2015), pp. 139-158; Shonaleeka Kaul, “‘Seeing’ the Past: Text and Questions of History in the *Rājatarāṅgiṇī*,” *History and Theory*, vol. 53, May 2014, pp. 194-211; Shonaleeka Kaul, “Kalhaṇa’s Kashmir: Aspects of the Literary Production of Space in the *Rājatarāṅgiṇī*,” *Indian Historical Review*, vol. 40, no. 2, 2013, pp. 207-222.

in the nineteenth century; and this palimpsest was further enriched by the aboriginal substratum of the nagas and pisachas.

Territorial definition and cultural uniqueness were completed by a political past and political future. The heroically independent and creative past lasted until 1586 when Akbar subjugated the country. Exceptionally in the historiography of the subcontinent, the great divide occurs with the loss of independence, not with the coming of Islam. For nearly four centuries thereafter Kashmir suffered foreign rule, Mughal, Afghan, Sikh, and Dogra, until salvation came in 1947;<sup>21</sup> in one version, that is yet to happen. Such a multilayered Kashmiri national identity, with its origin myth, its sacred texts, its defined territory and specific culture, its political past and future, all together allowed for its insertion into Indian nationalism; an Islamic one also opened the door for Pakistani nationalism; and, as with any nationalism, it could contemplate independence also. The Kashmiri nation is thus possessed of both a civic Kashmiri national identity and an ethnic Islamic one respectively within the civic Indian or the ethnic Pakistani. But it has also become a battleground between both the Indian and Pakistani states and between Indian and Pakistani ethnic nationalisms: more than in any other regional Indian nation therefore, independence often appears more attractive than dangerous, and its nationalism is sufficiently developed to sustain the ambition.

It would not be necessary to describe all the other nationalisms within India to press the point. The history and evolution of each of them was unique, but some of the common features may be suggested. Colonial officials have sometimes played an important role in the construction of the identities of these

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<sup>21</sup> In the words of Balraj Puri: “The watershed in Kashmir history is not the beginning of Muslim rule as is regarded in the rest of the subcontinent but the changeover from Kashmiri rule to a non-Kashmiri rule”, see Balraj Puri, “5000 Years of Kashmir,” in Balraj Puri ed., *5000 Years of Kashmir* (Delhi: Ajanta, 1997), pp. 128-137, here p. 133; Saif-ud-din Soz, “Kashmir under Alien Rule (1586-1947). Struggle for Secular Identity,” in Puri ed., *5000 Years*, pp. 99-110; Balraj Puri, *Jammu and Kashmir. Triumph and Tragedy of Indian Federalisation* (New Delhi: Sterling, 1981), p. 17.

nations, as noted in the cases of Gujarat and Rajasthan. As Europeans of the nineteenth century, especially with a background in romantic nationalism, they imagined a state with a centre of power, clear boundaries, a unique history and culture, and an identifiable social structure. Where all these elements seemed fluid, they provided the necessary fixity and specific features with their overwhelming political and academic resources. Of course, they recruited substantial assistance from such of the local intelligentsia as warmed to the effort. That such a state or province would be subordinate to the British Empire did not abate that need. The sequence of development of these nationalisms was comparable: they were defined through scholarly effort and disseminated through journalism and other forms of popularization before World War I, and mobilized politically thereafter. In this respect, their chronology is roughly the same as that of Indian nationalism. Each of them identified with Indian nationalism in its own way and Indian nationalism needed them in ample measure. When Indian nationalism came to constructing heroes and heroic moments, it chose of necessity the legends of struggles by regional heroes against an outsider. This accounts for the nationalist (not merely regional) careers of Rana Pratap or Shivaji, Kattabomman, Pazhassi Raja, the Rani of Jhansi or Birsa Munda. If the outsider was not British it was Mughal or Turk most often and for that reason the contest was cast as Hindu against Muslim. But in Muslim Kashmir the outsider was as much Mughal and Afghan. Cultural figures who have entered the pantheon of Indian nationalism are almost always regional, especially those of the bhakti movements. In this manner Indian nationalism is built on multiple regional nationalisms, not in opposition to them. However, such oppositions have also occurred, as with Khalistani, Kashmiri, Naga or Mizo nationalisms, and limitedly even the Tamil.

Conceiving India as a nation composed of nations has gone through three distinct phases. In the first, from approximately the 1870s to the 1940s, during the global heyday of nationalism and of the national movement(s) in India, both the regional nations and the Indian nation as a composite of them were freely accepted. In the second, from the forties to the eighties, the regional nation was suspect and the Indian nation was valorized. In global terms, this is due to the Cold War, when India was on

the weaker side of the global confrontation, and there were constant fears about Kashmir being snatched away. In domestic terms it was due to the trauma of Partition inducing nightmares of disintegration. Yet, it was during this phase that India was reorganized into linguistic states, effectively nations. In the third, from the eighties, regional and Indian nationalisms have been reconciled once again as they had been until the 1940s. The end of the Cold War mitigated anxieties about baleful intrigues around Kashmir; and the multiple elections, changes of governments and prime ministers, the numerous coalition governments at the Centre, the facing down of insurgencies and civil war, all generated confidence in the stability and success of Indian national and democratic processes. Indians could afford to gaze on the past and peer into the future with a post-national equanimity and critique. These shifts of emphasis are evident in the history and historiography of nationalism(s) over the past century and a half.<sup>22</sup>

Until the forties the Congress enthusiastically supported and promoted regional nationalisms. These were known in the discourse of the time as linguistic provinces, but the arguments in favour and the passions around them were typically nationalist. The protest against the partition of Bengal in the years before World War I was a major Bengali national movement in its own right.<sup>23</sup> The States Reorganization Commission itself catalogued the steps taken by both the Congress and the colonial government to foster linguistic national provinces. The Congress created within the party the Sind and Andhra linguistic provinces in 1908 and 1917 respectively; and in 1920 at the Nagpur Congress it resolved generally in favour of dividing the party into linguistic units for more effective mobilization. It demanded them of the Indian Statutory Commission in 1927, reiterated the commitment in the Nehru Committee Report of 1928, and continued in that vein until the Partition shook its confidence in this manner of structuring the nation. British action also resorted to this principle at various moments. Assam, Bihar,

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<sup>22</sup> The States Reorganisation Commission recognized the first two phases, see *Report of the States Reorganisation Commission* (New Delhi: 1955) chapter 2.

<sup>23</sup> Sumit Sarkar, *The Swadeshi Movement in Bengal, 1903-1908* (New Delhi: People's Publishing House, 1973) pp. 22-30, 41, and *passim*.

and Orissa were hived off from Bengal on linguistic grounds in 1912. The Montagu-Chelmsford Report of 1918 advocated culturally homogeneous units. In 1930 the Indian Statutory Commission admitted: "If those who speak the same language form a compact and self-contained area, so situated and endowed as to be able: to support its existence as a separate province, there is no doubt that the use of a common speech is a strong and natural basis for provincial individuality."<sup>24</sup> In 1931 the O'Donnell Committee considered creating a province for the "Oriya-speaking peoples", which was formed in 1936; that same year Sind was also formed.<sup>25</sup>

This first phase was when civic nationalists regarded nationalism as a possible form of globalism or a route to it. As regional nationalism flowed upward into Indian nationalism, so also Indian nationalism would debouch into global citizenship. Three major spokesmen of Indian nationalism, Tagore, Gandhi, and Nehru, each in his own way, demanded it.

Of the trinity, Tagore fired the first salvo. In 1921, during Non-Cooperation, he reminded his countrymen that the nation was to be created by itself, not to be enjoyed as a mere inheritance. He could have employed the modish expression "self-determination." As he fulsomely praised Gandhi for mobilizing the country, he warned against the danger of conformity in almost Tocquevillian terms. He then advanced the third and most famous proposition, that the world was integrating under the revolutionary impact of the War, that exclusiveness would be the worst form of self-denial, and that the creation of the nation was but a step toward all humanity.<sup>26</sup> Gandhi rebutted his charge that the spinning wheel was a misconceived strategy; but he warmly endorsed the call for openness in nationalism: "Indian nationalism is not exclusive, nor aggressive, nor destructive. It is health-giving, religious, and therefore humanitarian. India must

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<sup>24</sup> Cited in *Report of the States Reorganisation Commission* (New Delhi: 1955), p. 11.

<sup>25</sup> *Report of the States Reorganisation Commission* (New Delhi: 1955), chapters 1 and 2.

<sup>26</sup> Rabindranath Tagore, "The Call of Truth," *Modern Review*, vol. XXX, no. 4, October 1921, whole no. 178, pp. 423-433.



learn to live before she can aspire to die for humanity.”<sup>27</sup> It was to be both humanitarian and universal. He adhered to such a non-exclusive nationalism for the rest of his life.

Nehru however was the most aware of its paradoxes. When moving the independence resolution at the Lahore session of the Indian National Congress in 1929, he stressed the limitations of independence, the need for a world federation, and his readiness to surrender some of this newly to-be-won independence to such a body. Not only did he assert that “Independence is not a happy word in the world today; for it means exclusiveness and isolation”, but also that “Having attained our freedom, I have no doubt that India will welcome all attempts at world cooperation and federation, and will even agree to give up part of her own independence to a larger group of which she is an equal member.”<sup>28</sup>

On the eve of independence he reprised the theme: “I have long felt that something more than national attachment is necessary for us in order to understand and solve even our own problems, and much more so those of the world as a whole.”<sup>29</sup> He explained that in the cause of world cooperation, “We made it repeatedly clear, therefore, that we were perfectly agreeable to limit that independence, in common with other nations, within some international framework.”<sup>30</sup> He suggested that “The national state is almost too small a unit today and small states can have no independent existence”; that “It is doubtful if even many of the larger national states can have any real independence”; and that “The national state is thus giving way to the multi-national state or to large federations”, of which the Soviet Union, the USA, and even Hitler’s empire were examples.<sup>31</sup> He reaffirmed his

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<sup>27</sup> “The Great Sentinel,” (1921), *The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi*, vol. 21, August-December 1921, pp. 287-291.

<sup>28</sup> Presidential Address, Lahore Session of the Indian National Congress, 29 December 1929, Jawaharlal Nehru, *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru*, (hereafter SWJN), First Series (New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, 1973) vol. 4, pp. 184-198, here pp. 189-190.

<sup>29</sup> Jawaharlal Nehru, *The Discovery of India* (New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, 1981, 22<sup>nd</sup> impression 2002), p. 352.

<sup>30</sup> Nehru, *The Discovery of India*, p. 421.

<sup>31</sup> Nehru, *The Discovery of India*, pp. 530-531.

globalism in 1960 when tensions with China were mounting and he was ceaselessly negotiating borders with China. He asserted that modern technology had “rather made the idea of national frontiers out of date” and that it entailed “some kind of international authorities coming in.” As late as 1960 he could denigrate nationalism as a form of traditionalism and oppose them to modernism.<sup>32</sup> He periodically revisited the theme of what lay beyond and above nationalism.

Civic nationalists like Nehru, Gandhi, and Tagore were descended from the liberal nationalists of Europe of first half of the nineteenth century, when even such a prophet of nationalism as Mazzini proposed federation, not exclusion. He was emphatic that it was just a stepping stone, a halfway house between the individual and humanity. He complained that universalist creeds did not provide for anything between the individual and the species. In 1836 he announced that the goal of the epoch was “to establish a general social organization that will have humanity as its ultimate objective and the Country [*Patrie*] as its starting point.” A decade later, in 1847, he berated liberals and socialists: “Thus the cosmopolitans have been wholly unable to even conceive of the future nation, which will be the workshop of all those who labor for the sake of humanity”, and went on to claim that each nation would bring its unique traditions to a highly plural but unified world. A quarter of a century later he was to persist with that polemic: “Humanity constitutes the *end* and the nation the *means*. Without the nation you will be able to worship humanity in idle contemplation, but you will not be able to actually help it or even seriously attempt to do so.”<sup>33</sup> When he proposed a United States of Europe, he spoke of “the law of Europe” in the singular, but at once reassured his audience that “Ours is not a national project but an international one.”<sup>34</sup> The

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<sup>32</sup> Election speech at Ernakulam, 18 January 1960, SWJN/Second Series (hereafter SS)/ vol. 56.

<sup>33</sup> His three essays, “Humanity and Country” (1836), “Nationality and Cosmopolitanism” (1847), and “Nationality and Nationalism” (1871), in Giuseppe Mazzini, *A Cosmopolitanism of Nations. Giuseppe Mazzini’s Writings on Democracy, Nation Building, and International Relations*, edited with an introduction by Stefano Recchia and Nadia Urbinati; translations by Stefano Recchia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), pp. 53, 60-61, 63.

<sup>34</sup> “From a Revolutionary Alliance to the United States of Europe,” (1850) in Mazzini, *A Cosmopolitanism of Nations*, pp. 132-135, here p. 154.

most important ambiguity of the European Union had been adumbrated as he swung between the project of a European nation and an international organization in Europe. It is not surprising that Tagore referred to Mazzini, admittedly in passing and paired with Garibaldi, as was common among Indian nationalists of the epoch,<sup>35</sup> but it is curious to find V. D. Savarkar citing him in support of his doctrines of exclusion.<sup>36</sup> Savarkar was however in the good company of many leading Indian nationalists like Bipin Chandra Pal, Lala Lajpat Rai, or Bal Gangadhar Tilak, who were inspired by Mazzini's exertions in the cause of Italian unification and his advocacy of ethnic homogeneity while ignoring the cosmopolitanism of his nationalism.<sup>37</sup>

A variant of the vision of the three-tiered identity of regional—national—global was unveiled by the Communist Party during the 1940s. India was imagined a clone of the Soviet Union replicating Russian revolutionary and Soviet history; from this followed the unexpected demand that every nation within India should enjoy the right to become independent. Not only would a Pakistan be endorsed, so also would a series of other “nationalities such as Sindhis, Baluchis, Pathans and Punjabi Muslims” enjoy the same right so that it might eventuate in “the creation of an Indian Union based on voluntary co-operation of free nationalities.” Nations defined by religion and language were equated. “Wherever people of Muslim faith living together in a territorial unit, form a nationality in the sense defined above, they certainly have the right to autonomous state existence, just like the other nationalities in India, like the Andhras, Kannadis,

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<sup>35</sup> Tagore, “The Call of Truth,” p. 427.

<sup>36</sup> V. D. Savarkar, *Hindutva*, 5<sup>th</sup> edn (Bombay: Veer Savarkar Prakashan, 1969; 1<sup>st</sup> edn 1924), p. 94.

<sup>37</sup> For a modern scholarly reading of Mazzini as Indian nationalists of the latter half of the nineteenth century read him, see Thomas Blom Hansen, *The Saffron Wave. Democracy and Hindu Nationalism in Modern India* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999), pp. 82, 84, 85, 87, 91, 97, 253; but for Mazzini as the liberal nationalist, see E. J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780. Programme, Myth, Reality*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992; 1<sup>st</sup> edn 1990), pp. 30-32, 102.

Marathis, Bengalis etc.”<sup>38</sup> In September 1942, Adhikari’s report to the plenary session (plenum) of the Central Committee baldly stated that nationalism and national unity would proceed at two levels, that of the region and that of All India. He did not explain why it had to be so other than that “pride and love” for the homeland was perfectly natural and also compatible with pan-Indian nationalism. Nor did he explain how the homeland would be defined other than quoting Stalin’s famous definition of nation.<sup>39</sup> The plenum then faithfully reproduced Stalin’s definition, proclaimed India the home to many nations, granted them the right to secede or to federate in a “free India”, and concluded with the Leninist caution or warning that “the recognition of the right to separatism in this form need not necessarily lead to actual separation.” “Thus the free India of tomorrow,” the Party piously hoped, “would be a federation or union of autonomous states of the various nationalities such as the Pathans, Western Punjabis (dominantly Muslims), Sikhs, Sindhis, Hindustanis, Rajasthanis, Gujeratis, Bengalis, Assamese, Beharis, Oriyas, Andhras, Tamils, Karnatakis, Maharashtrians, Keralas, etc.” Not only were the linguistic and non-Hindu religious nationalisms granted equal status, but Bihar and Rajasthan merited mention as nationalities distinct from the Hindustani, which presumably meant what later became Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh.<sup>40</sup> The full-throated welcome to the Pakistan

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<sup>38</sup> G. Adhikari, “National Unity Now!” in G. Adhikari, ed., *Pakistan and National Unity* (Bombay: People’s Publishing House, n.d.), pp. 1-11, here p. 8; this article first appeared in *People’s War*, 8 August 1942.

<sup>39</sup> Report by G. Adhikari, to the Enlarged Plenum of the Central Committee, 19 September 1942, and endorsed by the First Congress of the Party in May 1943, see Adhikari, ed., *Pakistan and National Unity*, p. 26.

<sup>40</sup> In the resolution, the Stalinist definition of nationality appeared in this form: “Every section of the Indian people which has a contiguous territory as its homeland, common historical tradition, common language, culture, psychological make up and common economic life would be recognized as a distinct nationality with the right to exist as an autonomous state within the free Indian union or federation and will have the right to secede from it if it may so desire.” “On Pakistan and Nation Unity,” resolution of the Enlarged Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of India, 19 September 1942, and endorsed by the First Congress of the Party in May 1943, see Adhikari, ed., *Pakistan and National Unity*, p. 15. Stalin’s definition was as follows: “A nation is a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture.” See J. V. Stalin, “Marxism and the National Question,” (1913), in J. V. Stalin, *Works*, vol. 2, 1907-1913 (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1953), pp. 300-381, here p. 307.

demand has made these resolutions sensational; but they were remarkably prescient about the future construction of the Union as communal (Sikh), linguistic, and historic non-linguistic states (Rajasthan and Bihar); but most of all, they described these states as nationalities. According to this vision, India was a nation of nations.

From the European market place of ideas, Hindutva however selected the alternative, the unitary nation with a homogeneous culture which would be exclusive, not global. V. D. Savarkar spelt it out in the years following World War I with a clarity that left little to chance: “The necessity of creating a bitter sense of wrong and invoking a power of undying resistance especially in India that had under the opiates of Universalism and non-violence lost the faculty even of resisting sin and crime and aggression, could best be accomplished by cutting off even the semblance of a common worship” [with the outsider].<sup>41</sup> Within Indian nationalism Hindutva did allow for diversity, but not nationalist diversity of the kind implied by linguistic States. Thus Savarkar defined Hindus as those derived from a common origin and united by blood; but the religion Hinduism was but a part of it, a personal commitment and spiritual pursuit. Hindutva was civilizational, and Hinduism was religion within it. Golwalkar however defined religion in civilizational terms, embracing social organization and culture among other things.<sup>42</sup> Both their doctrines allowed for diversity, of the religious kind, and implicitly also culture as embodied in language. They had much to say about religion, culture, and civilization, but little on the political construction of language territories. Golwalkar, utterly exclusivist also, specified language as one of the essential components of a nation, along with geography, race, religion, and culture, but he did not deal with the problem of multiple languages in his Hindusthan.<sup>43</sup> With their commitment to a

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<sup>41</sup> Savarkar, *Hindutva*, pp. 24-25.

<sup>42</sup> John Zavos, “The Shapes of Hindu Nationalism,” in Katharine Adeney and Lawrence Sáez, ed., *Coalition Politics and Hindu Nationalism* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), pp. 36-54, pp. 41-45.

<sup>43</sup> M. S. Golwalkar, *We or Our Nationhood Defined* (Nagpur: Bharat Publications, 1939), chapter 2.

unitary Indian nationalism, the sub-state nationalism of linguistic diversity did not figure in their calculations. They were brought up short only with the debates in the Constituent Assembly and the subsequent agitations for linguistic states.

During the second phase, from the debates in the Constituent Assembly in the 1940s down to the Sarkaria Commission in the eighties, it was commonplace to regard the linguistic States and their multiplication as a potential threat to the unity of the nation. This was forcefully presented by the Dar Commission to the Constituent Assembly and the JVP Committee<sup>44</sup> to the Congress, and for the rest of his life Nehru was anxious lest linguistic states fragment the painfully achieved unity of the country. The testing times were the 1950s when the Andhra agitation peaked. Nehru repeatedly asserted that he was not in favour of linguistic states as they would be disruptive when it was imperative to consolidate. He would respect popular feeling and prepare for an Andhra Pradesh and certain others states. He warned of security implications, after the Partition, especially in frontier states like Punjab where the demand for a Sikh state was well advanced. He derided a general redrawing of the map on linguistic principles, which may appear logical, but history was not logical. He argued that the Congress had demanded linguistic States from the 1920s but that the British had ignored them (which was not entirely accurate since the linguistic provinces of Orissa, Bihar, and Assam had emerged from the Bengal Presidency). He noted that geopolitics and defence entailed entirely new prescriptions. Yet he was prepared for a complete reorganization while warning that other important matters like planning would be seriously delayed.

As he continued in this vein, clearly torn between the two extremes, he recognized the passion around linguistic states as a form of nationalism. At the time of the Andhra agitation in 1952, he disparaged the Communists as preparing for a “national agitation in a somewhat narrow sense of the word.”<sup>45</sup> In 1961 in the wake of language agitations in Assam, he was exasperated to

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<sup>44</sup> Acronym of its members’ names, Jawaharlal Nehru, Vallabhai Patel, and Pattabhi Sitaramayya.

<sup>45</sup> Nehru to C. Rajagopalachari, 28 May 1952, SWJN/SS/vol. 18, pp. 255-256.

find that to far too many, nationalism was understood as nothing more than regional nationalism. “A friend from Bengal comes up and talks a great deal about nationalism when it is obvious his idea of nationalism is Bengali nationalism and nothing else [Applause]. Another person will come up from Assam, and I talk to him. He will talk about nationalism and his idea is Assamese nationalism.”<sup>46</sup> Or again “It is more Punjabi nationalism, Bengali, Marathi, Gujarati, Madrasi, Bihari or Uttar Pradesh nationalism which is in fact parochialism.”<sup>47</sup> He recognized regional nationalism for what it was, as both a democratic concomitant to Indian nationalism and as inhering in the Congress reorganization into linguistic units after the Nagpur session of December 1920; but in his anxiety over Indian unity he clubbed it with communalism which fragmented unity and casteism which retarded social progress. On the other hand, he admitted that the evil of “provincialism, communalism, casteism and linguism” was engendered by democracy, not by its antithesis.<sup>48</sup> In this he was impeccably accurate, for democratic mobilization induced contradictory phenomena, of which the supreme examples were Franklin Roosevelt, Adolf Hitler, and Joseph Stalin. And he had long acknowledged, as early as 1953, that the despised “linguism” reflected political maturity: “The greater development of political consciousness among the people and the growing importance of the great regional languages led gradually to demands for the formation of certain States on a linguistic basis.”<sup>49</sup>

The Sarkaria Commission in the 1980s, the first one after the States Reorganization Commission of 1953 to reopen the entire question, recognized the reality of “sub-nationalism” but regretted it as tending to disruption, chauvinism, and oppression of minorities within each State. It claimed that these problems

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<sup>46</sup> Address to the AICC at Durgapur, 28 May 1961, SWJN/SS/ vol. 69 forthcoming.

<sup>47</sup> Speech to the Seventh All India Bharat Sevak Samaj at the Exhibition Grounds in Mathura, 8 April 1961, SWJN/SS/vol. 68, forthcoming.

<sup>48</sup> Letter to Chief Ministers of All States and The Prime Minister of Jammu & Kashmir State, in Jawaharlal Nehru, *Letters to Chief Ministers 1947-1964*, Vol. 5, 1958-1964, ed. G. Parthasarathi (New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, 1989), pp. 434-440, here p. 434.

<sup>49</sup> Statement in the Lok Sabha on the terms of reference for the States Reorganization Commission, 22 December 1953, SWJN/SS/ vol. 24, pp. 253-254.

arose, not from the constitution or the action of the Union and State governments but from outside them, in other words, from a political process about which the constitution itself could do little. It was pointing to the numerous insurgencies that plagued the country, especially that in Punjab. With undisguised disapproval it noted that one of the State Governments had even claimed that the linguistic states were “no longer mere administrative sub-divisions of the country” and were instead “growing into distinct nationalities” fostering such pernicious concepts as a “homeland.”<sup>50</sup>

Hindutva, like its implacable opponent Nehru, deplored the linguistic carving up of India, for the same reasons, but with colourful rhetoric. They declared their commitment to “One Country, One Legislature, One Executive Centre running the administration throughout the country—an expression of one homogeneous solid nation in Bharat.”<sup>51</sup> They denounced notions of pluralism, that “Indians are not one people at all in the sense of the unity of the people of England or France or Germany, but a conglomeration of numerous peoples having less in common with one another and having more differences with one another than even the peoples inhabiting the various countries of Europe.”<sup>52</sup> Golwalkar complained that the Constituent Assembly has missed the opportunity to make India a unitary state, and, even after the linguistic reorganization had been undertaken, he proposed a total reworking of the Constitution: “Let the Constitution be re-examined and re-drafted, so as to establish this Unitary form of Government and thus effectively disprove the mischievous propaganda indulged in by the British and so unwittingly imbibed by the present leaders, about our being just a juxtaposition of so many distinct ‘ethnic groups’ or ‘nationalities’ happening to live side by side and grouped together by the accident of geographical contiguity and one uniform supreme foreign domination.”<sup>53</sup> Were this to be carried out, he assured his audience, its authors “will be worshipped by

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<sup>50</sup> *Commission on Centre-State Relations* (New Delhi: 1988), chapter 1.

<sup>51</sup> M. S. Golwalkar, *Bunch of Thoughts*, 3<sup>rd</sup> revised and enlarged edn, (Bangalore: Sahitya Sindhu Prakashana, 1996; 1<sup>st</sup> edn 1966), p. 227.

<sup>52</sup> Golwalkar, *Bunch of Thoughts*, p. 222.

<sup>53</sup> Golwalkar, *Bunch of Thoughts*, p. 227.



posterity as modern manifestation of a Shankaracharya, as Bharatiya parallels of an Abraham Lincoln.”<sup>54</sup>

In spite of all such anxieties, India was reconstructed entirely as a nation of linguistic states, albeit with some exceptions as already noted, and Hindutva lived the tension between idealizing homogeneity and realizing its impossibility. Its ideal may have been the administrative parcelling of the country in the manner of France; but when the test came in the form of the linguistic reorganization of States, it surrendered to the pluralism induced by electoral logic, sometimes called democracy, to “positive secularism” and to linguistic diversity.<sup>55</sup> The Hindu Mahasabha did not oppose the linguistic units while reaffirming its faith in a unitary structure; and the Jana Sangh followed suit, even over the trifurcation of Punjab in 1966.<sup>56</sup> From 1967 The Jana Sangh accepted all national languages in the competitive examinations for employment by the State. The Bharatiya Janata Party freely forms coalitions with regional parties, including those with a pronounced nationalist (communal) stamp like the Akali Dal in Punjab and the otherwise nationalist Dravidian parties in Tamil Nadu. In the Northeast it negotiated with Naga insurgents and was seen as favouring a Greater Nagaland at the expense of Manipur, which led to electoral reverses in Manipur in 2002. In 2003 it created the Bodoland Territorial Council; in Kashmir it negotiated with the All Party Hurriyat Conference and conducted a fair election in 2002; and in 2003 it added four more languages to the Eighth Schedule of the Constitution, namely, Bodo, Maithili, Santhali, and Dogri.<sup>57</sup> Hindutva is thus comfortable with the sub-state nationalisms that were structured in the 1950s.

Owing to the investment in nationalism for integration, within India it was not easy to imagine the two levels of nationalism; but

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<sup>54</sup> Golwalkar, *Bunch of Thoughts*, p. 228.

<sup>55</sup> Ramachandra Guha, *India after Gandhi. The History of the World's Largest Democracy* (London: Picador, 2008), p. 755.

<sup>56</sup> See B. D. Graham, *Hindu Nationalism and Indian Politics. The Origins and Development of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 100-111.

<sup>57</sup> See Katharine Adeney, “Hindu Nationalists and Federal Structures in an Era of Regionalism,” in Adeney and Sáez, ed., *Coalition Politics and Hindu Nationalism*, pp. 97-115.

those outside India felt no such inhibition. Hardgrave's work on the Dravidian movement reflected a common international concern about India in these terms: "She poses all too clearly the question whether a multi-national society can become a viable democracy,"<sup>58</sup> echoing Selig Harrison's warnings of 1960.<sup>59</sup> Paul Brass compared India to the Soviet multinational state and unequivocally declared that "India was a developing multinational state" structured through a "dual nationalism, the comfortable accommodation of most Indians to a recognition of themselves as members of two nations: a Sikh, Bengali, or Tamil nation at one level of identity and an Indian nation at another."<sup>60</sup> To Soviet scholars, given their own history, it was almost self-evident that the linguistic state was "not only a major administrative unit but also a form of national statehood."<sup>61</sup>

From the 1980s however, with the stability of the Indian nation for nearly four decades, it was possible to revert to the first phase, of nationalisms at multiple levels; and this would be especially so with the globalization of the 1990s, when once again the concept of the global citizen seemed both real and attractive. This confident re-examination took the form of both a critique of nationalism by the subaltern school and their associates, and a more optimistic projection of this composite two-tiered nationalism by officialdom.

Critically investigating the vast claims of nationalism, Partha Chatterjee cautioned that history could no longer be written as national and regional, that it would be better conceived as national and national, as Indian national and Bengali national, as *bhāratavarṣīya* and Bengali. He has also regretted that "we do

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<sup>58</sup> Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr., "The DMK and the Politics of Tamil Nationalism," *Pacific Affairs*, vol. 37, no. 4, Winter 1964-1965, pp. 396-411, here p. 396, repeated with the insertion "perhaps" before "all too clearly" in Hardgrave, Jr., *The Dravidian Movement*, p. 3.

<sup>59</sup> Selig S. Harrison, *India. The Most Dangerous Decades* (India: Oxford University Press, 1960).

<sup>60</sup> Paul R Brass, *Ethnicity and Nationalism. Theory and Composition* (New Delhi: Sage, 1991), pp. 168-169, and repeated on p. 314.

<sup>61</sup> Cited in K. R. Bombwall, "Regional Parties in Indian Politics: A Preview," in S. Bhatnagar and Pradeep Kumar, eds, *Regional Political Parties in India* (New Delhi: Ess Ess Publications, 1988), pp. 1-16, here p. 2.

not yet have the wherewithal to write these other histories.”<sup>62</sup> Almost in unison, Sudipto Kaviraj rejected the common notion of the region as primordial and the nation as modern, noting instead that they “are both products of the same historical-cultural processes which produced a mapped world out of the earlier fuzzy one.” He reckons that Indian nationalism has been creative for being “able to resolve the potential conflict between regional and ‘Indian’ identity, and arrange them in a stratified order.”<sup>63</sup> The many volumes of *Subaltern Studies*, appearing from 1982, questioned the hegemonic claims of nationalism by suggesting autonomy and contestation from among innumerable subalterns like peasants, lower castes, workers, tribes, minorities, women, marginal groups, and criminals. They revealed the limits of nationalism, the manner in which it was reshaped at various instances, and how it could be frustrated. But the region and its nationalism are missing from this repertoire, which furnishes negative support to Sudipto Kaviraj’s thesis that the region replicated the nation. *Subaltern Studies* was in effect a critique of both levels of nationalism, which was not stated explicitly anywhere save in Kaviraj’s and Chatterjee’s contributions. Outside of *Subaltern Studies*, a well-established authority like K. R. Bombwall did not hesitate to note that “The combined alchemy of history, language, culture and economy has given a unique identity to each of these regions and each of them has become the homeland of a distinct ethno-national community.” He went on to argue that regionalism should no longer be bracketed with communalism and casteism as divisive, that it was essential to a polyethnic conglomerate like India, and that it was time to abandon the opposition of regional to

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<sup>62</sup> Partha Chatterjee, *The Nation and its Fragments. Colonial and Postcolonial Histories* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997; original edn 1993), pp. 114-115; also published as Partha Chatterjee, “The Genealogy of Modern Historiography in Bengal,” in *Subaltern Studies VII. Essays in Honour of Ranajit Guha*, eds, David Arnold, David Hardiman (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1994) pp. 1-49. He has also suggested that Indian nationalism be considered “confederal”, but this would be too weak a term to describe Indian nationalism.

<sup>63</sup> Sudipto Kaviraj, *The Imaginary Institution of India. Politics and Ideas* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), pp. 147-148, 6; earlier presented in Sudipto Kaviraj, “The Imaginary Institution of India,” in *Subaltern Studies, VII. Writings on South Asian History and Society*, eds Partha Chatterjee and Gyanendra Pandey (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 1-39.

national.<sup>64</sup> Alfred Stepan, Juan Linz, and Yogendra Yadav in their collective work admitted that India was a multinational society but denied that it was a multinational state on the ground that such a state was effectively impossible, since, by their definition, several nation-states must come together to form a multinational state, which has not happened democratically; and the non-democratic one of the USSR was excluded from purview.<sup>65</sup>

In a symmetrical process, the official view was that a political problem had subsided into a bureaucratic one. When setting up the States Reorganization Commission in 1953, Nehru had informed both Fazl Ali, the chairman, and K. M. Panikkar, one of the members, that the job of the commission was political, not legal; therefore judges were unsuitable unless they had other qualities, which he had discerned in Fazl Ali, a former judge and currently governor of Orissa.<sup>66</sup> But half a century later, the Republic felt more secure, and the issues appeared legal and administrative, not political. The Venkatachaliah Commission of 2002 reduced political strategy to bureaucratic rationality. The pursuit of unity and integrity was narrowed down to “mechanisms for the assessment of early warning symptoms of social unrest” and bemoaned the “uncoordinated and directionless amalgam of different departments often with overlapping and even mutually conflicting jurisdictions, powers and responsibilities which merely acts as a reaction to problems.”<sup>67</sup> Such banality however breathed political self-confidence. The Commission reflected the spirit of the times by asserting that “there is no dichotomy between a strong Union and strong States. Both are needed.”<sup>68</sup>

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<sup>64</sup> Bombwall, “Regional Parties in Indian Politics: A Preview,” pp. 1-2, 3.

<sup>65</sup> Alfred Stepan, Juan J. Linz, Yogendra Yadav, *Crafting State-Nations. India and Other Multinational Democracies* (Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011), chapter 1.

<sup>66</sup> See Nehru to Fazl Ali, 25 November 1953, and Nehru to K. M. Panikkar, 4 December 1953, SWJN/SS/ vol. 24, pp. 242-244 and 249-251.

<sup>67</sup> *Report of the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution*, 2 vols (New Delhi: March 2002), vol. 1, 2.27 (e).

<sup>68</sup> *Report of the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution*, 2 vols (New Delhi: March 2002), vol, 1, 8.1.5.

In subsequent reflections on the subject, the Government of India assumed a comparably post-nationalist posture. In its report of 2010 on the formation of Telengana, the Sri Krishna Committee admitted that the preoccupation of the 1940s with a strong Centre had given way to a preference for a strong Centre and strong States, and repeatedly spoke with approval of the “sub-nationalism” of Andhra Pradesh.<sup>69</sup> Indian and regional nationalism would flourish together. In 2010, yet another commission on relations between the Centre and States, this time under M. M. Punchhi, a retired chief justice of India, revisited all the questions that the Sarkaria Commission had considered in the 1980s. It recognized that the Sarkaria Commission had been set up under pressure from the opposition parties during the tense eighties and had to deal with the “contradiction” of “nationalism vs regional ethnicism.” The Punchhi Commission however had been ordered in a “passion-free and constraint-free atmosphere” marked also by “accommodative federalism.” It noted the great changes from the nineties leading to “Strong Centre with Strong States”, when liberalization permitted States to take large economic policy initiatives with Central support, and coalition governments at the Centre ensured that the Centre and the States would cooperate, not confront.<sup>70</sup> It was complacent and propagandistic, but it reflected equanimity and political self-assurance withal. The nation with its nations had come to stay.

The puzzling question of why a regional nationalism should integrate with a superior nationalism rather than striking out for sovereignty may be answered in the following ways. With each nation being formed as a State of the Union, the regional national elite secured most of what it aspired to. They gained leadership within a territory defined by a specific culture, whether of language, religion, tribe, or caste; through such domination they could promote forms of cultural and other development as they chose within the limits of the Constitution, and a very liberal Constitution permitted everything short of the

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<sup>69</sup> *Committee for Consultations on the Situation in Andhra Pradesh. Report* (New Delhi: 2010), vol. 1, pp. 434, 40-42, 48.

<sup>70</sup> See *Commission on Centre-State Relations. Report*. Vol. 1, Evolution of Centre-State Relations in India (New Delhi: March 2010) [Punchhi Commission], pp. 79-87.

persecution of minorities and secession; and they were guaranteed in return the support from the Union of all its formidable instruments, namely the bureaucracy, the armed forces, the police, the judiciary, the academic world, with the auxiliaries of the media and entertainment industry, which were formally not instruments of State but were constituents of the power structures that ruled the country. Each regional party, however parochial it might appear to the metropolitan vision, at some time or the other could exercise decisive power at the Centre, through coalition, through lobbying, through the salience of being a minority, all of which permitted it a wider field of action and influence than its regional name and programme suggested. Regional nationalism realized early on that their greatest hope lay in recruiting the Centre to their cause rather than in challenging it. Its programmes flowed into securing funds for sundry schemes, for development projects, for special packages, for extra consideration during the annual disasters of flood and drought, for employment preferences for certain categories like minorities, displaced persons, veterans of the armed forces. Through these methods regional groups and lobbies secured immense advantages for themselves in the name of a regional agenda but substantially at the expense of a regional agenda. As for the sensitive question of language and culture, it ceased to be a problem from the late sixties by when Hindi enthusiasts were firmly rebuffed by Tamil nationalism. Beyond that, every region was equally subject to the global domination of English; it was a grievance, but a grievance that could not be directed at any one part of India or even at the Union government, since American power and colonial history were the combined cause of this cultural misery. In this matter India escapes the fate of the Soviet Union where Russian domination could be targeted as oppressive; the Indian situation is more like the European where numerous languages have to accept each other but submit to the global supremacy of American English. The fact that much of India, though not all of it, is possessed of Sanskritic high culture may appear to be a factor that contributes to such unity; but too much must not be made of it since Europe also submitted to a common Latin high culture while plunging into its murderous nationalisms.

The associated puzzling question is why a nation should foster regional nations. If the nation be understood as a single political territory with a single culture, Indian cultural diversity poses the challenge of creating such a single culture. It can be only a composite one of the many cultures within India, not a uniform one. A bureaucracy reproduces itself downward by dividing its country into territorial units, usually called provinces, further subdivided into districts or their equivalents. In like manner the composite nation pulsates downward through culturally unified territorial units; if they do not exist, they are fashioned for the purpose. Indian nationalism pursued its mobilization through such a process, which continues to this day. These secondary levels of nationalism would be possessed of the same type of legitimacy and engage in the same kind of mobilization as a pan-Indian nationalism; but it would do so only within its own territory. The regional nationalism would be the vital link in the chain of imperious demand from above and importunate demand from below. This function could not be discharged by the other entities that are usually cited as constituting India, the caste and community, tribe and religion, or for that matter by other bodies like class and voluntary associations or even by purely territorial administrative units like the presidencies or certain provinces. Only a cultural territory can focus affective loyalties in the manner of the nation: caste, tribe, religion, and class fragment the territory; and the purely administrative unit lacks cultural unity. It was always a risk for the nation above to promote nations below, for the regional nation could well aspire to sovereignty and be cultivated for that purpose by external powers. The story of Punjab, Kashmir, Nagaland, and Mizoram amply illustrate that problem. But the risk could not be avoided as the cultural diversity of the country made such regional nations imperative. With increasing national integration, furthered by globalization, the future may well be a common culture divided only by language, as in Europe, but unlike Europe, with a single state.

This nation of nations is unique in the world as the largest and so far the most successful example of a nationalism integrating a host of other nationalisms. But its significance has been obscured for a number of good reasons. The first was the polemic around the two-nation theory. This theory is not so much wrong as

inadequate, for the subcontinent is home to many more than two nations. There was no way of determining in advance how many sovereign nations would be formed out of this welter. In the event, instead of one, first two and then three have emerged, and so far all attempts at carving out more have been fought off. The preoccupation with one and then two nations has dulled our awareness of the multiplicity of nations. The second was the trauma of Partition. Any nationalism that seemed to call into question the supremacy of a pan-Indian nationalism seemed an augury of another partition and its attendant horrors. For that reason, the integration of regional nationalism in the constitutional structure has been regarded as a concession to popular demand or a clever compromise that turned out to be successful. But notions of concession and compromise hinder our constructing a possible model of composite nationalism(s) at multiple levels. As the world is both integrating and is composed of nations, such composite nationalisms are essential to the ideal of global citizenship and of a single world order. During the twentieth century the Soviet, Indian, and European Unions were the largest such experiments; the Soviet Union fell victim to the Cold War, and only the Indian and European Unions remain as projects on such a vast scale. Of the two the Indian Union has progressed far ahead of the European Union in effecting a democratic union out of immensely greater diversity than Europe has had to contend with. Advocates for the European Union have been enthusiastic about offering it as a model of the world state and society while regretting that the process of its formation has been more bureaucratic than democratic;<sup>71</sup> the Indian Union as of now may have something more to offer.

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<sup>71</sup> Jürgen Habermas, *Europe. The Faltering Project*, translated from the German edition of 2008 by Ciaran Cronin (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2009); Jürgen Habermas, *The Crisis of the European Union. A Response*, translated from the German by Ciaran Cronin (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012).



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